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Abstract 
 
 
Certain prominent environmental theorists have accounted for and/or addressed our unmitigated 
environmentally damaging behavior in cognitive terms, related to a common (misplaced) belief 
that economic development and technological advancement, among other contemporary 
processes, will solve our environmental problems. However, I argue that they have not given due 
consideration to the complex (predominantly non-cognitive/non-conscious) discursive 
constitution of the individual, and thus seem to adhere to a Kantian notion of autonomy that 
overlooks such non-cognitive factors. Focusing on this non-cognitive aspect of discursive 
constitution, I ascribe our ecological apathy mainly to the fact that we have been discursively 
constituted as docile bodies and prostrate subjects. Further, I argue that, because this process of 
discursive constitution is primarily non-cognitive, any attempts to remedy our ecological apathy 
at a cognitive level alone will not be completely effective.  
Consequently, I propose that a more effective way of fostering pro-environmental 
dispositions may be for individuals to engage in an ethic/culture of the self that is not exclusively 
conceptual in orientation, and which is centered on the practice of a counter-discourse that does 
not constitute the individual as docile and prostrate nor negate the individual’s dependence on the 
environment. Alternatively, in order to engender pro-environmental civilizational change, it may 
be necessary to operate within the discursive parameters of dominant/popular institutions, in 
order to incrementally alter the discourses employed within, and disseminated through, these 
institutions, in a manner that would lead to the problematization, rather than the endorsement, of 
the ecologically deleterious technological, political and economic trajectories of our time. 
 
 
Key words: archaeology, development, discourse, docility, efficiency, environmentalism, 
genealogy, prostration, subjectivity 
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Introduction 
 
 
Only a few years into the twenty-first century, we are already witnessing a dramatic rise in 
climatic anomalies, species extinction, potentially irreversible environmental degradation, 
warnings concerning resource depletion, and conflicts over whom to hold responsible for our 
critical environmental state of affairs. In scientific circles, entities such as the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) have established that average global air and ocean temperatures 
have increased, that natural systems are being influenced by regional climate changes, and that 
because of the long-term effects of climate change, anthropogenic warming, rises in sea level and 
extreme weather events will increase for centuries even if we curb our pollution emissions 
immediately.1
However, in a highly contentious and politically charged field of debate, it is at least to 
some extent possible to attribute, what may be termed our ‘ecological apathy,’ to our uncertainty 
concerning who or what we should blame for these environmental problems, and how these 
problems should consequently be addressed. Notably, in their Paths to a Green World: The 
Political Economy of the Global Environment, Jennifer Clapp and Peter Dauvergne show how the 
environmental movement itself is plagued by precisely such uncertainty. That is, they thematize 
the degree to which discursive conflicts take place among environmentalists themselves, in 
relation to the question of whether economic globalization, technological proliferation, etcetera, 
constitute the causes of, or the cures for, our environmental (and social) problems.
 Our environmental problems have been accorded similar attention in both the 
academic realm and, to a certain degree, in the media—with the consequence that we cannot 
easily ascribe our failure to change our un-ecological perspectives and patterns of behavior to an 
information deficit pertaining to these problems. 
2
                                                 
1 For the most recent detailed report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), see IPCC 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), “Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report” (2007). Available from 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf.  
 And further, 
with reference to these theoretical skirmishes, Clapp and Dauvergne convincingly demarcate 
what may broadly be termed the contemporary environmental battleground, by classifying 
environmentalists as adhering to clashing ‘market liberal,’ ‘institutionalist,’ 
‘bioenvironmentalist,’ and ‘social green,’ worldviews. In short, they advance that while ‘market 
liberals’ promote the idea that global economic growth can and will solve our environmental and 
2 Jennifer Clapp and Peter Dauvergne, Paths to a Green World: The Political Economy of the Global Environment 
(Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2005). 
 10 
social ills in the long run, ‘institutionalists’ add that we need to strengthen global institutions and 
norms in order to direct this global economy. In contrast to both of these perspectives, 
‘bioenvironmentalists’ and ‘social greens’ generally agree that the neoclassical economic 
assumption of infinite economic growth, and our culture of consumerism which has sprung from 
this assumption, are some of the primary causes of our problems in the first place and cannot, 
therefore, be prescribed as remedies for them. Consequently, bioenvironmentalists and social 
greens focus much of their attention on both undermining the above-mentioned assumption, and 
addressing the problem of overconsumption—at the level of the individual. 
Because my own perspective on our environmental crisis is generally consonant with 
what Clapp and Dauvergne identify as the bioenvironmentalist and social green worldviews, and 
because the focus of my dissertation consequently falls on the need to address the ecological 
apathy of the individual, rather than on any consideration of the possible long-term merits of 
either unrestrained economic growth or improved institutional cooperation on issues of 
sustainability, what interests me is the approach adopted specifically by bioenvironmentalists and 
social greens when they address their reader—the individual they regard as an important agent of 
change—in an effort to promote their particular perspective on how we can solve our 
environmental (and social) problems. 
Within this dissertation, I advance that a common approach adopted by 
bioenvironmentalists and social greens is one informed, either implicitly or explicitly, by the 
notion that individuals remain ecologically apathetic because they adhere to what may be termed 
the ‘dominant social paradigm’ (DSP) of contemporary society—through the discursive lens of 
which the technological, political and economic trajectories of the present are framed as generally 
benevolent rather than as environmentally and socially malevolent. Admittedly, the existence of 
an inverse relationship, between the degree of an individual’s adherence to the DSP on the one 
hand, and the level of his/her environmental concern on the other, would only be 
comprehensively addressed by William Kilbourne, Suzanne Beckmann and Eva Thelen in 2002. 
That is, in their 2002 article, “The Role of the Dominant Social Paradigm in Environmental 
Attitudes: A Multinational Examination,” Kilbourne and his colleagues would identify the 
technological, political and economic dimensions of the DSP of contemporary society, and 
empirically assess how the beliefs associated with each of these dimensions inhibit the 
development of environmental concern on the part of contemporary individuals.3
                                                 
3 William E. Kilbourne, Suzanne C. Beckmann and Eva Thelen, “The Role of the Dominant Social Paradigm in 
Environmental Attitudes: A Multinational Examination,” Journal of Business Research 55/3 (2002): 193-204. 
 However, in 
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bioenvironmentalist and social green writings that preceded this comprehensive study of the DSP, 
the same logic manifests itself. In short, what is evident from such writings is that the theorists in 
question make the implicit assumption that the more an individual clings to dominant societal 
discourses that advance technological proliferation, contemporary political systems, and liberal 
economics as universally advantageous, the less they will be concerned about the environmental 
and social problems of the present—even though these problems are in fact caused by existing 
technological, political and economic processes. And, accordingly, within such 
bioenvironmentalist and social green writings, the legitimacy of what is tantamount to the DSP of 
contemporary society, including its technological, political and economic dimensions, is 
systematically problematized, arguably in an effort to lessen readers’ adherence to the DSP and in 
so doing augment their environmental concern. 
Taking Clapp and Dauvergne’s discursive contextualization of environmentalism, and 
Kilbourne and his colleagues’ comprehensive study of the DSP, as my points of departure 
(Chapter One), I proceed to analyze the most recent (single-authored) texts of two prominent 
environmental theorists, namely those of the social green, Wolfgang Sachs, and of the 
bioenvironmentalist, Thomas Princen (Chapter Two). Principally, through my examination of 
Sachs’ Planet Dialectics: Explorations in Environment and Development on the one hand,4 and 
Princen’s The Logic of Sufficiency on the other,5
                                                 
4 Wolfgang Sachs, Planet Dialectics: Explorations in Environment and Development (London: Zed Books, 1999). 
 I attempt to thematize the degree to which these 
texts operate with hypotheses concerning certain of our thoughts, ideas and beliefs that can be 
directly related to the DSP of contemporary society. Otherwise stated, I undertake to highlight the 
lengths to which Sachs and Princen go in order to undermine the legitimacy of our continued 
belief in the merit of, among other contemporary processes endorsed within the DSP, open-ended 
economic development and the drive towards ever greater efficiency. For example, while Sachs 
would render an archaeological analysis of the concept of development, and in so doing highlight 
its arbitrary construction and frequently concealed negative repercussions, Princen would furnish 
readers with a historical overview of the concept of efficiency, bringing to light just how young 
this concept really is, how arbitrary its origins are, and how dismal its effects have proved to be. I 
hold that these studies, carried out by Sachs and Princen, are of exceptional importance, not only 
owing to their accuracy and clarity, but also owing to the fact that they inspire in the reader a 
skepticism concerning all of those contemporary developments—such as economic globalization 
and technological proliferation—that are usually framed as progressive and benign. 
5 Thomas Princen, The Logic of Sufficiency (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2005). 
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However, I do contend that when it comes to addressing (what may be perceived as) our 
unwillingness to change our environmentally damaging behavior, a very important element is 
missing from Sachs’ and Princen’s approach. This is because, insofar as these theorists, at least in 
the above-mentioned texts, principally work with hypotheses concerning our thoughts, ideas and 
beliefs in relation to what are tantamount to the technological, political and economic dimensions 
of the DSP—and thereby operate at the general level of cognitive content—they do not give due 
consideration to the complexities of the predominantly non-cognitive/non-conscious processes 
involved in the discursive constitution of individual subjectivity, and thereby miss an important 
dimension in the explanation of human behavior. Furthermore, this focus on cognitive content 
suggests that these theorists adhere to a modernist paradigm/episteme dominated by systematic 
reason, which presupposes the Kantian conception of autonomy: individuals, as rational beings 
who may ‘give themselves the law,’ are situated in a position external to discourse. In short, what 
this conception of autonomy implies is that individuals can act perfectly correctly on the basis of 
their own rational assessment of available information, and can be certain that other rational 
beings who calculate equally correctly will come to the same decision. It appears as though Sachs 
and Princen harbor just such a Kantian conception of autonomy, as their writings seem to suggest 
that once we are made sufficiently aware of the deleterious nature of the technological, political 
and economic trends within the contemporary world, and once we have been shown that it is 
possible (and indeed ethically imperative) to extricate ourselves from the technocentrism, 
acquisitiveness, and economism of the present, we should, as rational and autonomous beings, be 
able to act in the interest of safeguarding environmental and social wellbeing. And, correlatively, 
it appears as though these theorists, at least in part, implicitly attribute our ecological apathy to 
the fact that not enough focused critical discourse—undermining the legitimacy of the 
technological, political and economic trajectories of the contemporary era—has been generated to 
convince people to change their perspectives, and with these, their patterns of behavior. 
Instead of proceeding along the (nonetheless important) discursive trajectory initiated by 
theorists such as Sachs and Princen, through continuing to focus at a general level of cognitive 
content on why belief in, for instance, the benevolence of development and efficiency, is 
problematic from an environmental point of view, I focus my efforts on the 
discursive/psychological level of the individual (Chapter Three). The aim of this undertaking is to 
complement the valuable work of Sachs and Princen by considering the discursive constitution of 
the individual as a factor in explaining our ecological apathy, precisely because the process of 
discursive constitution principally operates at a non-cognitive/non-conscious level. In short, to 
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account for our ecological apathy, I appropriate the arguments, made by the French philosopher 
and social theorist, Michel Foucault, concerning the way in which the discourses and micro-
techniques of what Foucault terms ‘disciplinary power’ and ‘bio-power,’ operate to constitute 
contemporary individuals as inherently docile, prostrate, and infantilized—which severely 
problematizes any attempt to project onto individuals a Kantian conception of autonomy, in terms 
of which individuals are conceived as rational beings, situated in a position undetermined by 
discourse, who give themselves the (moral) law.6
                                                 
6 The principal texts that I draw on in this part of my argument are Foucault’s Discipline and Punish: The Birth of 
the Prison, and The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality: Volume One. Michel Foucault, Discipline and 
Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin, 1991); and Michel Foucault, The Will to 
Knowledge: The History of Sexuality: Volume One, trans. Robert Hurley (London: Penguin, 1998). 
 In other words, on the basis of Foucaultian 
theory, I put forward a more complex/nuanced account for our ecological apathy: rather than 
ascribing our ecological apathy predominantly to the fact that our faith in the technological, 
political and economic trajectories of the present has not been sufficiently problematized, I 
principally ascribe such ‘apathy’ to an actual incapacity, on our part, to change our behavior—
this, owing to the fact that through the discourses and micro-techniques of disciplinary/bio-
power, we have been constituted as markedly ‘non-autonomous’ beings. In this respect, my 
argument involves an unambiguous rejection of the (Kantian) notion that individuals, as rational 
and autonomous beings, can act perfectly correctly on the basis of their own rational assessment 
of available information. That is, in opposition to this perspective, I contend that even if we were 
conceptually furnished with sufficient information to unequivocally undermine, at a cognitive 
level, the legitimacy of our adherence to what is tantamount to the DSP of contemporary society, 
we would still not change our behavior—because we have, at a non-cognitive/non-conscious 
level, been constituted through dominant discourses as docile, prostrate, and infantilized. 
Subsequent to this study of the discursive constitution of individual subjectivity, I reflect upon 
the ways in which the writings of Sachs and Princen in certain respects mirror, and in other 
respects differ from, Foucaultian theory. On the one hand, by thematizing the degree to which 
Sachs’ and Princen’s writings approximate the theorizations of Foucault, I am able to legitimate 
my claim of complementing the work of these environmental theorists through a Foucaultian 
consideration of the implications, for individual subjectivity, of the discourses and micro-
techniques of disciplinary/bio-power. Yet, on the other hand, by highlighting the fact that, despite 
such approximation, neither theorist discards his arguably Kantian disposition in favor of 
embracing a more circumspect approach to the issue of individual autonomy, I am able to justify 
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my claim concerning the necessity of reconsidering the approach to be adopted in order to effect 
pro-environmental civilizational change.  
In the final chapter of this dissertation (Chapter Four), I undertake precisely such a 
reconsideration of approach, by exploring the possible ways in which one could work against the 
continued discursive constitution, of contemporary subjectivity, around docility, prostration and 
infantilization. Again drawing on Foucaultian theory, I advance that although we are constituted, 
at a largely non-cognitive/non-conscious level, through existing discourses from which we cannot 
simply dissociate ourselves, we nevertheless can revolt against the specific configuration of 
discourses that have robbed us of our capacity for relative autonomy. That is, while it is fair to 
argue that individuals, as discursive animals, can never completely divorce themselves from, or, 
as it were, ‘stand outside of,’ discourse, it is still possible for them to reconstitute their 
subjectivity with reference to alternative discourses. However, very importantly, precisely 
because individuals are not the rational and autonomous beings that Kant supposed them to be, 
such discursive reconstitution cannot be effected through cognitive deliberation alone. Instead, as 
I attempt to show through my exploration of the practices of the first/second century C.E. 
Hellenistic/Roman ‘cultures of the self,’ the reconstitution of subjectivity requires both 
conceptual effort and practical application—it “involves rejoining oneself as the end and object 
of a technique of life, an art of living,” through exercises of listening, reading, writing, speaking, 
meditating, and application, that do not culminate in “the objectification of the self in a true 
discourse, but the subjectivation of a true discourse in a practice and exercise of oneself on 
oneself.”7
                                                 
7 Michel Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France: 1981-1982, trans. Graham 
Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 333. 
 In other words, subjectivation, or the discursive reconstitution of subjectivity, is 
dependent on engagement in both complex theoretical deliberation and arduous practical work; 
and this necessity of combining conceptual endeavor with practice makes it an extremely difficult 
undertaking—especially in the contemporary era, within which precisely those disciplinary/bio-
power discourses and micro-techniques that are unequivocally endorsed, are the ones that 
individuals wishing to reconstitute their subjectivity, in the interest of cultivating relative 
autonomy, would have to oppose in thought as well as in action. Owing to such difficulties, I 
argue that unless an individual is born into (marginal) cultures/traditions that prize independence 
and environmental care and that encourage the formation of a corresponding type of subjectivity, 
or unless an individual is possessed of the personal capacity for, and enjoys external conditions 
conducive to, the appropriation of an alternative ethic of existence through which he/she can 
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cultivate such qualities, any such discursive reconstitution of subjectivity, in the midst of 
disciplinary/bio-power society, is nearly impossible to effect.8
That said, though, as I indicate in the Conclusion of this dissertation, it may be possible to 
engender a mass reconstitution of subjectivity, in the interest of fostering in individuals the 
nuanced autonomy necessary for pro-environmental change, through altering the modi operandi 
of dominant/popular institutions themselves—institutions that, at present, under the impetus of 
disciplinary/bio-power, play a key role in the production of contemporary subjectivity around 
notions of docility, prostration, and infantilization. Here, I argue that nothing short of waging a 
form of guerrilla warfare against, but within the discursive parameters of, dominant/popular 
institutions, would suffice to engender any broad-spectrum formation of a type of subjectivity 
other than that of the ‘non-autonomous’ disciplinary/bio-power variety. This would involve 
furtively yet steadily encouraging the abandonment of the (disciplinary/bio-power) operations of 
these institutions, through instigating incremental shifts in the discursive regimes of, and 
prompting the discarding of the micro-techniques employed within, these institutions, which 
together operate to render people into little more than automatons in the service of the 
technological, political and economic processes of our time. The media, the school (and by 
extension the university), and religion, are, arguably, the three most viable sites for engendering 
an (anti-disciplinary) transformation of subjectivity en masse; however, altering the orientation of 
these institutions would by no means be easy. In the main, the contemporary mass media 
disseminate discourses that entail no problematization of the technological, political and 
economic dimensions of our societies, nor of the (correlative) approach that we adopt in relation 
to our own identity, to our dealings with others, and to the natural world surrounding us. Schools 
are presently saturated with discourses and micro-techniques that constitute children as docile 
and prostrate, in the ultimate interest of growing an ever more obedient and efficient workforce. 
And the institution of religion is similarly plagued by barriers that prevent the faithful from 
cultivating relative autonomy and environmental care—the most notable of which are 
anthropocentrism, otherworldliness, obedience, and commercialization. These obstacles to pro-
environmental civilizational change may seem overwhelming, but, as I endeavor to show, 
because of the critical role that institutions play in the discursive production of individuals, and 
because of the difficulty of fostering (anti-disciplinary) types of subjectivity in the absence of 
 
                                                 
8 Importantly, my arguments concerning the conditions necessary for the formation of types of subjectivity that are 
not dictated by disciplinary/bio-power, find corroboration not only in the example of the individuals/groups that 
Sachs and Princen posit as exemplars of pro-environmental behavior, but also in the example of Sachs and Princen 
themselves. 
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institutional support, finding a practical means of surmounting these obstacles within institutions 
is a matter of the utmost urgency. 
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Chapter One: Contextualizing contemporary environmental 
discourse 
 
 
In Paths to a Green World: The Political Economy of the Global Environment, Clapp and 
Dauvergne undertake a study of contemporary environmental discourse, in order to make sense 
of its theoretical heterogeneity and, in so doing, to offer an explanation for the dissidence that 
characterizes environmentalism today. In short, within their text, rather than advocating a 
particular perspective on how the global environment is affected by technology, politics and 
economics, they adopt an impartial stance, delineating four worldviews on this issue and 
examining the particular logic of each. The worldviews that Clapp and Dauvergne present are, on 
the one hand, those of the ‘market liberals’ and the ‘institutionalists,’ who “do not reject the way 
we have organized political and economic life on the planet,” and on the other hand, those of the 
‘social greens’ and the ‘bioenvironmentalists,’ who reject the existing politico-economic 
organization of society.9 And while, as Clapp and Dauvergne themselves admit, these categories 
are ideal insofar as it is improbable that any environmentalist would adhere to the tenets of one 
particular worldview exclusively, they are a useful means of demarcating what may be termed the 
environmental battleground of the contemporary era. That is, these categories bring to light the 
fact that environmentalists, far from adhering to a uniform set of beliefs, are in constant conflict 
with one another over both the causes of our environmental problems and how these problems 
should consequently be addressed. Thus, the value of Clapp and Dauvergne’s Paths to a Green 
World derives from the way in which this text clarifies contemporary environmental discourse, 
which would otherwise quite rightly remain “a seemingly unmanageable avalanche of conflicting 
information and analysis.”10
                                                 
9 Clapp and Dauvergne, Paths to a Green World, 8. 
 The following summary, of the main conflicts between the four 
environmental worldviews identified by Clapp and Dauvergne, admittedly only scratches the 
surface of their authoritative study, but it suffices as the first of two steps towards providing a 
context for my examination, in Chapter Two, of the works of the social green, Wolfgang Sachs, 
and the bioenvironmentalist, Thomas Princen. The second step towards providing such a context, 
which is also to be carried out within this chapter, involves reviewing the conflicting perspectives 
of market liberals, institutionalists, social greens and bioenvironmentalists, on the possible role of 
10 Ibid., 3. 
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the individual in solutions to our environmental problems, and considering the ‘paradigmatic’ 
difficulties that may have to be overcome if the individual is indeed to play an active role in 
facilitating environmental (and social) wellbeing. 
 
 
Clashes of belief on the contemporary environmental battleground 
 
As indicated above, within their text, Clapp and Dauvergne attempt to unpack contemporary 
environmental discourse—and perhaps the most important result of their study is their disclosure 
of the fact that environmentalism, far from being something homogenous and unified, is 
inherently diverse and marked by contestation. That is, they show that environmentalists may 
adhere to any of a number of perspectives, on the causes of and the solutions to our 
environmental problems, each of which is based on very specific assumptions, theories and 
values. Generally speaking, those environmentalists who adhere to what Clapp and Dauvergne 
identify as the ‘market liberal’ worldview, advance that economic growth will eventually remedy 
our environmental and social problems. In turn, those who subscribe to the ‘institutionalist’ 
worldview, although not completely dismissing the market liberal standpoint, argue that 
economic growth must be controlled and directed by global institutions in the interest of 
effectively addressing our contemporary environmental and social concerns. However, those 
environmentalists who adhere to the ‘social green’ and ‘bioenvironmentalist’ worldviews, 
unequivocally reject the ‘economistic’ orientation of the market liberals and the 
institutionalists,11
                                                 
11 In his “Ecology, Education and the Real World,” Henryk Skolimowski defines economism as “a philosophical 
doctrine which claims (implicitly or explicitly) that economics . . . determines the structure and the ethos of society 
and should be unconditionally obeyed for it is our god.” Henryk Skolimowski, “Ecology, Education and the Real 
World,” Trumpeter 8/3 (1991). Available from 
http://trumpeter.athabascau.ca/index.php/trumpet/rt/printerFriendly/456/754. It is plausible to argue that market 
liberals and, albeit to a lesser degree, institutionalists, adhere to this doctrine, owing to their belief that economic 
growth constitutes the cure for environmental and social ills. 
 and instead argue that our environmental and social problems will only be 
solved if widespread societal reform is carried out in direct opposition to the technological, 
political and economic status quo. From these general differences alone, it is clear that 
contemporary environmentalism is a veritable battleground; but it is to the finer points of the 
conflict between environmentalists—such as their complex disputes concerning the 
environmental and social impact of globalization, economic growth, and global trade, investment, 
and financing—that we now turn. 
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Conflicting perspectives on globalization 
 
Both market liberals and institutionalists see globalization—which increasingly engenders 
political, economic, and cultural homogeneity worldwide—as crucial to both the generation of 
wealth and environmental wellbeing. That is, market liberals and institutionalists argue that 
sufficient funds are generated through (economic) globalization to raise standards of living 
worldwide, and to finance environmental improvements. However, while market liberals argue 
that environmental improvement constitutes a natural consequence of the machinations of the 
free market economy, institutionalists caution that strong global institutions and agreements are 
needed to guide economic globalization in the interest of specifically ensuring environmental 
wellbeing. Nevertheless, market liberals and institutionalists offer up a uniform response to 
accusations concerning the (undeniable) negative environmental effects of economic 
globalization, such as air and water pollution. In short, adherents to these two worldviews share 
the contention that while some environmental problems are certainly created through economic 
globalization, these problems must be approached from a historical perspective that brings into 
conspicuousness the degree to which the life of humankind has improved in recent times, as a 
direct consequence of economic globalization. That is, they argue that if one juxtaposes the 
existing situation to conditions at the beginning of the twentieth century, it becomes evident that 
food production has increased to such an extent that far fewer people suffer from malnourishment 
today, that medical care has vastly improved the lives of millions of people, and that life 
expectancy has also increased, as has the world population (growing from three billion in 1959 to 
six billion in 1999).12
Further, both market liberals and institutionalists contend that the global community has 
proved itself perfectly capable of solving any foreseeable major environmental problems through 
technological means—although, it must be added, institutionalists worry that the global 
marketplace may not distribute the benefits of such technologies equally. As proof of our 
capacity to solve environmental problems through technology, market liberals and 
institutionalists frequently invoke the global cooperative effort that was undertaken to reduce the 
amount of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) released into the atmosphere. That is, they emphasize that 
once it had been discovered, in 1974, that CFCs deplete the ozone layer, and once a hole 
 
                                                 
12 U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division, “World Population Information” (2008), International Data Base (IDB). 
Available from http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/worldpopinfo.html. 
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(thinning) in the ozone layer was observed around 1985, a momentous global endeavor was 
initiated in the interest of drastically reducing CFC production, and ultimately concluded with the 
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer in 1985, and the Montreal Protocol of 
1987. 
In contrast to the above stance adopted by market liberals and institutionalists, social 
greens and bioenvironmentalists see globalization as a negative force, arguing that it is the root 
cause of numerous environmental problems and social ills. In other words, although they agree 
with market liberals and institutionalists that globalization fosters economic growth, for them 
such growth, firstly, has an environmentally negative impact, because its stimulation of 
overconsumption has lead to an unprecedented diminishment of natural resources and to the rapid 
filling of waste sinks.13
 Accordingly, unlike market liberals and institutionalists who argue that the negative 
environmental effects of globalization must be approached from an (anthropocentric) historical 
perspective, bioenvironmentalists, in particular, stress that its effects must instead be considered 
from a perspective centered on geological time. In short, bioenvironmentalists argue that when 
the effects of globalization are contextualized in this manner, they are shown to be disastrous, 
because what is revealed is that the population explosion that has occurred during the age of 
globalization has pushed the earth beyond its carrying capacity. What bioenvironmentalists mean 
by this is that our (finite) planet is expected to provide resources for rapidly increasing numbers 
of consumers, but that it simply cannot continue to do so indefinitely. For instance, within the last 
century alone, global water consumption has increased dramatically, as has water scarcity; 
wetlands as well as forests have been disappearing at an alarming rate; and global marine fish 
stocks have been reduced to precarious levels.
 Secondly, they argue that the economic growth that proceeds from 
globalization has negative social implications, as well. In this regard, while social greens advance 
that economic growth engenders and/or exacerbates social inequality, which, in turn, intensifies 
environmental problems, bioenvironmentalists emphasize that economic growth acts as a catalyst 
for population growth, with equally dire environmental consequences. 
14
 
 And when one contextualizes this human impact 
on the environment within the framework of geological time, the results are frightening—as 
Louis Pojman explains, if 
                                                 
13 That is, as Wolfgang Sachs argues, “from the local up to the global level, it has become evident in many instances 
that resources (water, timber, oil, minerals, etc.), sites (land for mines, settlements, infrastructure), and sinks (soils, 
oceans, atmosphere) for the natural inputs of economic growth are becoming scarce” (PD, 166). 
14 Clapp and Dauvergne, Paths to a Green World, 35. 
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we compacted the history of the Earth into a movie lasting one year, running 146 years per second, life would 
not appear until March, multicellular organisms not until November, dinosaurs not until December 13 . . . 
mammals not until December 15, Homo sapiens (our species) not until 11 minutes before midnight of 
December 31, and civilization not until one minute before the movie ended. Yet in a very short time, say less 
than 200 years, a mere 0.000002% of Earth’s life, humans have become capable of seriously altering the 
entire biosphere. In some respects we have already altered it more profoundly than it has changed in the past 
billion years.15
 
 
While social greens similarly emphasize the deterioration of the environment during the age of 
globalization, they point to inequality rather than to the population explosion as the main driver 
of such deterioration. This is because, from the perspective of the social greens, the majority of 
our environmental and social ills are caused by the behavior of affluent populations of the 
North—that overconsume, pollute, and exploit the natural environments and the poor populations 
of the South for their own financial gain. Thus, social greens argue that even though, in 
comparison to conditions at the beginning of the twentieth century, life may well be better for 
individuals residing in wealthy countries, it is far worse for those who inhabit poor countries 
because of the inequality produced through (economic) globalization. For example, every year, 
while over eight hundred million people go malnourished in the developing world, in the 
developed world hundreds of thousands die of causes related to “obesity and physical 
inactivity.”16
Finally, while social greens and bioenvironmentalists do not reject the idea that we need 
new institutions to help remedy our environmental and social problems, they do not share the 
institutionalists’ faith in the capacity of institutions to guide globalization, because they believe 
that globally influential institutions such as the World Bank and the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) will always prioritize capitalist interests over environmental or social concerns. 
Moreover, neither social greens nor bioenvironmentalists share the market liberals’ and the 
institutionalists’ conviction that our environmental (and social) problems can be solved through 
technology and modern science alone. Rather, they believe that we need to radically transform 
the entire global economy, otherwise so-called technological and scientific solutions to 
environmental problems will continue to amount to little more than ‘bandage treatment.’ In this 
regard, social greens and bioenvironmentalists argue that some of the ‘solutions’ that have to date 
been provided, have simply involved the deflection of the negative environmental impact of 
 
                                                 
15 Louis P. Pojman, Global Environmental Ethics (Mountain View: Mayfield, 2000), 1. 
16 Clapp and Dauvergne, Paths to a Green World, 36-37. 
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globalization into another environment or into the future. For example, these ‘solutions’ have 
often entailed little more than the substitution of an environmentally harmful substance, used 
within the broadly un-ecological consumerist economy, with an environmentally benign 
substance, to be used within this same un-ecological consumerist economy. This makes social 
greens and bioenvironmentalists critical of the claim, made by market liberals and 
institutionalists, that the global community has proven itself capable of solving environmental 
problems—a claim made in virtue of the successful global cooperative effort to reduce the 
amount of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) released into the atmosphere. In short, while they rightly 
grant that the success of the CFC endeavor was primarily facilitated through technology (i.e. by 
the production of a substitute for CFCs), they assert that the CFC case in no way proves that we 
will, through technology, be able to solve all future environmental problems. For one, the 
affordability of the substitute for CFCs was likely of key importance in the decision to abandon 
CFC production, which carries the implication that this endeavor may not have been successful if 
the substitute had proved to be more expensive to manufacture. Also, for social greens and 
bioenvironmentalists, simply substituting one chemical for another is hardly an adequate long-
term solution to our environmental problems—many of which are far more complex and their 
processes and effects far more uncertain than those bound up with CFC production. And further 
still, neither social greens nor bioenvironmentalists acquiesce to the idea that the benefits of any 
future, environmentally beneficial, technological and scientific innovations will be distributed in 
an egalitarian manner. Judging by current trends, these benefits will be enjoyed by the developed 
world, while those environmentally and socially deleterious industries that are too economically 
indispensable to discard, will continue to be established in the developing world. 
 
Conflicting perspectives on economic growth 
 
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), two dominant global economic 
institutions that hold mainly market liberal perspectives on environmental issues, rank the 
performance (and by implication the wellbeing) of countries in terms of the rate of growth of a 
country’s gross domestic product (GDP) or gross national product (GNP)—both measures of 
which indicate a rise in industrial production and in consumption. While market liberals support 
the continued use of these measures, owing to their conviction that economic growth and 
development are key to human welfare and environmental improvement, certain institutionalists 
have challenged the use of these measures, on the grounds that human development and 
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environmental conditions cannot be measured in terms of the rise or fall of national incomes 
alone. Their discontentment with these measures may have played some role in the later 
establishment of an additional measure—the UN Development Programme’s Human 
Development Index (HDI)—which is said to provide a more holistic assessment of the wellbeing 
of a nation, through its inclusion of non-economic aspects of development, such as educational 
attainment and life expectancy.17
Despite such differences in perspective concerning how development should be measured, 
both market liberals and institutionalists ground their perspectives on economic growth, 
development, and their environmental implications, in neoclassical economics. In short, as Clapp 
and Dauvergne point out, in terms of neoclassical economics, the growth within the economy of a 
country is facilitated through the functioning of the market, understood as a closed “circular flow 
system . . . between firms and households in the wider macroeconomy.”
 
18 As such, the only 
active agents within this system are, on the one hand, the firms that provide products and 
employment opportunities for households, and on the other hand, the households that consume 
the products of, and provide the labor for, the firms. What is notable about this system, then, is 
that the natural environment is generally assumed to be unaffected by the functioning of the 
market, and its resources infinitely available. And even when neoclassical economists do, in 
some instances, link environmental problems to the market, they insist that such problems arise 
from a rare form of market failure, referred to as ‘negative externalities,’ in terms of which the 
negative impact of economic activity, on entities that are not directly involved in that activity, has 
not been taken into account.19
                                                 
17 On the basis of my own experience of social and political conditions in South Africa, I support the argument that 
the HDI measure furnishes a far more holistic (and realistic) assessment of human development than do other, more 
economically-orientated, measures. For instance, while South Africa was placed 44th out of 131 countries in the 
World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report of 2007/2008, in the 2007 HDI it was placed (an 
appalling) 121st out of 175 countries. Rowan Philp, “It’s Better than We Think,” The Times, March 29, 2008. 
 Most market liberals and institutionalists continue to hold the main 
tenets of neoclassical economics as valid, yet many have modified their perspectives somewhat, 
by admitting to the reality of problems such as pollution and resource depletion. One of the 
outcomes of this shift in perspective has been the emergence of ‘environmental economics,’ in 
which attempts are made to integrate environmental factors into the circular flow system 
originally conceived by the neoclassical economists. A further result of this shift in perspective 
18 Clapp and Dauvergne, Paths to a Green World, 87-89. 
19 Pollution constitutes an excellent example of a negative externality: firms frequently retain heavily polluting 
technologies rather than investing in more expensive, clean, technologies—and the clean-up, health and 
environmental costs of their pollution is ‘externalized,’ insofar as these costs are carried not by the polluting firms 
themselves but by governments and by the general public. 
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has been the emergence of a critical attitude, on the part of market liberals and institutionalists, 
towards the idea that environmental harm derives from rare market failures. Many market 
liberals now regard ‘market distortions,’ (i.e. government subsidies used to foster economic 
growth or the diversification of the economy), as a persistent environmental threat, because such 
subsidies often involve charging unrealistically low prices for natural resources, or undercutting 
incentives to use clean technologies. Further, in an effort to effectively address market failures, 
market liberals are calling for the instantiation of market-orientated measures to promote 
environmental efficiencies, and for the rejection of government subsidies. Institutionalists, in 
their turn, are primarily emphasizing the need to establish and/or strengthen international 
cooperation and agreements to ensure, among other things, the transfer of clean technologies to 
developing countries. 
In fact, in almost all of their attempts to address what they perceive as environmentally 
problematic ‘inefficiencies’ in production and consumption, market liberals and institutionalists 
employ the notion of ‘sustainable consumption,’ or ‘eco-efficiency.’ Essentially, this notion is 
based on the idea that economic growth eventually results in two environmentally beneficial 
processes, namely, the dematerialization of production and the optimization of consumption. That 
is to say, market liberals and institutionalists advance that although economic growth and 
pollution are coupled in the short term, in the long term these two phenomena decouple—firstly, 
because developed economies tend to shift towards more service- and information-based 
industries (whence the dematerialization of production), and secondly, because higher per capita 
income instigates a rise in societal concern over environmental standards, which, in turn, puts 
pressure on markets and governments to use clean technologies in the production of goods and 
the rendering of services (whence the optimization of consumption). In addition, as mentioned 
earlier, market liberals and institutionalists also place great faith in technological and scientific 
innovation—for example, many contend that as resources and waste sinks become scarcer, such 
scarcity will instigate innovations in efficient resource use and/or the discovery of alternative 
resources. Arguably, the economist Julian Simon states this faith in future (technological) 
innovation more succinctly (and somewhat more controversially) than most, when he advances 
that “the supply of natural resources is not finite in any economic sense . . . we and our 
descendants can manipulate the elements in such a fashion that we can have all the raw materials 
that we desire at prices ever smaller relative to other goods and to our total incomes.”20
                                                 
20 Julian L. Simon, The Ultimate Resource 2 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 54, 67. 
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Finally, market liberals and institutionalists believe that a lack of, or sluggish, economic 
growth, is the root cause of the most severe instances of environmental degradation. In this 
respect, market liberals focus especially on the environmental impact of poverty, arguing that it is 
primarily because of a lack of economic growth and insecure property rights that the poor, driven 
by inherently short-term thinking, exploit the natural resources at their disposal. Institutionalists, 
similarly, regard the poor as one of the main agents of environmental damage, but they focus 
their criticism on the failure of governments to provide the poor with the education needed to 
expand their horizons. Further, institutionalists link this same educational deficit to excessive 
population growth, which they perceive as another catalyst for environmental degradation. 
In complete opposition to market liberals and institutionalists, who believe that economic 
growth is crucial to human welfare and environmental improvement, social greens and 
bioenvironmentalists argue that economic growth is one of the main causes of human suffering 
and environmental devastation. Owing to this perspective, they also vehemently oppose the 
market liberal idea that one can measure human development and environmental conditions in 
terms of GDP or GNP measures. In short, for social greens and bioenvironmentalists, all that 
these measures indicate are increases in levels of industrial production and consumption—both of 
which in fact exacerbate social exploitation and environmental degradation. Further still, these 
measures undermine the value of subsistence farming and the work done by women, they do not 
incorporate ‘unquantifiable’ elements such as the state of the environment and income 
distribution, and they actually include harmful activities, such as resource extraction and the 
clean-up costs following environmental disasters, as positive economic activities. And while 
social greens and bioenvironmentalists show preference for the HDI measure owing to its 
inclusion of non-economic aspects of development such as educational attainment, they still 
regard it as insufficient, because it incorporates economic growth as a critical element and does 
not factor in any environmental indicators. 
 In turn, ‘ecological economists,’ who are either social green or bioenvironmentalist in 
orientation, reject the neoclassical economic assumptions held by environmental economists who, 
as discussed above, adhere to either market liberal or institutionalist perspectives. Most 
importantly, they oppose the neoclassical economic model discussed earlier, in terms of which 
the economy is conceptualized as a closed, circular flow system between households and firms, 
with the ecosystem only featuring as a subsystem, if it features at all. Instead, ecological 
economists argue, if one takes cognizance of the biological limits of economic growth (i.e. that 
unlimited growth is physically impossible because of the scarcity of resources and waste sinks), 
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what one is forced to realize is that the economy is actually only a subsystem of the ecosystem. 
But because environmental economists do not heed this reality of scarcity, they do nothing to 
limit, or call into question, the economic growth that will ultimately lead us to overstepping the 
ecological bounds of the earth. 
In the light of the above, it is not at all surprising that social greens and 
bioenvironmentalists show utter disdain for the market liberal and institutionalist notion of 
sustainable consumption, or eco-efficiency—which, as indicated earlier, is tied to their claims 
concerning the eventual decoupling of economic grown and pollution, and the gradual 
dematerialization of production and optimization of consumption. Specifically, social greens and 
bioenvironmentalists point out that market liberal and institutionalist analyses, of the so-called 
decoupling of economic growth and pollution, do not factor in certain pollutants such as CO2, 
which increase alongside economic growth. In addition, they contend that such analyses also fail 
to address the possibility that pollution diminishes in developed countries only because these 
countries have the economic power to shift their dirty industries into the developing world. 
Further, owing to this, not insignificant, fact that wealthy states shift their 
environmentally damaging industries to economically weaker areas, social greens in particular 
are highly critical of the market liberal and institutionalist argument that the poor constitute 
principal agents of environmental degradation. Admittedly, social greens are not so naïve as to 
deny the existence of a correlation between poverty and environmental degradation, but they do 
insist that this correlation is far more complex than market liberals suppose. With reference to 
this correlation, they ask, for instance, why the poor are poor in the first place—which brings to 
light the marginalization of the majority of the world population through the process of economic 
globalization. ‘Enclosure,’ one of the main mechanisms that have facilitated such 
marginalization, has proved devastating at social and environmental levels alike. Briefly put, this 
mechanism, which constitutes part of the global spread of capitalism, “has enabled transnational 
corporations or local elites to occupy the best lands for timber or export-crop production, which 
in turn creates pockets of poverty with severe environmental problems (like soil erosion and 
falling agricultural yields).”21
                                                 
21 Clapp and Dauvergne, Paths to a Green World, 108. The devastating environmental and social effects of enclosure 
are illustrated in the plight of the Ga-Pila villagers in Limpopo, South Africa. Owing to the expansion of Anglo 
Platinum’s mining operations, the Ga-Pila people were relocated to an area that, according to them, has no land 
suitable to agriculture, nor any clean water. In short, these villagers have been rendered destitute through being 
deprived of the ancestral lands that they had previously subsisted upon, and rising levels of unemployment has only 
served to exacerbate their misery. Borrie La Grange, “Jobless Community in Tatters after Angloplat Resettlement: 
Ga-Pila Residents Say Brick Houses, Schools, Worth Nothing without Work,” The Times, April 7, 2008. 
 Bioenvironmentalists harbor deep concerns over this stress that is 
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being placed on the environment by rapidly growing (poor) populations in the developing world. 
However, social greens advance that the damage that the poor do to the environment is nothing in 
comparison to the destruction wreaked through large-scale agriculture, which involves single-
minded specialization in monocultures, an enormous employment of chemically harmful 
substances, and an approach to nature as a mere means to an economic end.   
 In addition, social greens and bioenvironmentalists advance that even if, by means of 
economic globalization, all nations were to be raised out of poverty, the pollution and 
overconsumption that would proceed from this would destroy the ecosystem because of the 
scarcity of resources and waste sinks. For instance, as the bioenvironmentalists Mathis 
Wackernagel and William Rees have shown through their ‘ecological footprint’ analyses, 
“current human consumption of agricultural products, wood fiber and fossil fuel have an 
Ecological Footprint that exceeds available ecologically productive land by close to 30 percent,” 
so that we already “need an Earth 30 percent larger . . . to accommodate present consumption 
without depleting corresponding ecosystems.” They add to this that “United Nations statistics 
show that . . . the developed world alone occup[ies] . . . an Ecological Footprint larger than the 
global carrying capacity,” with the consequence that “there’s nothing left into which the rest of 
the world can grow (without eroding global life-support).”22
                                                 
22 Mathis Wackernagel and William Rees, Our Ecological Footprint: Reducing Human Impact on the Earth 
(Gabriola Island: New Society Publishers, 1996), 149. This argument finds corroboration in a recent article that 
appeared in The New York Times, in which it is claimed that oil producers are being placed under enormous pressure 
to offer up enough oil to meet the needs not only of developed nations, but also those of the developing world. 
Added to this, automobile numbers are expected to double within the next few decades as developing countries 
modernize, with the result that, by 2030, oil producers would have to have found a means of yielding eleven billion 
barrels more oil per annum. Jad Mouawad, “The Big Squeeze: Preparing for a Future of Ever More Costly Oil,” The 
New York Times, April 25, 2008. 
 Notably, owing to precisely this 
problem of scarcity, bioenvironmentalists have, according to Clapp and Dauvergne, abandoned 
their erstwhile preoccupation with the issue of population expansion in the developing world, in 
favor of increasingly focusing on the hugely problematic issue of overconsumption, especially in 
the developed world. And what social greens and bioenvironmentalists alike find particularly 
worrisome about overconsumption, is that consumers in the developed world are unable to grasp 
the disastrous ecological consequences of their patterns of consumption, because globalization 
facilitates the ‘distancing’ of ‘sites of consumption’ (usually in developed nations) from ‘sites of 
production’ and ‘sites of pollution’ (usually in developing nations). Further, while social greens 
and bioenvironmentalists do not unrealistically assert that we must do away with economic 
growth altogether, in the light of the above problems they advocate a drastic reduction of 
growth—they believe that our environmental crisis will only be solved through a civilizational 
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change which involves the relinquishing of insatiable acquisitiveness and the embrace of 
frugality and self-restraint. 
 
Conflicting perspectives on global trade 
 
As a consequence of globalization, trade in services and goods has increased exponentially; and 
this is something that market liberals wholeheartedly support, not only because they believe that 
such global trade promotes economic growth, but also because it enhances efficiency, facilitates 
the distribution of clean technologies, and elevates environmental standards. That is to say, from 
the market liberal perspective, global trade enhances efficiency, because countries are able to 
specialize in products that they are better at producing than others—this is referred to as 
‘comparative advantage’—and this specialization leads to the streamlining of production 
processes, as more products are created from ever fewer resources. In turn, such streamlining 
fast-tracks the economic growth needed to finance and encourage environmental improvements, 
as discussed earlier. Also, market liberals contend, global trade facilitates the distribution of clean 
technologies, because the trade liberalization that is intrinsic to it encourages firms to embrace 
cleaner production processes in order to remain competitive at an international level. And 
correlatively, market liberals advance that countries that adopt liberal trade policies tend to raise 
their environmental standards, to remain competitive in markets that maintain high standards. 
Because of these positive effects of free trade, market liberals vehemently oppose trade 
sanctions—for them, trade sanctions easily lead to the erection of trade barriers, trade barriers 
then provide trade protection for certain firms, and such trade protection allows these firms to 
cling to dirty production processes rather than adopt clean technologies in order to remain 
competitive in the global marketplace. In addition, some market liberals contend that trade 
sanctions that enforce one set of environmental regulations globally, unfairly destroys the 
comparative advantage held by certain (especially poorer) countries that are better able than 
others to absorb pollution. Also, they oppose the use of the ‘precautionary principle,’ which 
involves the restriction of trade when no full scientific information is furnished concerning an 
activity that may cause environmental harm, on the grounds that this principle merely constitutes 
a government tool to protect domestic markets. For them, there are far more effective ways of 
ensuring environmental wellbeing, such as through the implementation of sound environmental 
policies and the creation of incentives to adopt higher environmental standards.    
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 Although institutionalists agree with most of the market liberals’ claims concerning the 
benefits of global trade, they propose that trade must be managed, through global cooperation, to 
ensure environmental wellbeing.23
Social greens and bioenvironmentalists reject the market liberal and institutionalist 
argument that global trade is vital to human welfare and environmental improvement. Rather, 
they regard global trade and free-trade agreements as principal causes of our environmental 
crisis, arguing that the wealth amassed through free trade activities derives from the short-sighted 
exploitation of natural resources. For example, social greens and bioenvironmentalists counter the 
market liberal claim that global trade facilitates environmental improvement through enhancing 
efficiency, by pointing out that when production processes become more efficient, (i.e. by 
producing more output per unit of input), consumer prices are lowered—and that this, in turn, 
increases product demand and in so doing accelerates resource throughput. In addition, social 
 For example, such global cooperation can lead to the 
establishment of ‘green markets,’ where the prices of products accurately reflect the 
environmental and social costs of their production—which would not only lower consumption 
levels but also amass the funds needed for the sustainable management of resources. 
Institutionalists also disagree with market liberals on the issue of trade sanctions; that is, they 
argue that trade sanctions must necessarily be implemented when it is clear that trade in a certain 
product will cause serious environmental harm. Further still, they argue that use of the 
precautionary principle is at times warranted, and emphasize the importance of mechanisms such 
as government taxation schemes and the ‘polluter pays principle’ (PPP), as these force firms to 
bear all costs related to pollution prevention and control, thus preventing them from externalizing 
environmental costs. Finally, while market liberals hold that existing WTO rules adequately 
address environmental concerns, the more skeptical institutionalists advance that WTO rules do 
not prevent states from weakening their environmental standards in order to gain competitive 
advantage in global trade. Similarly, they argue that under current WTO rules, it is almost 
impossible to ban trade in harmful products, and that WTO rules are frequently privileged over 
(more demanding) environmental agreements. Consequently, institutionalists emphasize the need 
to ‘green’ international trade agreements and to effectively coordinate these with international 
environmental agreements. But despite these concerns, institutionalists do not reject global trade; 
on the contrary, they believe that it is only through (managed) global trade that human welfare 
and environmental wellbeing can be ensured. 
                                                 
23 Clapp and Dauvergne, Paths to a Green World, 132. 
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greens and bioenvironmentalists advance that the benefits of free trade are not distributed 
equally. In this regard, they specifically criticize the market liberal notion of ‘comparative 
advantage,’ on the grounds that this notion does not include a consideration of the mobility that 
globalization has afforded goods as well as capital. As a result, arguments in favor of free trade 
that draw on this notion, fail to address the reality that powerful transnational corporations 
(TNCs) concentrate their polluting industries in (poor) developing countries, and that these 
countries consequently suffer grave environmental and social damage while only the 
transnational corporations reap the financial rewards. And for them, what worsens these 
destructive aspects of global trade is that the bulk of production for export, from the developing 
world, derives from natural resource extraction such as mining, fishing and forestry, and that in 
free-trade regimes the prices of these goods do not reflect the actual environmental and social 
costs of production. 
Social greens and bioenvironmentalists are equally critical of the market liberal argument 
that countries that adopt liberal trade policies tend to raise their environmental standards to 
remain competitive in markets that maintain high standards. Rather, they advance that the inverse 
of this is the case: free trade encourages the ‘dumbing down’ of environmental standards, because 
in order to compete in the global market, countries are tempted to weaken their environmental 
regulations or their enforcement of such regulations, which, in turn, encourages the firms within 
these countries to externalize environmental costs. This claim, on the part of social greens and 
bioenvironmentalists, discloses their distrust of the WTO—an organization that may be construed 
as a progressive development upon the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 
1947, but that has never relinquished the neoclassical economic assumptions of the latter. In fact, 
as social greens and bioenvironmentalists point out, GATT remains the primary trade agreement 
for goods under the WTO, and even Article XX of the agreement, which includes environmental 
clauses, does nothing but implicitly privilege economic over ecological interests. For instance, 
they argue, with reference to this Article, that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for a 
country to provide proof of the fact that the trade restrictions it wishes to impose do not constitute 
acts “of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” against other signatories, “or a disguised 
restriction on international trade.” How a country is to prove that trade restrictions are “necessary 
to protect human, animal or plant life or health” raises similar concerns, and another problematic 
aspect of Article XX is that when a country wishes to restrict trade, it must simultaneously 
impose restrictions upon its own people. Moreover, the narrow focus of this Article does not 
allow for any consideration of global environmental problems such as climate change, nor does it 
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address the need to protect natural resources that fall outside of the national borders of the 
signatories.24 In addition, social greens and bioenvironmentalists question the ethicality of WTO 
rules that prevent countries from restricting trade based either on the location where a product is 
produced, or on how it is produced. In other words, as Clapp and Dauvergne explain, “WTO 
trade rules call for no discrimination between ‘like products,’ where like products are those that 
are similar in their physical qualities, regardless of whether the method of production was clean 
or dirty.”25
 
 Finally, social greens and bioenvironmentalists agree with institutionalists on the 
necessity of coordinating trade agreements with international environmental agreements, but they 
worry that this will never take place under the auspices of the WTO, owing to the 
overwhelmingly economistic nature of this institution. Consequently, most social greens and 
bioenvironmentalists demand a complete overhaul, or even the dissolution, of the WTO, and 
insist that nations must be granted the sovereignty to restrict trade in the interest of environmental 
protection, and to implement trade sanctions against countries that attempt to evade 
environmental regulations. Also, while social greens and bioenvironmentalists, like 
institutionalists, support the use of mechanisms such as the precautionary principle, they 
unequivocally reject the institutionalist claim that (managed) trade can be good for the 
environment; this is because, for them, global trade fuels unsustainable growth, rampant 
inequality, and overconsumption. 
Conflicting perspectives on global investment   
 
Because free trade, deregulation, privatization, and financial flows have increased exponentially 
through the process of economic globalization, the power of firms has also been dramatically 
augmented; indicative of this is the fact that within little over thirty years, the number of 
transnational corporation (TNC) parent firms has grown from seven thousand to more than sixty-
five thousand.26
                                                 
24 World Trade Organization (WTO), “Article XX: General Exceptions” (1947), General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT). Available from http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_02_e.htm#articleXX. 
 In short, these corporations engage in foreign direct investment (FDI) in overseas 
operations—a type of investment that is a central feature of, and a powerful catalyst for, 
economic globalization. Yet, numerous concerns have been raised with reference to the agendas 
of TNCs, such as why they choose to invest overseas rather than in their own countries, whether 
25 Clapp and Dauvergne, Paths to a Green World, 137. 
26 Jennifer Clapp, “Transnational Corporations and Global Environmental Governance” (2003). Available from 
http://www.trentu.ca/org/tipec/3clapp4.pdf. 
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the monetary benefits and environmental costs of such investment are equally distributed, and for 
what reasons these corporations would frame themselves as environmental advocates and actively 
involve themselves in global environmental governance. In debates concerning these questions, 
TNCs have been accused of deliberately transferring heavily polluting industries to countries 
with weak, or poorly enforced, environmental regulations—either out of ‘industrial flight’ from a 
country that imposes harsh environmental regulations, or in order to save on pollution-abatement 
costs by situating their industries in ‘pollution havens’ (i.e. areas that intentionally lower their 
environmental standards to attract foreign investment). Market liberals, however, have countered 
such criticism with econometric studies focused on pollution emissions and emission-control cost 
data of American-owned manufacturing firms. According to them, the findings of these studies 
undermine the validity of the notions of industrial flight and pollution havens; this is because the 
studies indicate that environmental costs are negligible compared with technology and labor 
costs, with the consequence that there is little chance that a firm would relocate because of 
differential environmental standards alone. Also, through these studies, market liberals claim to 
have established that some firms actually decide to remain in their own countries, even if 
compliance costs are high, in order to maintain predictable product standards. And further, as 
indicated earlier, market liberals contend that attempting to instantiate uniform environmental 
standards on a global scale may actually destroy the comparative advantage that certain countries 
possess: that many of the poorer countries have greater (political and/or physical) pollution-
absorption capacities than do their richer counterparts, and that it would thus do these countries 
harm to prevent them from lowering their environmental standards in order to attract foreign 
investment. In addition, it is argued that what the econometric studies carried out by market 
liberals have also revealed is that relocating firms to developing countries not only guarantees 
economic growth, but also ensures the transfer of clean technologies and of management 
expertise to these countries. Moreover, according to market liberals, TNCs maintain high 
environmental standards regardless of where they decide to situate their industries, as this action 
forms part of their risk-management strategy, ensures the efficient production of high quality 
goods, and pleases NGOs and other international organizations concerned about environmental 
and social wellbeing. And finally, among various other arguments in support of TNCs, market 
liberals advance that even when firms do move to what some refer to as pollution havens, the 
economic benefits that the firms derive from doing so are extremely short-lived, because as 
economic growth takes place in the host country as a result of such foreign investment, 
environmental standards are raised and cleaner production processes are called for. Thus, for 
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market liberals, TNCs do less harm than good in their host countries; accordingly, they advocate 
the use of inherently market-friendly measures, such as the public disclosure of pollution 
emissions data, to encourage the environmental performance of firms. 
 Institutionalists share most of the market liberals’ assumptions concerning TNCs and FDI, 
but they believe that firms should be guided towards sustainable development practices, because 
the profit imperative can easily entice TNCs to decrease their environmental performance in 
order to cut back on costs. Also, while institutionalists may agree with market liberals on the 
crucial role that TNCs play in promoting economic growth in developing countries, they are 
critical of the market liberals’ skepticism concerning the existence of pollution havens, and their 
support of the maintenance of differential environmental standards. In fact, they argue that it is 
crucial for the global community to implement policies that are aimed at remedying the problems 
associated with differential environmental standards, and that address the possibility that poorer 
countries retain extremely low environmental standards purely out of fear that higher 
environmental standards would repel foreign investors. Finally, like market liberals, 
institutionalists encourage the public disclosure of the pollution emissions data of firms, but some 
argue for the need to go beyond such market-friendly measures, by establishing compulsory, 
rather than voluntary, global investment agreements that place rigorous environmental controls 
on TNC activities in overseas territories.      
In striking opposition to market liberals and institutionalists, social greens and 
bioenvironmentalists perceive TNCs in a completely negative light—as catalysts for 
overproduction, overconsumption, and pollution. According to them, TNCs not only plunder the 
world’s natural resources in order to produce goods that fuel a destructive culture of 
consumerism in the developed world, but are also guilty of ruining the environments of the 
developing world by situating their dirty industries within these economically weaker areas. 
Moreover, social greens also accuse TNCs of inflicting social harm, arguing that these 
corporations exacerbate the inequalities engendered through economic globalization, by 
exploiting workers in developing nations and amassing the riches that result from their labor in 
the developed world alone. In turn, social greens, in particular, are severely critical of the market 
liberals’ cynicism concerning the actuality of industrial flight and the existence of pollution 
havens. Most notably, they criticize the econometric studies, conducted by market liberals in 
relation to these phenomena, on the grounds that their analyses do not address ‘unquantifiable’ 
matters such as the experiences of people who inhabit environments dominated by TNCs. In 
contrast, social green investigations into industrial flight and pollution havens indicate that the 
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latter are potential, if not already extant, problems. Not only do these studies show that TNCs 
usually invest in environmentally and socially damaging industries, such as mining and other 
forms of natural resource extraction; they also disclose that these corporations are guilty of 
holding double standards, insofar as the self-imposed environmental standards to which they 
adhere in their own territories are far higher than those to which they adhere in the developing 
world. As evidence of the devastating environmental and social impact of TNCs in the 
developing world—owing specifically to their holding of double standards—social greens 
frequently invoke the worst industrial accident in history, which occurred in Bhopal, India. In 
brief, they argue that Union Carbide, an American TNC that produced pesticides at plants in 
Bhopal and in West Virginia, had for some time held double standards, insofar as the 
environmental, health and safety standards of its Bhopal plant were far lower than those 
maintained at its West Virginia plant. And, according to social greens, Union Carbide’s failure to 
remedy those double standards resulted in the poisonous gas leak, at the Bhopal plant in 1984, 
which killed eight thousand people and injured several hundred thousand more. However, instead 
of accepting responsibility for the disaster, Union Carbide proceeded to blame the gas leak on 
saboteurs and, in other instances, on the ‘negligent’ Indian government that co-owned the plant. 
Owing to accidents attributable to double standards, such as the disaster at Bhopal, social greens 
and bioenvironmentalists express great concern over the fact that developing countries neglect to 
strengthen their environmental regulations or enforcement in order to attract or retain foreign 
direct investment (FDI) on the part of TNCs. And, similarly, on the basis of their various other 
studies of the dubious practices of TNCs, social greens and bioenvironmentalists reject outright 
the market liberal argument that TNCs facilitate the transfer of clean technologies into the 
developing world. On the contrary, they contend that the environments of developed nations 
improve, while the environments of developing countries worsen, as increasing numbers of TNCs 
transfer their dirty industries away from their own countries and into the developing world.27
                                                 
27 Notably, though, while social greens focus their criticisms, in relation to global investment, on TNCs in particular, 
bioenvironmentalists regard all corporations, be they transnational or local, as environmentally malignant, because in 
their view all corporations are inherently exploitative owing to their exclusive concern with the maximizing of 
profits. 
 
Furthermore, social greens and bioenvironmentalists alike oppose the market liberals’ (arguably 
naïve) assumptions concerning the agendas of TNCs. In short, by focusing on the actual practices 
of TNCs, social greens and bioenvironmentalists have been able to show that TNCs often invest 
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in ecologically unsustainable and socially detrimental industries, such as logging, mining,28
Finally, on the basis of their disclosure of the dubious practices of TNCs through their 
studies, most social greens and bioenvironmentalists completely reject the market liberal 
argument that TNCs should continue to voluntarily regulate themselves. Instead, they demand 
corporate accountability from TNCs, because in their view these corporations have, to date, done 
little more than employ pro-environmental language in order to improve their public image, while 
concealing the environmental and social destruction caused through their business ventures. That 
is, social greens and bioenvironmentalists advance that ‘corporate greening’ is, at bottom, a 
façade, and that the only reason that TNCs can claim to promote sustainable development, is 
because they have appropriated and redefined this concept in such a way that it complements 
rather than contradicts their existing business practices. They also counter the market liberal 
claim that TNCs voluntarily adopt clean technologies, by pointing out, for example, that in many 
cases these corporations adopt such technologies owing purely to government pressure.
 oil 
extraction, and the manufacture of hazardous substances. 
29
                                                 
28 I unequivocally support the social green and bioenvironmentalist criticisms of TNCs in this respect, having 
witnessed the manner in which such corporations threaten Southern African ecosystems and communities. For 
example, much controversy surrounds the dune mining operations that will be carried out by the Australian Mining 
Consortium, TEM, along South Africa’s pristine Wild Coast. These operations will, in time, likely have an 
irreversible negative impact upon this coastline, which has hitherto been the location of a number of eco-tourism 
ventures, and local community members are also concerned that the presence of the mine will destabilize their 
traditional, subsistence-orientated, way of life. However, in so-called ‘consultations,’ with affected parties, leading 
up to the government’s authorization of these mining operations, neither of these two concerns was addressed. What 
was, instead, emphasized was the job opportunities that the mining operations would yield, which led many to 
believe that the mine would employ thousands of people while it would, in fact, only make available about three 
hundred jobs during the course of the seventeen years that it will be in operation. Just prior to the mining rights being 
granted, community members opposed to the mining received threats from a local power group, ACCODA, which 
was supposed to operate in support of, and give voice to the concerns of, affected communities; this group had 
apparently been bought over by some of the parties involved in the mining bid, through ‘donations’ of clothing, 
vehicles, and even houses. In fact, according to a Sigidi community member, even though many in her community 
were against the mining they could not voice their protest, as only ACCODA was permitted to communicate with the 
media. And in 2008, perhaps in a final attempt to coerce the community into supporting the mining bid instead of the 
creation of the proposed ‘Pondoland Conservation Park,’ some figures were suggesting to local communities that 
lions and tigers would be placed in the (proposed) conservation park, with the consequence that people would either 
get eaten, or would have to move away from their ancestral lands. Wild Coast Corruption, prod. Sandra Herrington 
(SABC, 2006); Wild Coast Dune Mining, prod. Sandra Herrington (SABC, 2003); Wild Coast, prod. Sandra 
Herrington (SABC, 2004); and Wild Coast, prod. Sandra Herrington (SABC, 2008). 
 
Because of this, social greens and bioenvironmentalists are highly critical of these corporations’ 
lobbying of policymakers at an international level, where they press for voluntary self-regulation 
and often have their demands met, owing to their immense economic and political influence. 
29 Many scholars specifically dismiss claims concerning “the ‘greening’ of corporate America,” arguing that “firms 
are not incorporating environmental considerations into marketing strategies except under duress and then only in the 
context of traditional profit-centered strategies . . . Few firms in any industry can afford to be ‘green’ after they have 
turned off the lights.” Kilbourne, Beckmann and Thelen, “The Role of the Dominant Social Paradigm in 
Environmental Attitudes: A Multinational Examination,” 194-195. 
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Similarly, both social greens and bioenvironmentalists are inherently dissatisfied with existing 
investment rules, as these address neither the double standards held by firms, nor the failure of 
firms to genuinely green their practices. Today, freedom continues to be unquestioningly granted 
unscrupulous TNCs, and for this reason, argue social greens and bioenvironmentalists, 
globalization is at bottom ‘corporate globalization’—a process whereby the global economy is 
constructed in a way that best suits the business interests of TNCs, at the expense of all else. 
 
Conflicting perspectives on global financing 
 
Global financing constitutes an integral part of the economies of developing countries, and for the 
most part, consists of development assistance from bilateral donors, loans from Export Credit 
Agencies (ECAs), private financial flows to firms or individuals, and multilateral lending and/or 
grants. Generally speaking, concessional assistance to developing countries, or, Official 
Development Assistance (ODA), which takes the form of grants or preferential loans from 
bilateral donors, the UN, and Europe, is intended for a variety of activities, such as education 
programs, food relief, technology transfer and sustainable development projects. And, as one can 
glean from the nature of these activities, donors of these types of grants and loans are far less 
concerned with the economic performance facilitated through their financing than they are with 
whether such financing has been able to provide humanitarian assistance and to alleviate 
comprehensive security concerns. Unfortunately, however, many donor governments have fallen 
short of their promise of contributing 0.7 percent of their GNP to developing countries, and this 
shortfall has led to poorer nations becoming increasingly indebted. Export credit agencies 
(ECAs), in turn, are public agencies in developed countries that provide credit, (mainly in the 
form of loans), to companies based in developing countries—typically, on condition that the 
governments of those countries back these loans. Principally, ECAs provide financing for trade 
and investment at very high interest rates, and have made an enormous financial impact upon 
developing countries, accounting for close to half of the debt of the latter. Also, these agencies 
often fund or insure high risk ventures, such as mining, oil and logging projects, and have 
consequently been accused of environmental and social unaccountability, and of willful blindness 
in regard of the environmental implications of the projects that they fund. As controls on 
financial flows have become increasingly liberalized, global private financial flows have also 
escalated. Yet, private financial agencies are, like ECAs, not easily held accountable for 
environmental and social infringements, as these agencies are difficult to monitor and are not 
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obliged to adhere to any environmental standards or guidelines. Because of this, many worry that 
private financing may have severely detrimental environmental and social consequences in the 
long run; and this anxiety is exacerbated by the fear that the economistic values, held by the 
majority of private financial agencies, propagate a short-term mentality diametrically opposed to 
environmental wellbeing and sustainability. Added to this, currency speculation and trading, 
which are central to financing, can have a disastrous impact upon the fragile economies of 
developing countries, in particular. Lastly, multilateral lending is one of the most important 
features of international finance, and is in large part carried out by the World Bank. The World 
Bank not only lends immense sums of money to developing countries, but is also responsible for 
the formation of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) for these developing countries, which 
operate to ensure that the latter repay their loans. In short, while the World Bank and the IMF 
were originally established to aid in the reconstruction of Europe after the Second World War, it 
later began to focus on granting loans to the developing world in an effort to ensure global 
economic stability and to foster global economic growth. But because many indebted developing 
countries found it extremely difficult to repay these loans, in 1980 the World Bank introduced 
structural adjustment lending and with it, structural adjustment programs (SAPs), which alter the 
organization of the indebted country in a number of ways. Firstly, in order for the country to 
recapture lost markets, a floating exchange-rate system is put into operation, and the currency of 
the country is devalued in order to boost local production—which, in turn, lowers prices and 
increases the amount of products for export. Secondly, to ensure that actual prices are not lower 
than market prices, SAPs also involve the lifting of trade restrictions and the liberalization of 
domestic price policies. And thirdly, with a view to reducing inefficiencies and, in so doing, 
facilitating the speedy repayment of debts, SAPs generally encourage the privatization of state-
owned firms, decreases in government spending, and the relaxation of restrictions on foreign 
investment. Notably, Clapp and Dauvergne point out that although SAPs were only supposed to 
be implemented for three to five years, and at that, only as a once-off adjustment, these programs 
have remained in place for over twenty years and are now particularly prevalent in countries in 
Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa. 
As expected, market liberals regard international financing as a crucial agent of economic 
growth and increased global investment, which together ensure global economic stability. They 
argue that global financing helps poorer countries to develop, and that these countries will, in 
time, be able to successfully manage any environmental damage that may have accompanied 
their development. Importantly, though, many market liberals oppose bilateral and multilateral 
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grants to developing countries, on the grounds that these grants encourage the formation of 
welfare states, characterized by rampant corruption; that is, they suspect that local elites, rather 
than utilizing grant funds for the improvement of their nation, proceed to parasitize upon these 
grants in total disregard of the suffering of the poor. Owing to this, market liberals instead 
advocate bilateral and multilateral concessional loans. From their perspective, developing 
countries are able to use these loans to set up the infrastructure required to compete in the global 
marketplace, and receive expert financial advice from bilateral and multilateral lenders. Further, 
concessional loans are generally constructive, in the sense that they foster responsibility on the 
part of the country in question, by compelling the latter to strive towards repaying these loans in 
the near future, and, ultimately, becoming independent of aid altogether. Market liberals do, 
however, concede that developing countries at times incur heavy environmental costs in their 
efforts to repay such loans, insofar as these countries are at least initially obliged to engage in 
both the large-scale export of natural resources and rapid industrialization. Yet, market liberals 
argue that this inevitable environmental damage is in time remedied, because as a country 
develops, its economy shifts towards more service- and information-based industries, and 
increasing pressure is placed on firms and the government to raise environmental standards. In 
turn, market liberals also view structural adjustment loans (SALs) in a positive light, and some 
even insist that SAPs have a number of direct ecological benefits. That is, some market liberals at 
the World Bank advance that most SAPs oblige governments to raise the price of natural 
resources, which promotes environmental conservation, and most encourage the privatization of 
state-owned firms, which similarly motivates environmental stewardship. Also, they argue that 
the price liberalization and the currency devaluation required in most SAPs instigate the 
production of tree crops for export, the root systems of which inhibit soil erosion, and that 
inefficient production and consumption are diminished when SAPs are implemented, because 
these programs promote the removal of government subsidies. Because of these various benefits 
of structural adjustment lending, market liberals tend to advance that any negative environmental 
or social effects linked to SAPs are not caused by the programs themselves, but rather by 
defective institutions, markets or policies. And further, they contend that these negative effects 
must at any rate be accepted as given, because developed countries cannot, in neocolonial 
fashion, attempt to “‘deep freeze’ the developing world in a past of hunters and gatherers, pristine 
(yet impassable) forests and mountains, and isolated (yet primitive) villages.”30
                                                 
30 Clapp and Dauvergne, Paths to a Green World, 217. It is, however, possible to argue that the true face of neo-
colonialism is in fact an economic one—of developed countries, major economic institutions, and powerful 
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 Institutionalists may support the majority of the market liberals’ assertions concerning the 
beneficial role of global financing, especially within the developing world, but they do contest 
market liberals on a number of points. Unlike market liberals, institutionalists argue that far more 
assistance, in the form of loans as well as grants, is required to strengthen both developing 
nations and global environmental institutions. In this regard, they insist that governments remain 
true to their promise of contributing 0.7 percent of their GNP to developing countries, and that 
some of these funds must be specifically allocated for the alleviation of local environmental 
problems. Further, institutionalists emphasize that it is only through increased multilateral 
environmental aid that developing countries can build sufficient capacity to effectively engage in 
environmental protection, and that the debt burden of heavily indebted developing countries must 
be alleviated, otherwise these financially strained countries will never be able to manage their 
natural resources wisely. In fact, institutionalists are so concerned about developing countries 
exploiting their natural resources in their imperative to ease their foreign debt burdens, that they 
advocate the adoption of stronger policies and loan/grant conditions centered on the problem of 
resource use. Finally, they support mechanisms, such as the Global Environment Facility (GEF), 
which is managed by the World Bank, the UNEP and the UN Development Programme (UNDP), 
because financing projects with environmental benefits is, from their perspective, the only 
conceivable way to ensure ecologically sustainable development. 
Social greens and bioenvironmentalists, however, reject outright the market liberals’ and 
institutionalists’ optimistic view of international financing. That is, although they agree with 
market liberals and institutionalists that global financing facilitates economic growth and 
international investment, social greens and bioenvironmentalists believe that both of these 
ostensibly positive effects of global financing are, in fact, harmful catalysts for unsustainable 
patterns of development. Among other things, social greens and bioenvironmentalists question 
the value of development assistance. They contend that these grants and preferential loans only 
worsen our existing environmental and social problems, as they are awarded in an effort to help 
developing countries elevate their living standards to those fundamentally unsustainable 
standards of developed countries. Social greens add to this that such development assistance 
hardly ever reaches the poor, and bioenvironmentalists argue that development assistance 
exacerbates the existing problem of overpopulation in the developing world. Social greens and 
bioenvironmentalists are also highly critical of the role of export credit agencies (ECAs) in the 
                                                                                                                                                              
corporations ‘colonizing’ developing nations financially, in order to siphon huge profits back to themselves. I have 
Bert Olivier to thank for this particularly important insight. 
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developing world, owing principally to the secretiveness of these agencies and to their lack of 
environmental and social accountability and care. 
 Furthermore, social greens and bioenvironmentalists aggressively oppose multilateral 
lending, much of which, as discussed earlier, is carried out under the auspices of the World Bank. 
First of all, they argue, this form of lending is underpinned by the extremely problematic 
assumption that economic growth is crucial to human welfare and environmental improvement. 
Moreover, they advance that even though the World Bank, a major agent of multilateral lending, 
adopted a pro-environmental image in the early 1990s, this image has not been matched by 
deeds—for instance, as Andrea Durbin and Carol Welch point out, even “in the fiscal year of 
2000, close to half the lending from the World Bank’s private sector division was [still] in 
environmentally harmful sectors, such as oil, gas, coal, mining, chemicals and infrastructure 
projects.”31 Also, social greens and bioenvironmentalists contend that the environmental impact 
assessments (EIAs) and social impact assessments (SIAs) that the World Bank commissions for 
the projects that it funds are far from thorough,32
 Social greens also question the merit of multilateral environmental aid, because for them, 
dumping lump sums of environmental aid into the developing world in no way addresses what 
they consider to be the most necessary of actions to be carried out to remedy both environmental 
 and that in virtue of its perpetuation of 
structural adjustment programs (SAPs), the World Bank exacerbates environmental and social 
problems within the developing world. In the latter regard, for example, social greens and 
bioenvironmentalists argue that the currency devaluation and the lifting of trade restrictions that 
form part of SAPs, instigate the unsustainable export of natural resources, the environmentally 
destructive mining of minerals, the use of harmful chemicals to maximize yield, and the 
generation of export-orientated crops rather than produce for local consumption. 
                                                 
31 Andrea Durbin and Carol Welch, “Greening the Bretton Woods Institutions,” Foreign Policy in Focus 5/33 
(2001), quoted in Jennifer Clapp and Peter Dauvergne, Paths to a Green World: The Political Economy of the Global 
Environment (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2005), 202. 
32 For example, the World Bank decided to fund the Nam Theun 2 (NT2) project in Laos—which would involve the 
construction of a large dam to generate hydroelectricity for a rapidly modernizing Thailand—and was thus obliged to 
commission EIAs and SIAs. However, Barbara Franklin, the evaluation expert hired by the bank to assess the 
efficacy of consultations with local communities on the issue of the dam, was of the opinion that these consultations 
had failed outright. For instance, she indicated that during these consultations, “most of the plateau people just stared 
at the presenters” who used language “more appropriate to [a US] Army Corps of Engineers meeting,’” and that the 
majority of the people interviewed after the consultations had not understood anything. Also, “of those who said they 
did understand the topic, most had no idea that these meetings were about moving them from their land and resettling 
them as rice farmer entrepreneurs,” and a few of them actually believed that the consultants “had come to present 
them with a simple . . . gift: not Laos’s largest dam, but a village water well.” Michael Goldman, “Imperial Science, 
Imperial Nature: Environmental Knowledge for the World (Bank),” in Earthly Politics: Local and Global in 
Environmental Governance, eds. Sheila Jasanoff and Marybeth Long Martello (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 
2004), 69. For a local example of inadequate consultation with affected parties in relation to projects with profound 
environmental and social implications, see note 28 above. 
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deterioration and social inequality—namely, the restructuring of the entire global economy. From 
the social green perspective, such financial assistance, on the contrary, gives developing nations 
the impression that they should continue to industrialize, and that the global community will 
continue to relieve the environmental impact of such industrialization through, among other 
means, this form of aid. In fact, this particular stance on environmental aid constitutes one of the 
main points of conflict between the social greens and the institutionalists, and their antagonism in 
this regard is most pronounced on the issue of the Global Environment Facility (GEF), which 
funds projects with ‘global’ environmental benefits. Unlike institutionalists, social greens are 
extremely skeptical of the GEF, because of the dominant role that the World Bank plays it its 
management. In their view, the GEF mirrors the World Bank in virtue of its secrecy and its 
resistance to consulting with NGOs on the subject of the projects that it funds. Also, they argue 
that the GEF has tended to adopt a ‘bandage approach’ to environmental problems, by treating 
the symptoms of environmentally destructive activities rather than preventing these activities 
from being carried out in the first place. For example, the GEF predominantly focuses on 
transferring clean technologies to developing countries without questioning broader issues, such 
as the problems associated with economic growth or the dangers inherent in fostering cultures of 
overconsumption. And because most of the projects for which the GEF provides environmental 
funding are tied to other World Bank loans, some suspect that the World Bank uses the GEF to 
externalize environmental costs. For the above reasons, social greens and most 
bioenvironmentalists support debt-cancellation initiatives instead of project funding; they see 
debt-cancellation as one of the very few means by which heavily indebted countries can regain 
their autonomy and, consequently, desist from overexploiting their natural resources to settle 
their foreign debt. 
 
 
Facilitating global environmental improvement: Irreconcilable solutions 
 
In the light of these severe and complex clashes of belief over the impact of globalization, 
economic growth, and global trade, investment, and financing, it is hardly surprising that market 
liberals, institutionalists, social greens, and bioenvironmentalists, offer such conflicting solutions 
to our environmental and social problems. While these solutions were to a certain extent 
indicated above, I revisit them here, in order to ascertain what role (if any) the ordinary 
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individual is expected to play in those solutions proposed by market liberals and institutionalists 
on the one hand, and in those proposed by social greens and bioenvironmentalists on the other 
hand. Further, by reviewing these irreconcilable solutions, I aim to establish a direct correlation 
between the market liberals’, and to a certain extent, the institutionalists’,33 beliefs concerning 
how the global environment is affected by technology, politics and economics, and what 
Kilbourne and his colleagues refer to as the ‘dominant social paradigm’ (DSP) of contemporary 
society.34 In other words, I endeavor to show that the contemporary DSP—that is, “the values, 
metaphysical beliefs, institutions, habits, etc. that collectively provide social lenses through 
which individuals and groups interpret their social world”35
 
—bears a striking resemblance to 
especially the market liberal worldview identified by Clapp and Dauvergne. What such a 
correlation, in turn, would imply is that the beliefs held by the majority of contemporary 
individuals are largely market liberal in orientation—which makes the social greens’ and 
bioenvironmentalists’ task of encouraging the individual-in-society to adopt pro-environmental 
beliefs and behaviors extremely difficult, to say the least. Ultimately, through these studies, I 
hope to construct a conceptual framework for my examination, in Chapter Two, of the most 
recent (single-authored) texts of the social green, Wolfgang Sachs, and the bioenvironmentalist, 
Thomas Princen. That is to say, through utilizing a framework within which the market liberal 
worldview is correlated with the DSP, I will be able to show that Sachs and Princen, within their 
writings, attempt to do discursive battle with a double enemy of sorts—namely, the problematic 
market liberal and institutionalist theoretical perspectives, and their reader’s faith in the equally 
problematic DSP of contemporary society. 
The near-absence of the individual in market liberal and institutionalist solutions to our 
environmental problems 
 
                                                 
33 Although institutionalists disagree with market liberals on certain issues, they share most of the market liberals’ 
perspectives. For example, market liberals and institutionalists alike accept the existing politico-economic 
organization of society, and render their support to the capitalist- and consumerist-orientated ethic of contemporary 
individuals, believing that the economic growth and development that proceed from such an ethic are vital to 
environmental improvement and human welfare. Thus, because the fundamental similarities between market liberals 
and institutionalists far outweigh the differences between them, when I speak of the correspondence between the 
DSP and the market liberal worldview, I am in the latter case, at least to a certain extent, implicitly referring to the 
institutionalist worldview as well. 
34 Kilbourne, Beckmann and Thelen, “The Role of the Dominant Social Paradigm in Environmental Attitudes: A 
Multinational Examination,” 193. 
35 L. Milbrath, Environmentalists: Vanguards for a New Society (Albany: University of New York Press, 1984), 7. 
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As discussed earlier, market liberals demand reforms, such as the lifting of restrictions on trade 
and investment, in the interest of unleashing the invisible hand of the (free) market and thereby 
speeding up the global economic growth and development that, according to them, are needed to 
solve the environmental and social problems of our time. Further, on the premise that firms are 
fully cognizant of the fact that adopting ecologically sustainable practices will benefit them in the 
long run, market liberals advocate market-friendly, voluntary, corporate measures to improve the 
environmental performance of firms. In addition, they harbor great faith in the capacity of 
technology and modern science to solve our environmental problems, in the absence of any 
transformation of our global economy. In fact, market liberals believe that the economic growth 
and development that are facilitated by our existing economy, fast-track much-needed 
technological and scientific innovation. 
Institutionalists, in turn, support most of the market liberals’ arguments concerning how 
the global environment and social conditions are improved through economic growth and 
development. However, they insist that it is necessary to direct the global economy, because they 
perceive population growth, environmental scarcity, and inequality among countries, as problems 
that cannot be remedied by the (unguided) invisible hand of the market alone. Moreover, 
although institutionalists, like market liberals, regard the promotion of sustainable development 
as an integral means of ensuring environmental wellbeing, they stress that much stronger 
environmental institutions, and compulsory rather than voluntary global investment agreements, 
are needed to guarantee that businesses and governments adopt sustainable practices. In actual 
fact, most institutionalists hold that the weaknesses that plague current institutions, and the lack 
of global institutional cooperation on matters of sustainability, constitute the main drivers of 
environmental degradation. Finally, institutionalists share the market liberals’ faith in the 
capacity of technology and modern science to solve our environmental problems, but emphasize, 
again, that effective international cooperation and agreements are required to ensure the transfer 
of ecologically innovative technologies to the developing world. 
 Ultimately, though, despite the differences between them, neither market liberals nor 
institutionalists reject the current politico-economic organization of society. Correlatively, they 
support the current capitalist- and consumerist-orientated ethic of individuals because, as 
indicated earlier, they believe that the economic growth and development that proceed from such 
an ethic are vital to environmental and social wellbeing. Owing to this stance, their proposed 
solutions to present and future environmental problems range from the (predominantly market 
liberal) promotion of unrestrained economic growth, to the (more institutionalist) emphasis on the 
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need for greater institutional cooperation to guide the global economy. As such, neither market 
liberals nor institutionalists demand any radical change of behavior from the individual-in-
society. 
 
The crucial presence of the individual in social green and bioenvironmentalist solutions to 
our environmental problems 
 
As indicated in the preceding pages, social greens stand in diametric opposition to the market 
liberals and the institutionalists when it comes to proposing solutions to our environmental 
problems. Among other things, instead of calling for unrestricted economic growth, or for the 
mere strengthening of global institutions in order to better guide such growth, social greens argue 
that nothing short of a complete overhaul of contemporary societal organization is required in 
order to solve our environmental problems; this is because, for them, in the absence of such 
drastic societal transformation, environmentally deleterious phenomena such as economic 
growth, development, and consumerism, would continue unabated. In addition, social greens 
reject notions such as sustainable development, or eco-efficiency, on the grounds that the 
neoclassical economic assumption of infinite economic growth, which underpins such notions, is 
completely unfounded. That is, as aforementioned, in criticism of such notions and this 
assumption, social greens point out that the ‘efficient’ production of goods merely leads to the 
lowering of prices, to greater product demand and, ultimately, to increased throughput of natural 
resources and to more pollution—which can in no way be construed as sustainable. Furthermore, 
while social greens do not reject the institutionalist idea that we could use institutions to help 
remedy our environmental problems and social ills, they do contend that rather than operating to 
guide economic globalization, such institutions should help facilitate a drastic curbing, or even an 
undoing, of economic globalization, through aiding in the localization of economies, the re-
empowerment of previously marginalized voices, and the instantiation of significant penalties for 
environmental and social infringements. Yet, social greens have very little faith in the capacity of 
institutions to do so, because they believe that many institutions, such as the World Bank and the 
WTO, will always privilege capitalist concerns over environmental or social ones. And they have 
even less faith in the (market liberal and institutionalist) assumption that we can, through 
technology and modern science alone, solve our environmental problems. As discussed earlier, 
they believe that unless scientific and technological innovation is accompanied by a radical 
transformation of the global economy, so-called technological and scientific solutions to 
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environmental problems will continue to amount to little more than ‘bandage treatment’—and at 
that, treatment that favors the developed world even though it is the developing world that is most 
burdened by the negative environmental and social effects of (economic) globalization. 
Bioenvironmentalists, in turn, share most of these social green beliefs, but they do 
disagree with social greens on some issues. For example, unlike social greens, 
bioenvironmentalists harbor deep concern about the stress placed on the environment by rapidly 
growing populations in the developing world, and thus call for measures, (such as educational 
programs for women), to reduce population growth. Also, bioenvironmentalists are resistant to 
the social greens’ localization strategy, as they feel that the move to localize economies would 
inhibit the global institutional coordination needed for the successful eradication of unsustainable 
economic activities. 
Ultimately, although such differences in perspective instigate the occasional skirmish 
between social greens and bioenvironmentalists, their alliance nevertheless remains rooted in 
their shared rejection of “the way we have organized political and economic life on the planet.”36 
Accordingly, while market liberals would propose reforms to unleash the invisible hand of the 
market, and institutionalists would emphasize that strong global institutions are needed to ensure 
that environmental and social improvement occurs through economic growth, social greens and 
bioenvironmentalists call for a radical transformation of the entire global economy, in order to 
remedy our environmental and social crises. And, importantly, they believe that a rejection of our 
existing capitalist- and consumerist-orientated ethic, in favor of an embrace of an ethic of 
frugality and self-restraint, is critical to such a transformation. That is, as Clapp and Dauvergne 
point out, social greens and bioenvironmentalists alike “see a need to profoundly change Western 
values and lifestyles to solve global environmental problems . . . [—that w]e must move, as 
Thomas Princen . . . argues, from values based on efficiency and cooperation alone to ones 
focused on ‘sufficiency.’ In other words, accept ‘enough’ and stop aiming for ‘more’ through the 
growth paradigm.”37
                                                 
36 Clapp and Dauvergne, Paths to a Green World, 8. 
 What is evident from this is that social greens and bioenvironmentalists 
diverge strikingly from market liberals and institutionalists, by demanding a radical behavioral 
change, of the individual subject, as the first indispensable step towards facilitating a pro-
environmental civilizational change. The political and environmental scientist Michael Maniates 
37 Ibid., 234. See also Thomas Princen, “Consumption and Its Externalities: Where Economy Meets Ecology,” 
Global Environmental Politics 1/3 (2001): 11-30; and Thomas Princen, “Distancing: Consumption and the Severing 
of Feedback,” in Confronting Consumption, eds. Thomas Princen, Michael Maniates and Ken Conca (Massachusetts: 
The MIT Press, 2002). 
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sums this approach up wonderfully when he both emphasizes the “individualization of 
responsibility” because “individual consumption choices are environmentally important,” but 
stresses that such consumption choices are “constrained, shaped and framed by institutions and 
political forces that can be remade only through collective citizen action.”38
 
 
The ‘dominant social paradigm’ (DSP) as an obstacle to the solutions proposed by social 
greens and bioenvironmentalists 
 
Most social greens and bioenvironmentalists are, however, opposed to any implementation of 
coercive measures to facilitate the pro-environmental civilizational change for which they hope. 
Consequently, they promote education as one of the most promising means of instigating 
individual (and in the long run collective) behavioral transformation, since the “educational goal 
is to teach citizens to choose to live within limits—to use less, waste less, recycle, and alter 
lifestyles.”39
                                                 
38 Michael Maniates, “Individualization: Plant a Tree, Buy a Bike, Save the World?,” Global Environmental Politics 
1/3 (2001), quoted in Jennifer Clapp and Peter Dauvergne, Paths to a Green World: The Political Economy of the 
Global Environment (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2005), 235. Nicolas Hildyard similarly advances that “it is only 
through the direct and decisive involvement of local peoples and communities in seeking solutions to the 
environmental crisis that the crisis will be resolved.” Nicholas Hildyard, “Liberation Ecology,” in The Future of 
Progress: Reflections on Environment and Development, eds. Helena Norberg-Hodge, Peter Goering and Steven 
Gorelick (Foxhole: Green Books, 1995), 160. 
 The implication of this is that, within their writings, social greens and 
bioenvironmentalists are obliged not only to engage in discursive warfare with market liberals 
and institutionalists on the academic front, but also to educate their readers in the interest of 
convincing them to adopt more environmentally benign behaviors. But this second task is by no 
means straightforward, especially if one considers the possibility that the majority of 
contemporary individuals live in terms of the ‘dominant social paradigm’ (DSP) of contemporary 
society, which can be argued to mirror the market liberal worldview on how our environment is 
affected by technology, politics and economics. In what follows, I trace Kilbourne, Beckmann 
and Thelen’s study of the DSP, in order to reveal the degree to which the DSP corresponds with 
the market liberal worldview delineated by Clapp and Dauvergne. And through establishing these 
parallels between the market liberal worldview and the DSP, I endeavor to consolidate a 
conceptual framework for my study, in Chapter Two, of the writings of the social green, 
Wolfgang Sachs, and the bioenvironmentalist, Thomas Princen—writings within which efforts 
are arguably made both to counter the market liberal and institutionalist worldviews, and to 
39 Clapp and Dauvergne, Paths to a Green World, 232. 
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undermine the reader’s (ecologically incapacitating) faith in what is tantamount to the DSP of 
contemporary society. 
In their article, “The Role of the Dominant Social Paradigm in Environmental Attitudes: 
A Multinational Examination,” Kilbourne, Beckmann and Thelen examine the technological, 
political and economic dimensions of the DSP of contemporary society at a theoretical level, and 
then furnish an empirical assessment of how the beliefs associated with each of these dimensions 
instigate an ‘ecological apathy’ of sorts in contemporary individuals. Accordingly, they argue 
that one of the principal aims of their study is to explain why, despite “claims for the ‘greening’ 
of consumption, . . . consumers are not climbing on the ‘green’ consumption wagon as readily as 
opinion polls would suggest.”40 Admittedly, scholars such as R. E. Dunlap and K. D. van Liere 
had long ago identified the dimensions of the DSP that influence environmental attitudes, the 
most important of which are faith in scientific and technological innovation, a laissez-faire form 
of government, and economic growth.41
Within their study, Kilbourne, Beckmann and Thelen consider the technological 
dimension of the DSP in terms of its general character of ‘technological optimism’ and 
‘technological politics.’ They argue that technological optimism emerged in the wake of the 
successful development and application of Enlightenment science and technology, which, among 
other things, facilitated vast improvements in people’s standard of living as well as a revolution 
in industry. Over time, humankind derived greater and greater benefits from technological and 
scientific innovation, with the consequence that today, most people engage in an unquestioning 
valorization of technology. That is, we have “become so enamored of technology that [we] . . . 
fail to adequately examine its full implications,” and assume “that technology can and will come 
to the aid of society whenever and wherever it is called upon.” In turn, in relation to technological 
politics, the main point put forward by Kilbourne and his colleagues is that technology is by no 
means politically neutral—large-scale technologies are usually centralized, control over their use 
 However, as Kilbourne and his colleagues point out, no 
one has examined these technological, political and economic dimensions of the DSP together—
yet for them, such a study is absolutely crucial, not only because these three dimensions are 
virtually indissociable and must therefore be included in a single model, but also because this 
model must then be tested empirically in order to assess the effect that adherence to the DSP has 
on the ecological concern of the individual. 
                                                 
40 Kilbourne, Beckmann and Thelen, “The Role of the Dominant Social Paradigm in Environmental Attitudes: A 
Multinational Examination,” 194. 
41 R. E. Dunlap and K. D. van Liere, “Commitment to the Dominant Social Paradigm and Concern for 
Environmental Quality,” Soc Sci Q 65 (1984): 1013-1028. 
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is inherently authoritarian, and they have an enormous impact on the environment. Small-scale 
technologies, in contrast, are more decentralized, are consequently more democratic in 
orientation, and have a lesser impact on the environment—but they will never be chosen over 
their large-scale counterparts, because such a move would be “contradictory to the DSP that 
compels large-scale technologies.”42 It is notable that this valorization of technology as an 
unequivocal good within the DSP, resonates strongly with the market liberal (and institutionalist) 
worldviews on technology, discussed earlier. And significantly, Kilbourne and his colleagues 
advance that such an optimistic perspective on technology causes individuals to assume that 
technology can and will solve all existing and future environmental problems, with the 
consequence that they are unlikely to exhibit environmental concern or embrace more 
environmentally benign behaviors.43
In their discussions concerning the political dimension of the DSP, Kilbourne and his 
colleagues point to liberal democracy as the dominant mode of political organization today. They 
explain that this form of government promotes individual freedom, condemns excessive 
government interference, and upholds the right to private property—all of which has instigated in 
contemporary individuals an acute form of ‘possessive individualism.’ In other words, what has 
flowed from this form of government is a valorization of acquisitiveness, a preoccupation with 
the unrestrained accumulation of wealth, and, ultimately, a re-conceptualization, of individual 
freedom, as “freedom to participate in the market, i.e., freedom to consume.” Further, Kilbourne, 
Beckmann and Thelen contend that because liberal democracy involves little more than a laissez-
faire politics, liberal democratic governments will in all probability be unable to address the 
problem of natural resource depletion, for example, insofar as they lack the institutions and 
infrastructure necessary to facilitate the open deliberation and coordinated efforts that would be 
required to effectively address such an immense problem. In short, what these scholars suggest is 
that “reformist politics within the DSP is inadequate to the task of environmental remediation[, 
and that] . . . a radical ‘green’ politics may be necessary that calls into question the very 
 
                                                 
42 Kilbourne, Beckmann and Thelen, “The Role of the Dominant Social Paradigm in Environmental Attitudes: A 
Multinational Examination,” 196. 
43 It appears as though Kilbourne and his colleagues, in their argument concerning the inverse relation between 
technological optimism and environmental concern, are implying that technological optimism involves an individual 
placing their unequivocal faith in technological solutions to environmental and social problems. This orientation 
spares the individual of the unpalatable task of questioning the legitimacy of the existing global economy—even 
though it is possible that the so-called technological solutions, generated under the auspices of this economy, may 
well only operate to slow, rather than stop, the (technologically) irreparable environmental destruction wreaked 
through activities such as economic growth and global trade. 
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foundations of liberal democracies.”44 Despite these shortcomings of liberal democracy, it 
remains the dominant (and largely unquestioned) mode of political organization in the DSP. This 
leads Kilbourne and his colleagues to propose that individuals who are confident in the existing 
political dimension of the DSP, are less likely to be concerned about the environment and are, 
correlatively, less likely to embrace more environmentally benign behaviors. It is notable that the 
political perspective encouraged through the DSP resonates strongly with the market liberals’ 
unreserved embrace of “the way we have organized political and economic life on the planet.”45
Finally, Kilbourne and his colleagues advance that the economic dimension of the DSP is 
dominated by a liberal economic perspective, underpinned by notions such as “free markets, self-
interest as the sole motivator of behavior, prices as the mediator of exchange, and efficiency as 
the primary criterion for the effective functioning of markets.” It is significant that all of these 
notions are similarly present within the market liberal perspective on economics. For example, 
that “free markets and unlimited economic growth form the foundations of the economic 
dimension of the DSP,”
 
46
Questionnaires that Kilbourne, Beckmann and Thelen constructed to test their above-
mentioned three propositions, were completed by 742 university students in seven countries. 
Notably, close to 65 percent of the students ranked extremely high in terms of their adherence to 
all three dimensions of the DSP. After careful study of the many responses, Kilbourne and his 
colleagues were able to confirm the existence of an inverse relation between, on the one hand, the 
 in no way conflicts with the market liberal view that unleashing the 
invisible hand of the (free) market, and thereby speeding up global economic growth and 
development, is what is needed to solve environmental and social problems. Equally, for 
example, the DSP belief that environmental problems—if they can at all be linked to the 
market—arise from rare market failures, to a certain extent mirrors the market liberal perspective 
on this matter. What is also clear from these beliefs alone is that the economic dimension of the 
DSP is characterized by an immense confidence in economic growth as the panacea for all ills, 
and it is such economic optimism that leads Kilbourne and his colleagues to propose that 
individuals who have faith in the economic dimension of the DSP, are unlikely to be concerned 
about the environment and are, correlatively, unlikely to embrace more environmentally benign 
behaviors. 
                                                 
44 Kilbourne, Beckmann and Thelen, “The Role of the Dominant Social Paradigm in Environmental Attitudes: A 
Multinational Examination,” 197. 
45 Clapp and Dauvergne, Paths to a Green World, 8. 
46 Kilbourne, Beckmann and Thelen, “The Role of the Dominant Social Paradigm in Environmental Attitudes: A 
Multinational Examination,” 197-198. 
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degree of an individual’s adherence to the DSP, and on the other hand, their level of 
environmental concern (and willingness to adopt more environmentally benign behaviors).47
 
 In 
other words, their study revealed, in no uncertain terms, that the DSP of contemporary society 
markedly diminishes the chances of the individual adopting pro-environmental behavior or even 
displaying environmental concern. And their study also brought to light that such unwillingness 
to adopt environmentally benign behaviors, and such a lack of environmental concern, are further 
strengthened by the fact that within the DSP, 
the usual approach to examining ultimate ends is to take conventional priorities such as economic growth as 
given and determine from them the ultimate end that is consistent with and legitimates the status quo. If, for 
example, we accept economic growth as a given, we would choose material wealth as the desideratum rather 
than social justice since material wealth is the outcome that economic growth produces most effectively. 
Using this strategy, conventional priorities consistently turn out to be what we ought to be pursuing and the 
status quo is vindicated.48
 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
Social greens and bioenvironmentalists are, then, confronted by a formidable double enemy. On 
the academic front, they are obliged to counter the economistic reasoning of the market liberals 
and, to a certain extent, the institutionalists. Yet, if one assumes that the majority of individuals 
may well adhere to the DSP of contemporary society—which, as we have seen, strikingly mirrors 
the market liberal worldview49
                                                 
47 Ibid., 202. 
—social greens and bioenvironmentalists are also tasked with 
literally ‘converting’ the individual-in-society. That is, in order to instill environmental concern 
in the individual, and to instigate collective pro-environmental action in the long run, these 
environmentalists have, through their writings, to actively undermine their reader’s existing faith 
in the technological, political and economic dimensions of the DSP. In the next chapter, I 
examine the works of the social green, Wolfgang Sachs, and the bioenvironmentalist, Thomas 
Princen, in order to show that these theorists engage in just such strategies. However, as I will 
also indicate, these strategies are grounded in a very specific conception of autonomy, which is 
not without its problems. 
48 Ibid., 196. 
49 See note 33 above. 
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Chapter Two: An exploration of the strategic nature of social green 
and bioenvironmentalist writings 
 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, in Paths to a Green World, Clapp and Dauvergne show that 
environmentalism constitutes a disputed domain—with environmental theorists, on the basis of 
diverse assumptions, theories and values, offering conflicting arguments concerning the causes 
of, and the solutions to, the environmental and social problems of our time. The most important 
point of contestation between environmentalists, according to Clapp and Dauvergne, concerns 
whether “the way we have organized political and economic life on the planet” operates in the 
interest of environmental and social wellbeing.50 Market liberals and institutionalists would argue 
that it does; that is, despite disagreeing on some matters, they share the conviction that the 
existing politico-economic organization of society, to the extent that it engenders economic 
growth and development, is environmentally and socially beneficial. But social greens and 
bioenvironmentalists oppose this perspective—they completely reject the existing politico-
economic organization of society, on the grounds that the economic growth and development 
facilitated through this particular form of societal organization constitute the primary causes of 
our environmental and social crises. Thus, for social greens and bioenvironmentalists, it is 
imperative to operate against the technological, political and economic trajectories of 
contemporary society. And they believe that this operation has to be carried out by ordinary 
individuals, because it is virtually inconceivable that governments and global institutions would 
ever deviate from their economistic modi operandi by drastically curbing economic growth, 
development, and consumerism. However, because it is possible that the majority of individuals 
adhere to what Kilbourne, Beckmann and Thelen identify as the ‘dominant social paradigm’ 
(DSP) of contemporary society51
                                                 
50 Clapp and Dauvergne, Paths to a Green World, 8. 
—a paradigm which mirrors the market liberal worldview in its 
endorsement of the status quo—social greens and bioenvironmentalists are faced with an onerous 
task. That is, in addition to countering market liberal and institutionalist perspectives through 
their texts, they have also to instigate in their readers an unequivocal disillusionment with the 
DSP—in the hope that such disillusionment will impel them to embrace more environmentally 
benign behaviors. 
51 Kilbourne, Beckmann and Thelen, “The Role of the Dominant Social Paradigm in Environmental Attitudes: A 
Multinational Examination,” 193. 
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In what follows, I aim to show that the most recent (single-authored) texts of the social 
green, Wolfgang Sachs, and of the bioenvironmentalist, Thomas Princen, are manifestations of 
precisely such a strategy. In other words, through close examination of Sachs’ Planet Dialectics 
and Princen’s The Logic of Sufficiency, I attempt to reveal that these theorists both operate 
against market liberal and institutionalist perspectives, and go to extraordinary lengths to provoke 
their readers to abandon their faith in what is tantamount to the DSP—through incisive critical 
analyses of ostensibly beneficent processes and notions, such as (economic) development and 
efficiency. Admittedly, my decision to analyze, specifically, Sachs’ and Princen’s works, was 
influenced by factors other than this definite strategic and methodological resonance between 
their two above-mentioned texts. My choice was also motivated by the fact that Sachs and 
Princen are two prominent theorists in the field of environmentalism,52
 
 as well as by the fact that 
an academic dialogue exists between them: for instance, in a single work—namely The Logic of 
Sufficiency—Princen comments positively on one of Sachs’ earlier texts, while Sachs, in his turn, 
offers praise for Princen’s book (LS, 336, back page). Now, however, it is time to examine Sachs’ 
and Princen’s respective works, with reference to what are arguably their attempts at 
undermining the market liberal and institutionalist perspectives and the DSP of contemporary 
society, and in relation to the specific conception of individual autonomy that appears to have 
informed their theoretical strategies. 
 
Wolfgang Sachs’ Planet Dialectics: Explorations in Environment and 
Development 
 
In his preface to Planet Dialectics, Wolfgang Sachs advances that through the essays compiled in 
his book, he endeavors to address two essential issues. His first aim is to investigate “Western-
style development, examining its hidden assumptions, its technological glamour, [and] its 
economic obsessions;” and his second, is to instigate the abandonment of this model of 
development in favor of, among other things, embracing “other cultures; creating sophisticated 
but moderate-impact technologies; putting a stop to the reign of relentless accumulation; and 
appreciating ways of living that are simple in means, but rich in ends” (PD, xi). Accordingly, in 
                                                 
52 The esteem in which both Sachs and Princen are held is, albeit implicitly, indicated in the mention that they 
receive in Clapp and Dauvergne’s Paths to a Green World. Clapp and Dauvergne, Paths to a Green World, 12, 110, 
234, 248. 
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what follows, I firstly trace Sachs’ critical analysis of this Western model of development—an 
analysis that exposes the political archaeology of development, problematizes the neo-liberal 
economic assumptions that underpin it, and reveals the role that technology has played in 
furthering it.53
 
 And secondly, I examine what Sachs posits as an alternative to this model of 
development, and how he believes a civilizational embrace of this alternative could be facilitated. 
Ultimately, through focusing on these aspects of Planet Dialectics, I endeavor to disclose that 
Sachs, in the interest of fostering consensus concerning the causes of and solutions to our 
environmental and social ills, and with a view to instigating pro-environmental change, sets about 
undermining the market liberal (and institutionalist) worldviews on the academic front, and his 
readers’ faith in what is tantamount to the dominant social paradigm (DSP) of contemporary 
society. 
The birth, failures, and recuperations of the development idea 
 
Within the first pages of his text, Sachs indicates why he is undertaking an archaeological 
analysis of development—in short, he is intent on exposing its true nature, which is that of an 
“outdated monument to an immodest era” (PD, 3). The analyses that succeed this programmatic 
declaration are almost overwhelming in their detail, with the consequence that I trace only the 
most important points of Sachs’ argument here; this includes his account of the arbitrary birth of 
the development idea, its association with a specific conception of technology, and the numerous 
recuperations that this idea underwent in response to its equally numerous failures. 
Sachs advances that the “development idea” was born during the 1949 inauguration 
speech of President Harry Truman, in which the latter described the majority of the world as 
‘underdeveloped’ and, consequently, in need of aid. In short, Truman argued that the economic 
development of the globe—to be achieved through augmenting production and providing 
technical assistance—would play a decisive role in alleviating the suffering of the millions of 
inhabitants of underdeveloped areas (PD, 3). However, Sachs argues, this development strategy 
envisioned by Truman and implemented by, among other institutions, the World Bank, was based 
on extremely narrow-minded conceptions of ‘poverty’ and ‘wealth,’ and correlatively, of 
‘underdeveloped’ and ‘developed.’ That is, as Sachs points out in reference to an early (1948-
                                                 
53 These three dimensions—political, economic and technological—of Sachs’ analysis, unavoidably overlap, owing 
to the complex interweaving of politics, economics and technology in the contemporary era. Because of this, I do not 
attempt to separate these dimensions of Sachs’ analysis from one another when I render an account of his work. 
 54 
1949) World Bank report, societies across the world were unfairly designated as ‘poor’ on the 
basis of the fact that their per capita income was far lower than per capita income in the United 
States at the time. For instance, according to the World Bank report to which Sachs here refers, 
this economic discrepancy “plainly revealed . . . [b]oth the need and potential for 
development.”54 Further, argues Sachs, reports such as these betray the fact that Truman’s 
development strategy entailed nothing less than the projection of the American (economistic) 
model of society onto the entire globe. Thus, his strategy in effect disdained the economies of 
Southern nations, and involved a derogation of these nations’ traditional values and modes of 
existence, which were characteristically “free from the frenzy of accumulation” (PD, 10). 
Unfortunately, though, rather than oppose Truman’s development strategy, the leaders of the 
nations of the South unquestioningly embraced this American societal model, and internalized the 
North’s demeaning perception of their countries with much alacrity. According to Sachs, the 
amenability of Southern nations to this new worldview and this new self-image can be attributed 
to their engrossment with the “magic technology” of the North, which constitutes a crucial 
instrument of development, and captivates people by affording them power over time and space 
that far exceeds their bodily capacity (PD, 15). In fact, Sachs adds that engrossment with 
technology was not exclusive to ‘underdeveloped’ Southern nations; rather, the seductions of 
technology evoked a global response, with John F. Kennedy, for example, asserting that people 
worldwide have come to “see the abundance which modern science can bring,” and to “know the 
tools of progress are within their reach.”55
Briefly, Sachs’ view of technology as anything but innocent, stems from his (social green) 
perspective on how technology has been, and will probably continue to be, utilized in the service 
of the global economy. To begin with, as discussed in Chapter One, social greens believe that 
unless technological innovation is accompanied by a radical transformation of the global 
economy—away from the rampant economic growth, resource-depleting development, and 
insatiable consumerism that cause our existing environmental (and social) crises—so-called 
technological solutions to our crises will continue to amount to little more than ‘bandage 
treatment.’ In addition, although Sachs endorses the nineteenth century socialist notion that “a 
 In other words, the North and the South alike accepted 
the doctrine that more technology is always better—but Sachs warns that through doing so, they 
fell prey to the “tragic fallacy” that technologies are as innocent as tools (PD, 13). 
                                                 
54 World Bank, quoted in Wolfgang Sachs, Planet Dialectics: Explorations in Environment and Development 
(London: Zed Books, 1999), 8. 
55 J. F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address, Washington, DC (January 20, 1961), quoted in Wolfgang Sachs, Planet 
Dialectics: Explorations in Environment and Development (London: Zed Books, 1999), 12. 
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certain level of technology is indispensable for overcoming scarcity” and inequality, he 
nonetheless contends that 
 
the emerging bio-physical limits suggest that there is also a ceiling to nature-intensive development beyond 
which equity can no longer be achieved. Chemical agriculture, the automobile society or meat-based nutrition 
are cases in point[, as t]hese levels of [technologically-driven] development are structurally oligarchic: they 
cannot be generalized across the world without putting the life chances of everybody in jeopardy. (PD, 170-
171) 
 
What Sachs implies by this is that the development facilitated through technologies cannot lead 
to global (economic) equity without eroding our life-support system—that as long as technology 
operates in the service of open-ended economic growth and corporate expansion, it will remain 
fundamentally unsustainable from an ecological point of view. And Sachs, like other social 
greens, believe that the global economy does not heed this reality, with the consequence that 
technologically-driven development continues unabated, to the detriment of the environment 
upon which all of us ultimately depend. Moreover, according to Sachs, what people also fail to 
realize is that a technologically-orientated society requires the subjugation of the majority of the 
population. For example, as Sachs explains, most fail to realize that even something as 
commonplace as an electric mixer could not function “were it not assured that, in the whole 
system chain, everything happens at the right time and place and is of the right quality.” This is 
because “coordination and scheduling, training and discipline, not just energy, are the elixir of 
life for these . . . devices[, which] . . . appear . . . labour-saving, yet . . . function only if people 
themselves turn into tools” (PD, 14). And finally, Sachs contends that what people also overlook 
is the fact that technologies are “culturally potent”—in our technocentric societies, people’s 
perceptions of their (empirical and social) worlds have altered in such a way that nature is 
increasingly being 
 
viewed in mechanical terms, space is seen as geometrically homogenous and time as linear . . . [And t]he 
flood of machines . . . has . . . washed away traditional aspirations and ideals[, replacing them with] . . . 
aspirations and ideals ordered on the coordinates of technological civilization—not only for the limited 
number who benefit from it, but also for the far larger number who watch its fireworks from the sidelines. 
(PD, 14-15) 
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That the South, like the rest of the world, failed to take cognizance of these all-but-innocent 
aspects of technology, is evident from the fact that the professional development coaching staff, 
sent into Southern nations from 1949 onwards, met with very little resistance. And ultimately, 
argues Sachs, such development coaching lead to “an unprecedented flowering of agencies and 
administrations . . . to address all aspects of life—to count, organize, mindlessly intervene and 
sacrifice, all in the name of ‘development’” (PD, 6). To sum up, then, from Sachs’ perspective, 
the global deployment of Truman’s development strategy, which was carried out much “like a 
moral crusade” (PD, 9), spelled disaster—development ruined the ancient hierarchies, traditions, 
and alternative mentalities of the South. Perhaps even worse, it failed to alleviate the problem of 
poverty for which it had been designed in the first place. That is, by the late 1960s, it had become 
clear that poverty, (measured in terms of per capita income), was not being eradicated through the 
(economic) development of nations. For Sachs, this proved, beyond a doubt, that equating social 
progress with development (i.e. industrialization, economic growth, and increased levels of 
production and consumption), constituted nothing less than a “collective hallucination” (PD, 6). 
However, instead of abandoning the development idea, leaders of the North decided to 
recuperate it. As Sachs points out, in 1973, Robert McNamara, the president of the World Bank, 
announced a new development strategy. This time, development would focus on rural 
development and small farmers, in an effort “to eradicate absolute poverty”—no longer through 
raising per capita income, but through “the elimination of malnutrition and illiteracy, the 
reduction of infant mortality and the raising of life expectancy standards to those of developed 
nations.”56
Ultimately, from Sachs’ perspective, all of the development strategies that have been 
devised up till now, have involved an erroneous equation of frugality with poverty. That is, 
because the North possesses a commodity-based culture, its development proponents fail to 
realize that the cultures of other peoples may encourage a way of life that is not centered on 
economic gain, nor on the acquisition of goods (PD, 18). And as a consequence of this oversight, 
 Sachs contends that this first recuperation of the development idea set a bizarre 
precedent, because from then on, whenever a new problem, (either caused or aggravated by 
development), was identified, yet another development strategy was devised to remedy it. This, in 
effect, meant that the concept of development “was repeatedly stretched until it included both the 
strategy that inflicted the injury and the strategy designed for therapy” (PD, 33).  
                                                 
56 My emphasis. Robert McNamara, “Address to the Board of Governors,” World Bank, Nairobi (September 24, 
1973), quoted in Wolfgang Sachs, Planet Dialectics: Explorations in Environment and Development (London: Zed 
Books, 1999), 9. 
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the deployment of development strategies to remedy what is construed as poverty, actually 
destroys frugal societies and creates destitution—an actual form of poverty that comes into being 
when traditionally frugal societies are deprived of the community cohesion and the natural 
resources that allowed them to subsist without money. Despite this, Sachs argues, the 
development idea has remained ineradicable, in part owing to its benign appearance, and in part 
owing to various efforts that have been made to recuperate it. But Sachs stresses that we must 
remain aware of its insidious effects and the invalid notions that underpin it—that is, he cautions 
us that the development idea “allows any intervention to be sanctified in the name of a higher 
evolutionary goal,” and that Truman’s erroneous assumptions “travel like blind passengers under 
its cover” (PD, 7). 
To prove his point, Sachs devotes much attention to problematizing the most recent 
revival of the development idea, in particular. That is, he goes to some length not only to identify 
the failures of the old development strategies that necessitated the recuperation of the 
development idea in its present form of ‘sustainable development,’ but also to disclose the 
enormously problematic assumptions inherent in this new form of development itself. Notably, 
this stance places him squarely at odds with those environmentalists who Clapp and Dauvergne 
identify as proponents of sustainable development, namely, the market liberals and the 
institutionalists. 
In his discussion of events leading up to the formulation of sustainable development, 
Sachs indicates that by the mid-1990s, the need to revive the development idea had become 
imperative, firstly, because of the worsening crisis of justice. In short, by this time, what was 
being realized was that the development of the globe had exacerbated rather than remedied 
inequality; for instance, the 1996 Human Development Report revealed that despite the rapid 
pace of globalization and development, between 1960 and 1996 alone, the disparity between the 
per capita income of industrial and developing nations had actually tripled (PD, 73). Sachs 
attributes such failure to the fact that development, carried out via economic globalization, 
actually involves the countries and corporations of the North parasitizing upon the rich resources 
and cheap labor of the South—accordingly, Sachs argues, the economic ascendancy of Northern 
nations “has in part been fuelled by the riches drained from the South through the network of 
global interconnections” (PD, 72). Moreover, he contends that this North-South economic 
division is mimicked within Southern nations themselves, insofar as the elite and the middle class 
benefit from economic globalization and development, at the expense of the further 
impoverishment of the majority. However, Sachs contends that the North can no longer ignore 
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this crisis of justice, because the interconnectedness facilitated through globalization “not only 
joins the haughty North with the South, but also the chaotic South with the North” (PD, 75). That 
is, on the one hand, the North is beginning to regard the South not as a promised land but as a hub 
of catastrophe, and is thus intent on dominating activities in the South, not in order to facilitate 
economic prosperity but rather to “stop itself being pulled down by the collapse of the South” 
(PD, 22). On the other hand, leaders of the South, having through the earlier promptings of the 
North successfully succumbed to the “development syndrome” (PD, 42), are in their turn 
insisting on their right to develop, in order to attain the levels of prosperity that had been 
promised to them during the 1970s.  
The second factor that, according to Sachs, necessitated the recuperation of the 
development idea, was the intensifying crisis of nature. In short, the dominant economistic 
conception of society as an economy, rather than as something that has an economy, which 
instigated the belief in the possibility of unlimited economic growth, had “been exposed as a 
serious illusion” (PD, 75). This is because the bio-physical limits of economic growth were 
becoming increasingly evident as more and more environmental problems, such as ozone 
depletion and acid rain, were coming to the fore. And to the alarm of the North, it was apparent 
that these problems were being caused not only through industrial activities of the North but also 
through those of the South. 
Thus, for the development idea to be successfully revived, its new strategy would have to 
address both the crisis of justice and that of nature, since development was, from the outset, 
construed as something that could be universalized in space (i.e. spread across the social 
continuum of all nations) and perpetuated in time (i.e. continued well into the future). In other 
words, development newly conceived would have to benefit more people while utilizing less 
natural resources and waste sinks. And Sachs argues that ‘sustainable development,’ the most 
recent revival of the development idea, attempts to achieve precisely this, but that it is certain to 
fail. This is because, according to Sachs, the goal of sustainable development constitutes an 
impossibility: as long as justice continues to be understood as the right to economic development, 
the crisis of nature and that of justice will remain irreconcilable—since economic growth is 
unavoidably resource-intensive, and hence, environmentally destructive.57
                                                 
57 That is, as discussed in Chapter One, social greens and bioenvironmentalists argue that even if ‘resource-efficient’ 
technologies are employed in production processes—so that more output is produced per unit of input—this does not 
lead to any saving of natural resources. Rather, because open-ended economic growth and ever-increasing 
consumption are accepted as given, and because the efficient production of goods leads to the lowering of product 
 Nevertheless, the 1987 
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World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) proceeded to define this new 
form of development, as one “that meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”58
Within the contest perspective, argues Sachs, economic growth is prioritized over all else, 
yet proponents of this perspective maintain that such growth stands to remedy, rather than 
exacerbate, environmental problems. For them, the primary cause of our environmental 
predicament is neither economic growth nor development, but rather inefficient resource 
allocation, wasteful production processes, and the population explosion in the South. 
Accordingly, proponents of the contest perspective advance that our environmental predicament 
can only be solved through the lifting of restrictions on trade and investment, in the interest of 
speeding up the global economic growth and development that precipitate, among other 
processes, the instantiation of more stringent environmental standards and the adoption of clean 
technologies. For Sachs, all of the above arguments indicate that in terms of the contest 
perspective, the aim of sustainable development is not the protection of nature from expansionist 
development, but rather the protection of development from the nuisance of nature. Further, he 
contends, this nuanced interpretation of sustainable development permits proponents of the 
 However, Sachs warns us that this 
definition has instigated consensus rather than clarity (PD, 76-77). This is because, although the 
definition includes acknowledgement of the fact that, given our planet’s bio-physical limitations, 
development can only be perpetuated in time if it is modified or restrained in some or other way 
in the present, it includes no indication of what needs, nor whose needs, are to be met, and 
therefore fails to address the crisis of justice. Furthermore, because of the opacity of this 
definition, ‘sustainable development’ remains dangerously malleable—the concept can be 
employed to promote any number of political and/or economic agendas. Sachs substantiates this 
claim through showing how the concept of sustainable development has been appropriated by 
proponents of what he refers to as the ‘contest’ and the ‘astronaut’s’ perspectives. What is also 
significant is that, judging by Sachs’ descriptions of the contest perspective and the astronaut’s 
perspective, the former perspective bears a strong resemblance to what Clapp and Dauvergne 
identify as the market liberal worldview, while the latter perspective, in turn, mirrors what they 
identify as the institutionalist worldview. 
                                                                                                                                                              
prices, all that the employment of resource-efficient technologies actually leads to is greater consumer demand, and 
correlatively, an increase in the throughput of natural resources. 
58 WCED (World Commission on Environment and Development), Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1987), quoted in Wolfgang Sachs, Planet Dialectics: Explorations in Environment and Development (London: 
Zed Books, 1999), 76. 
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contest perspective to regard the South as the sole arena for ecological adjustment, and to frame 
the North as “the home of reason, stability and—why not?—cleanliness” (PD, 82).  
Since Sachs writes from what Clapp and Dauvergne term a social green worldview, and 
since the contest perspective of which he speaks bears an uncanny resemblance to what they 
identify as the market liberal worldview, it is unsurprising that Sachs proceeds to problematize 
this contest perspective on numerous grounds.59 Among other things, he criticizes the manner in 
which proponents of the contest perspective systematically ignore the fact that transnational 
corporations (TNCs)—which they construe as important agents of economic growth, and hence, 
of environmental improvement—habitually invest in environmentally and socially damaging 
industries. In addition, Sachs contends that rather than becoming more stringent, environmental 
regulations have become ‘stuck in the mud’ because of the competitive nature of free trade; also, 
he asserts that measures, “imposed under the . . . blackmailing care of the IMF structural 
adjustment programmes” (PD, 144), to ‘recuperate’ the economies of developing nations, have 
devastating environmental and social effects. Another of Sachs’ attacks on this (economistic) 
contest perspective is concentrated on the issue of eco-efficiency. Proponents of this 
perspective—like other economistic thinkers—suggest that an ‘efficiency revolution,’ to be 
brought about by economic globalization and technology transfer, will solve our environmental 
problems without damaging the possibility of future development. But Sachs opposes this notion, 
through arguing that even though market rationalization and technological innovation do lower 
the use of certain resources, levels of resource use will continue to increase as long as economic 
growth and consumerism remain unchecked.60
In turn, within the astronaut’s perspective, biospherical stability is of primary importance; 
that is, the earth is regarded as a scientific and political object of such singular significance that 
the differences between nations, their values, and their aspirations, are viewed as immaterial. 
Sachs proceeds to explain that this unique perspective was facilitated through the convergence of 
a number of events. To begin with, argues Sachs, the first photographs of the earth from space 
allowed the planet to be perceived as a controllable object under the gaze of humankind, rather 
than as something inscrutable that envelops humankind. Secondly, global environmental 
 Accordingly, he advances that “in the history of 
industrial society, efficiency gains have quite consistently been converted into new opportunities 
for expansion” (PD, 136), rather than into opportunities for the conservation of natural resources. 
                                                 
59 See the previous chapter for a detailed study of the social greens’ various attacks on the economistic reasoning of 
the market liberals. 
60 See note 57 above. 
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problems such as ozone depletion and acid rain led to the realization that the adverse effects of 
industrial pollution make themselves felt on a global scale—that industrial wastes “do not show 
up at customs posts or travel with passports” (PD, 57). Thirdly, enormous advances in the 
scientific study of the biosphere as an ecosystem, along with the proliferation of new, complex 
instruments and equipment, made possible the measurement of global processes through, for 
example, satellite observation and worldwide data processing. The convergence of these events, 
then, encouraged the objectification of the earth as a ‘patient,’ and allowed proponents of the 
astronaut’s perspective to establish, as their primary goal, the monitoring of the earth’s condition. 
And according to Sachs, it is this goal that “frames ‘sustainable development’ through an 
astronaut’s perspective” (PD, 84). Also, very importantly, because adherents to the astronaut’s 
perspective take cognizance of the fact that the negative impact of our (currently unchecked) 
industrial processes is experienced on a global scale, they hold that the entire world—not just the 
South—is responsible for ecological adjustment. Accordingly, they insist on the necessity of 
establishing “global institutions and ground rules” (PD, 85), in order to guarantee that stringent 
environmental standards are followed, and clean technologies are adopted, in regions both North 
and South of the equator. It is in this latter respect, in particular, that the equivalence between the 
astronaut’s perspective, and what Clapp and Dauvergne identify as the institutionalist worldview, 
is brought into conspicuity. Yet, writing from what Clapp and Dauvergne label a social green 
worldview, Sachs by no means spares the astronaut’s perspective of criticism. Most notably, he 
advances that proponents of the astronaut’s perspective make the erroneous assumption that an 
‘efficiency revolution,’ facilitated through (guided) economic growth, technology transfer, and 
global institutional collaboration, will resolve our environmental problems. For Sachs, this 
assumption prevents those who adhere to the astronaut’s perspective from identifying, and 
challenging the continuation of, what is actually causing our environmental crisis—namely, 
development itself. 
 
A radically alternative vision: Sachs’ call for a development-free civilization 
 
As the reasonable alternative to both the contest perspective and the astronaut’s perspective, 
Sachs promotes the ‘home perspective,’ to which he and numerous other “dissident intellectuals” 
as well as social movements subscribe (PD, 87). What is of central value to this perspective is 
neither the pursuit of economic growth, nor the attainment of biospherical stability via 
‘sustainable development,’ but rather the engendering of local livelihoods. In short, this radically 
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different strategy of the home perspective derives from the fact that its proponents regard 
‘development,’ facilitated through economic globalization, as the primary cause of our 
environmental and social problems rather than their remedy. This conviction, in turn, leads 
proponents of the home perspective to perceive ‘sustainable development’ as an oxymoron, 
because for them, as long as development continues to be equated with economic growth, 
technological proliferation, and increased levels of consumption, it could never be spatially nor 
temporally sustainable. 
In addition, argues Sachs, it is in the home perspective alone that the crisis of nature and 
that of justice truly coincide, because proponents of the home perspective alone recognize that 
through development, both nature and justice are undermined. That is, within the home 
perspective, (economic) development is identified as a process that involves not only the 
overexploitation of the natural resources of a country, but also the destitution of large sections of 
its population—specifically because development often entails powerful figures illegitimately 
seizing natural resources from local communities that have for centuries relied on these resources 
for subsistence.61
                                                 
61 For a local example of such deprivation through ‘development,’ see note 21 above. 
 Thus, for those who subscribe to the home perspective, and for these 
marginalized communities, sustainability can only ever be facilitated through resistance against 
development; with such resistance, in turn, best effected through encouraging the formation of 
societies that, guided by an ethic of sufficiency, are focused on localizing their economies. And 
Sachs goes on to argue that the remnants of societies, akin to those for which proponents of the 
home perspective hope, still exist in the South, and that the North would be well advised to learn 
from them. For example, Sachs advances, certain tribes in the so-called ‘Third World’ can teach 
the North that societies do not have to be “built on the compulsion to amass material wealth, 
[and] economic activity . . . geared to slick, zippy output;” they demonstrate that even if 
“‘economy’ is closely bound up with life . . . it does not [have to] stamp its rules and rhythms on 
the rest of society” (PD, 18). In short, demand for this kind of societal reform stems from the 
belief that the North, rather than the South, is the arena for ecological adjustment, because its 
style of affluence is inherently oligarchic. In support of this argument, Sachs invokes the 
bioenvironmentalists Mathis Wackernagel and William Rees, who have shown that the 
‘ecological footprint’ of countries of the North is much larger than their own territories, and that 
their ecological debts are immense because their disproportionate use of the biosphere has 
extended not over a few years but over many centuries. Consequently, for proponents of the 
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home perspective, the only means of remedying our environmental and social crises is for the 
North to cut down on its resource use—through a “reform of home” (PD, 87). 
Yet such reform would constitute a monumental task, not only because the throughput of 
energy and materials on the part of the North would have to be reduced by an astounding 70 to 90 
percent within the next fifty years, but also because, for that to happen, it would be necessary to 
“focus the social imagination on the revision of goals rather than on the revision of means” (PD, 
88). Why Sachs argues for the necessity of the latter is because from his perspective, the global 
drive towards clean technologies and efficient resource use may lead to the lowering of certain 
pollutants and of the use of certain resources, but will never lead to the conservation of nature, as 
efficiency gains are almost always used as opportunities for further expansion. Accordingly, he 
contends that we should rather focus on curbing development itself—since “even a clean 
economy could cheerfully continue eroding soils, cutting down forests, degrading biodiversity 
and heating the atmosphere” (PD, 171). This does not, however, imply that Sachs is dismissive of 
technologies that operate to lessen resource throughput and pollution emissions. Rather, his 
contention is simply that our environmental predicament will remain unsolved unless we adopt a 
“twin-rack approach:” on the one hand, an “intelligent rationalization of means”—an “efficiency 
revolution,” and on the other hand, a “prudent moderation of ends”—a “sufficiency revolution.” 
Ultimately, argues Sachs, it is owing to the need to instigate the adoption of this latter, rather 
‘alien,’ virtue of sufficiency, that the sustainability discourse of the home perspective focuses on 
changing people’s “values and institutional patterns . . . while both the contest and the astronaut’s 
perspective rather highlight the energetic-material processes, . . . the world of material quantities” 
(PD, 88). And notably, what can be gleaned from this argument is that Sachs’ home perspective 
differs from the contest and astronaut’s perspectives, in the same way that the social green and 
bioenvironmentalist worldviews, identified by Clapp and Dauvergne, differ from the market 
liberal and institutionalist worldviews. That is, unlike the contest and astronaut’s perspectives, 
(and correlatively, unlike the market liberal and institutionalist worldviews), the focus of the 
home perspective, (like that of the social green and bioenvironmentalist worldviews), falls 
squarely on radically changing the perspectives and behaviors of the individual-in-society, 
instead of leaving the resolution of our environmental predicament up to economic growth, or 
increased institutional collaboration alone. 
That Sachs is indeed focused on convincing his readers to change their perspectives and 
behaviors, at least as much as he is intent on countering competing theoretical perspectives, is 
quite clear from the rhetorical texture of certain of his expressions; for instance, Sachs begins his 
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discussion of the need to embrace non-economic models of prosperity with this provocative 
statement: “Fortunately for the home perspective, wealth is not anymore what it used to be” (PD, 
88). Yet, it must also be acknowledged that Sachs backs up such expressions with formidable 
theoretical argumentation—in this particular case, through uncovering the negative effects of the 
Western, economic, model of prosperity. In what follows, I trace his argument against this model 
of prosperity, in order to reveal that Sachs is, here, aiming at destabilizing his readers’ faith in 
what are tantamount to the technological, political and economic dimensions of the dominant 
social paradigm (DSP) of contemporary society, in order to undo the ecological apathy that such 
faith engenders.62
As examined in Chapter One, in “The Role of the Dominant Social Paradigm in 
Environmental Attitudes: A Multinational Examination,” Kilbourne, Beckmann, and Thelen 
advance that the technological dimension of the DSP involves individuals misconstruing 
technology as politically neutral, and in the main, being “so enamored of technology that they fail 
to adequately examine its full implications.” This orientation, in turn, causes them not only to 
perceive technology as environmentally benign, but even leads them to assume that there is a 
“technofix” for any conceivable environmental problem that humankind may encounter.
 For that matter, it can be argued that Sachs himself indicates his intention to 
achieve just this, because he states that if we wish to develop a new culture that is not 
preoccupied with development and consumption, it is crucial to “revisit the institutions and world 
views that have come into bloom with the rise of the fossil-intensive society” (PD, 197). 
63
                                                 
62 In Chapter One, I showed the correspondence between the dominant social paradigm (DSP) of contemporary 
society and the market liberal, (and to a lesser extent, the institutionalist) worldview. The DSP can, equally, be 
associated with the contest, (and to a lesser extent, the astronaut’s) perspective, owing to the parallels between, on 
the one hand, the market liberal worldview and the contest perspective, and on the other hand, the institutionalist 
worldview and the astronaut’s perspective. 
 
Throughout his text, Sachs questions the legitimacy of his readers’ faith in technology by, for 
example, highlighting the limitations of resource-efficient technologies, and emphasizing the un-
ecological manner in which technology is for the most part employed in the contemporary era. Of 
particular interest, though, is Sachs’ critical approach to the ‘technological blessing’ that is 
closest to home, namely, the fact that technology enables ordinary individuals to go further and to 
do things faster than ever before. Here, Sachs advances that, for “the modern mind, as the 
philosopher Günter Anders once suggested in ironic allusion to Kant’s ‘forms of apperception,’ 
space and time are the basic forms of hindrance,” and technology is revered for having 
significantly reduced these hindrances. However, Sachs proceeds to argue that technology, owing 
63 Kilbourne, Beckmann and Thelen, “The Role of the Dominant Social Paradigm in Environmental Attitudes: A 
Multinational Examination,” 196. 
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precisely to its reduction of these so-called hindrances, constitutes a primary source of misery to 
those who have access to it. For example, although technological devices are marketed as the 
ultimate time-savers, the more technologically saturated our lives become, the more “we feel . . . 
pressurized and driven by the lack of time.” Why this is the case, Sachs explains, is because the 
‘technological time’ in terms of which these devices operate, clashes not only with geological 
time, but also with social and individual timescales. That is, on the one hand, the environment 
cannot regenerate as fast as technologically-driven processes degrade it; and equally, on the other 
hand, the time needed for activities such as “researching, caring . . . cultivating friendships and 
doing arts, are at odds with the speed of the [technologically-driven] economy” (PD, 189-190, 
193-194). Because of this, Sachs believes that we should begin to urgently question the value that 
is usually attributed to technological devices, and to counter the idea—promoted by the likes of 
the mass media and the automobile industry—that acceleration confers absolute privilege and 
power upon the individual. In pointed reference to the automobile industry, Sachs marvels at the 
fact that “the speed Utopia of the nineteenth century still governs the development of automobile 
technology” and informs the desires of motorists, insofar as the most sought-after vehicles are 
still those that are “grotesquely overpowered”—this, in spite of the fact that the congestion of 
contemporary roadways makes sending these “speed machines out onto the streets . . . about as 
rational as shooting at sparrows with cannons” (PD, 203). 
In the final chapters of his text, Sachs also delivers numerous blows to what is tantamount 
to the political dimension of the DSP, specifically in relation to the way in which individuals in 
liberal democratic societies are encouraged to become increasingly acquisitive, and to adopt as 
their goal the unrestrained accumulation of wealth. In short, he advances that once Adam Smith 
had valorized work—in the formal economic sense—as the wellspring of national affluence, 
people became increasingly incapable of appreciating non-economic activities, such as raising 
children and forming friendships. As Sachs states, the “belief that everything of value is produced 
by marketable goods . . . found its complement in the belief that satisfaction derives from objects 
(and services) available from the market, and therefore from purchasing power” (PD, 207). Sachs 
warns, however, that such an economically-orientated perception of wealth is fundamentally 
flawed, because individuals who earn a comfortable wage are no less happy than the rich. In fact, 
he goes so far as to insist that the rich are frequently much less content than most people, as they 
are caught in a time trap. That is, while they may or may not spend more time at work than 
others, their leisure hours are engulfed by their material possessions: as Sachs points out, 
“beyond a certain number, things . . . become the thieves of time[, as g]oods . . . must be chosen, 
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bought, set up, used, experienced, maintained, tidied away, dusted, repaired, stored and disposed 
of” (PD, 211). In effect, what Sachs is trying to emphasize here is that wealth in possessions 
obliterates wealth in time, yet that it is time which is the most precious and restricted of all 
goods—for the obvious reason that we are finite beings, and because non-economic sources of 
contentment, such as friendship, study, and art, are crucial to human wellbeing but take a great 
deal of time to cultivate. 
Finally, as we saw in Chapter One, Kilbourne and his colleagues indicate that the 
economic dimension of the DSP is grounded in a liberal economic perspective, and thus centered 
on notions such as “free markets, self-interest as the sole motivator of behavior, prices as the 
mediator of exchange, and efficiency as the primary criterion for the effective functioning of 
markets.”64
To sum up, it is in the light of his problematization of what are tantamount to the 
technological, political and economic dimensions of the DSP, that Sachs exhorts his readers to 
reflect upon the possibility of adopting an alternative mode of being, in terms of which wealth in 
time takes precedence over wealth in possessions. That is, he asks us to earnestly contemplate the 
(non-economic) benefits that would derive from, among other things, choosing the length of 
one’s working day and thus gaining “sovereignty over one’s own time”—even if such 
sovereignty is gained through relinquishing a certain amount of purchasing power (PD, 207-208). 
Still, in whatever manner Sachs attempts to convince us to embrace the alternative lifestyles that 
he envisions, what he is in fact asking is no less than a “civilizational change” (PD, xii), 
involving a return to a life of frugality and a discarding of our obsessive interest in accumulation. 
And notably, Sachs asks for this societal reorientation not only for the sake of bringing to an end 
the crises of nature and of justice, but also for the sake of healing the disjointed lives of the 
rich—the sole beneficiaries of the economic development of the world. In other words, Sachs 
contends that the rich ultimately suffer from their wealth, and argues that this fact had already 
been noted by the sages of the East and West, who “almost unanimously recommended 
 In the preceding pages, I examined in some detail the sustained attack that Sachs 
launches against the Western model of development, and against the assumption, inherent in this 
model, that environmental and social progress can be facilitated through economic growth, free 
markets, and efficiency-regimes. As such, it would be rather superfluous to repeat that argument 
here. 
                                                 
64 Ibid., 197. 
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adherence to the principle of simplicity in the conduct of life,” since “the opposite to a simple 
lifestyle is . . . not a luxurious but a fragmented existence” (PD, 212). 
In short, throughout his text, Sachs affirms his faith in the ability of individuals to change 
both their perceptions of the world and their behavior; and he does so at an explicit level, as well 
as implicitly, through his conceptual problematization of what is tantamount to the dominant 
social paradigm (DSP) of contemporary society. Yet, certain of the remarks that Sachs makes in 
relation to the civilizational transformation for which he hopes, suggest that he is trying to make 
sense of people’s failure to change for the better. Perhaps the most telling is his indication that 
any pro-environmental transformation of society would be extremely difficult to achieve, because 
the self-limitation that it requires “implies a loss of power,” and “in what way [such] a 
renunciation of power for the sake of the common good could be reconciled with the quest for 
individual liberty remains [a] . . . conundrum” (PD, 89). The striking divergence between, on the 
one hand, Sachs’ belief in people’s capacity to change and, on the other hand, this perplexing 
conundrum, is of key importance to the third and fourth chapters of my dissertation. There, I 
attempt to provide an alternative explanation for people’s failure to change their perspectives and 
behaviors. Briefly, I consider the possibility that our ecological apathy derives not from an 
information deficit, nor even (as Sachs suggests) from a reluctance to relinquish power, but rather 
from a powerlessness which is intrinsic to our (predominantly non-cognitive/non-conscious) 
discursive constitution. But before I do so, it is necessary to turn to the work of Princen, and 
thereafter to identify and explore the specific conception of autonomy to which Sachs and 
Princen appear to adhere. 
 
 
Thomas Princen’s The Logic of Sufficiency 
 
That a definite strategic and methodological resonance exists between Princen’s The Logic of 
Sufficiency and Sachs’ Planet Dialectics, is perhaps best illustrated in Sachs’ appraisal of 
Princen’s text. Recall that Sachs, in his attempt to encourage his readers to adopt a life of 
frugality, furnishes a meticulous archaeological analysis of what he refers to as the ‘development 
idea,’ within which economic growth, technological proliferation, and increased levels of 
consumption are (mis)construed as unequivocal goods. In short, by way of his analysis, Sachs 
strives to disclose the error of the (economistic) assumptions that underpin ‘development,’ and 
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concomitantly, to shake his readers out of their uncritical acceptance of this idea. And Sachs’ 
praise of Princen’s The Logic of Sufficiency suggests that a similar methodological approach is at 
work in, and a corresponding transformative objective is intrinsic to, this latter text. He states: 
 
After reading this book, anyone still using the word ‘efficiency’ is bound to stumble and stutter. Masterfully 
dissecting the hidden economism among policymakers, Princen audaciously calls for ‘sufficiency’ as the 
cornerstone of a growth-free society.65
 
 
Princen, in his turn, corroborates this perspective on his text, through advancing, in the preface to 
this work, that we have to reorganize industrial society around new principles—the most 
important of which is sufficiency—yet that this crucial principle has “nowhere . . . been 
developed in a systematic way,” perhaps partly because “is absolutely contrary to efficiency, the 
dominant principle of material social organization today.” Accordingly, Princen argues, he aims 
through his book to build “the concept of sufficiency, contrasting it with efficiency, and 
grounding it in everyday, organized practice” (LS, viii). In what follows, I firstly trace Princen’s 
problematization of the idea of efficiency and of related economistic notions that, according to 
him, prevent the principle of sufficiency from taking root within societies today. Secondly, I 
scrutinize what Princen posits as an alternative to our existing, efficiency-orientated, paradigm—
namely, the logic of sufficiency—and thereafter reflect on how, he believes, a paradigmatic shift 
towards the embrace of sufficiency as a social organizing principle could be facilitated. 
Ultimately, one of the primary aims of my examination of these aspects of The Logic of 
Sufficiency is to highlight the way in which Princen, through persuasive theoretical argumentation 
and case studies, problematizes the market liberal, (and to a lesser extent, the institutionalist) 
worldview on the academic front, and challenges his readers’ faith in what is tantamount to the 
dominant social paradigm (DSP) of contemporary society. 
 
Debunking the logic of efficiency 
 
Within his text, Princen indicates that the dominant rationality of our time involves an 
endorsement of “the efficient and the judicial” above all else (LS, 24), and the concomitant 
derogation of alternative values, such as sufficiency. Accordingly, he advances, almost any 
                                                 
65 Wolfgang Sachs, quoted in Thomas Princen, The Logic of Sufficiency (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2005), back 
page. 
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venture—however ecologically or ethically dubious it may be—will find support if the person 
who proposes it can “find a way to frame it as an efficiency gain.” In other words, in the 
contemporary world, “[e]fficiency trumps all;” it has “in its evolution . . . achieved the status of a 
self-evident truth, the gospel truth” (LS, 84). However, rather than accepting this state of affairs, 
Princen argues for the necessity of problematizing efficiency—of deposing this conceptual 
“emperor” of our time (LS, 47), in order to make way for alternative rationalities and principles, 
with reference to which we may be able to restructure our societies in a more ecological and just 
manner. In what follows, I examine how Princen attempts to do just this; that is, how he 
undermines the legitimacy efficiency, via a historical analysis of its rise to dominance, a 
theoretical enquiry into its political leanings, and a delineation of the negative repercussions of its 
reign. 
Princen begins his historical unpacking of efficiency with the argument that throughout 
time, power has been the most ubiquitous principle in societies. In other words, there have always 
been, and always will be, select individuals who, because they “command the armies, amass the 
gold, and write the rules get the resources, and . . . decide who gets what’s left” (LS, 49). 
However, Princen advances, power is always accompanied by other social organizing principles 
such as caste and divine right—and today, its chief accompanying principle is efficiency. That is, 
even though efficiency may have played some role in the organization of earlier societies, from 
the late nineteenth century onwards, efficiency effectively thwarted all other values to become 
not only the leading managerial principle but also the most pervasive social organizing principle. 
It is this rise to dominance that Princen sets out to trace. 
During the Middle Ages, argues Princen, efficiency connoted suitability and 
effectiveness, as it remained closely connected with the Aristotelian conception of the causus 
efficiens, or, the work and instruments that, together with an overall goal (causus finalis), a 
design (causus formalis), and materials (causus materialis), constituted the “four conceptually 
distinct and essential causes for rational human use of material resources.” Thus, if one were 
building a house, efficiency would imply not “the speed . . . nor . . . the cost” of the labor (as it 
does today), but rather “the fit, the appropriateness of the construction, the effectiveness of the 
builder and of the process of building.” However, Princen contends, the definition of efficiency 
underwent a vast transformation when, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, there emerged 
“a new set of ‘rulers’ . . . with . . . a new linguistic need” for a term that would complement and 
buttress the emergence of industrial society. Among other things, this term would need to 
connote scientific, engineering and economic excellence, involve an implicit valorization of the 
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new industrial machines, as well as imply that these machines would spare the worker of great 
toil (LS, 51). At this juncture, advances Princen, efficiency lost its relation to such notions as 
effectiveness and value, and was instead redefined as a ratio of a desired result, expressed 
quantitatively.66
To sum up, Princen attributes this striking definitional transformation of efficiency 
primarily to the process of industrialization, and to the emergence of a market economy. But he is 
careful to emphasize that while Adam Smith may be regarded as the conceptual father of the 
productive economy, and accordingly, as the person who initiated the rise of efficiency to the 
level of a dominant organizing principle, it was only in the coincidence of two important events, 
over one hundred years after his death, that our modern concept of efficiency was consolidated. 
The first of these developments was the economists’ creation of their hypothetical “economic 
man, . . . who bases all decisions on perfect information to maximize personal gain.” Princen 
argues that this concept of ‘economic man’ allowed economic theory to become more 
“quantifiable,” and perhaps even “more ‘scientific.’” Yet, because large parts of society were 
“seeking to throw off the shackles of tradition and parochialism,” ordinary people began to mimic 
this idealized figure; in other words, what the economists had inadvertently created through their 
construction of an “analytic device” was in fact “a model for personal and organizational 
behavior.” The second development that facilitated the consolidation of our modern concept of 
efficiency was the rise of the corporation, which, according to Princen, proceeded not only to 
dominate in the realm of business, but also in the domain of general society—owing to the 
emergence of the belief that success in any sphere of life could best be assured through a 
‘corporate’ approach. For Princen, one of the most significant repercussions of this general 
societal reorientation, with reference to the corporate model, is that it led everyone to embrace 
efficiency simply because the corporation had done so. Yet, far from being of benefit to the 
whole of society, this valorization of efficiency played almost exclusively into the hands of the 
neoclassical economists and the corporations. This is because while classical economists, such as 
Adam Smith, were essentially philosophers who wished to further the altruistic goal of ensuring 
 Once efficiency had been redefined in this manner, it could be employed by 
economists to “convert the notions of work and constraint into the notion of trade-offs in market 
transactions,” and to frame “efficient solutions to problems of production [as] . . . those that 
improve a benefit-to-cost ratio for producer or consumer” (LS, 52). 
                                                 
66 That this definition of efficiency has maintained even into recent times is evinced by the term being defined, in a 
1983 dictionary, as “The ratio of work done or energy expended to the energy supplied in the form of food or fuel.” 
Funk & Wagnall’s Standard Desk Dictionary, 1983 ed., s.v. “efficiency.” 
 71 
“wealth for all,” the neoclassical economists divested economics of this moral underpinning 
insofar as, under their auspices, Smith’s imperative “gave way to just wealth.” Accordingly, the 
neoclassical economists, “along with the physicists and engineers,” transformed “efficiency from 
a qualitative notion to a quantitative one,” and thereby “substitute[d] the philosopher’s concerns 
for social meaning and purpose for the engineer’s concern for mechanical precision” (LS, 55-57).  
In addition to the above, Princen advances further reasons for the rise of efficiency to the 
level of a dominant social organizing principle. Perhaps the most notable of these other reasons 
was the emergence of the belief that, through adopting efficiency methods, the United States 
could become the world’s leading nation. This belief was especially promoted by figures such as 
the engineer, Frederick Winslow Taylor, who first initiated scientific management (i.e. 
‘Taylorism’) in the factory, in an effort to discover the most efficient means of managing 
production (LS, 59). For example, in order to render workers ever more efficient, Taylor 
introduced the “differential piece rate” system, that involved the computing and fixing of “the 
shortest possible time for each job,” such that “if the worker finished the job in this time he was 
given a good price per piece,” whereas “if he failed, he was given a rate so low that the ‘lazy or 
inferior’ worker could not hold the job.” Importantly, though, Taylor actually hoped to extend 
such scientific management to the whole of society, on the premise that efficiency was not only 
of commercial use but could inspire greater productivity in general. Notably, Princen points out 
that, within Taylor’s frame of reference, the idea of efficiency strayed extremely far from its 
earlier association with effective, quality work. This is because Taylor believed, firstly, that it 
was only by way of scientific guidance that work could be done well, and secondly, that the 
ability to discern whether or not the work was done well resided with the “efficiency experts,” 
rather than with the workers themselves. Briefly, Taylor, 
 
by way of calculations in foot-pounds, and later with the aid of his techniques of time and motion studies . . . 
went in search of scientific laws of work to answer the closely related questions of how a job could best be 
done and how much could be produced. He derived a ‘science’ of shoveling, pig-iron lifting . . . etc., through 
a controlled variation of the isolated elements of each task. This . . . meant the conversion of the task into its 
physical quantities[, and it meant] . . . that the man who did the work could not derive or fully understand its 
science. The result was a radical separation of thinking from doing.67
 
 
                                                 
67 Samuel Haber, Efficiency and Uplift: Scientific Management in the Progressive Era 1890-1920 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1964), quoted in Thomas Princen, The Logic of Sufficiency (Massachusetts: The MIT 
Press, 2005), 59, 61. 
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Princen finds the above-mentioned ‘separation of thinking from doing’ particularly problematic, 
because its manifestation in workplace hierarchies utterly subordinates and alienates workers—to 
the extent that they are simply to take orders and ‘do,’ while their managers do the thinking and 
decide on how the workers can perform their task most efficiently. Thus, what such hierarchies in 
effect engender, is the reduction of the worker to a tool to be manipulated. And this is something 
that Taylor himself indicated in his argument that the worker must obey the orders given to him, 
without suggesting alternatives or protesting in any manner—in this regard, the social historican 
Samuel Haber, to whom Princen refers, invokes Taylor’s own statement that “‘It is absolutely 
necessary for every man in an organization to become one of a train of gear wheels.’”68
A further event that, from Princen’s perspective, decisively contributed to the rise of 
efficiency to the level of a dominant social organizing principle, was the Eastern Rate Case of 
1910-1911, which involved Eastern business interests contesting the setting of railroad shipping 
rates on the part of railroad owners and unionists. Louis D. Brandeis, who represented those 
challenging the high shipping rates, resolved the conflict by stressing the need for the scientific 
management of railroads. Such management, he argued, would make the railroads “more 
efficient” and, in so doing, allow railroad owners to make significant profits without having to 
increase their rates. In the eyes of the public, the outcome of this case constituted unequivocal 
proof of the fact that efficiency could solve even the most perplexing of problems—such as the 
perennial clash of interests between businesses that seek to maximize profits, and citizens who 
wish to spend as little as possible (LS, 63-64). 
 Further, 
Princen advances, neither Taylor nor any of his followers appear to have conceived this 
dehumanization of the worker as problematic, arguably because they assumed that the fruits of 
scientific management would in time be distributed to all. However, Princen suggests that it is 
possible that precisely these negative aspects of Taylorism created the perfect condition for the 
“efficiency craze” to truly take off, since the worker, although thoroughly subordinated in the 
workplace, could always counteract such subordination by adopting the role of efficient manager 
at home, and by wielding authority in the shopping mall (LS, 63).  
Ultimately, Princen argues, it is in the wake of all of these events that America’s 
‘efficiency craze’ took off, with efficiency spreading from the workplace into the social sphere, 
and operating not only to encourage hard work, but also, it was believed, to promote social 
                                                 
68 My emphasis. Samuel Haber, Efficiency and Uplift: Scientific Management in the Progressive Era 1890-1920 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), quoted in Thomas Princen, The Logic of Sufficiency (Massachusetts: 
The MIT Press, 2005), 62. 
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harmony. The spread of efficiency manifested itself in, among other things, the establishment of 
“efficiency societies,” a proliferation of efficiency expositions, and the publication of efficiency-
orientated literature (LS, 64-66). And the advocates of efficiency addressed themselves to, among 
many others, homemakers, the clergy, academics,69
                                                 
69 For example, as Princen points out, one of Taylor’s disciples, “Morris L. Cooke . . . recommended that professors 
be treated as producers, that lecture notes be standardized, and that the ‘student hour’ be adopted as a unit of 
measurement for administrative efficiency.” And even today, these “prescriptions . . . find . . . frequent expression in 
the administrative quarters of . . . academe. The language of efficient production (teaching and credentialing) in 
service to consumers (students and parents), . . . is pervasive (LS, 70). 
 and the United States government itself—as 
attested to by the establishment of “efficiency commissions” in approximately sixteen states (LS, 
71). Yet, Princen contends that the single most pernicious way in which efficiency influenced 
society was not through its infiltration of educational or governmental structures, but rather 
through its association with—of all things—consumption. Briefly, as Princen explains, in the first 
decades of the twentieth century, businesses began to relinquish their preoccupation with 
production, in favor of focusing on sales; and the “Taylor Society” responded to this shift by 
creating a sales section dedicated to the study of how scientific management could be used to 
shape consumer demand. Subsequently, the notion of “consumer sovereignty” (i.e. the idea that 
the market responds to the demands of the consumer), became a “mantra” among government 
leaders and businessmen alike, and it also proved irresistible to the individual-in-society. This is 
because, although ordinary individuals, in their capacity as workers, were ordered around and 
stripped of decision-making authority, these same individuals, in their capacity as ‘sovereign 
consumers,’ could reverse their subjugation by giving the orders and making all of the decisions 
in the supermarket aisle—with a view not to saving but to spending ‘properly’ (LS, 63, 75-76). 
Ultimately, while some have argued that the United States’ engagement in the First World War 
signaled the demise of this ‘efficiency craze,’ Princen advances that, judging by conditions after 
the Second World War and within the contemporary era, the idea of efficiency has “become a 
background condition, the linguistic, analytic, and political water in which we all swim” (LS, 78, 
80). Even today, workers remain largely disempowered and alienated in the workplace, and 
consequently attempt to find fulfillment “through consuming the products of other people’s work, 
not through the process of work itself.” And today, “schools . . . routinely instruct children and 
their parents on the virtues of efficient time management” (LS, 81). In short, Princen believes that 
the “mental revolution” dreamed of by Taylor has come to fruition, because efficiency has clearly 
become the organizing principle for social behavior in general (LS, 86). 
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In spite of this, Princen commits himself to unequivocally undermining the legitimacy of 
the reign of efficiency, and having provided readers with the above historical unpacking of the 
concept, he sets about exposing the biases inherent in its technical side. He begins this critical 
analysis by advancing that the allure of efficiency also derives from its scientific dress, in the 
form of ratios devised by the (ostensibly) politically neutral ‘experts.’ Princen, however, proceeds 
to show, in no uncertain terms, that the technical side of efficiency is inherently political: that the 
act of choosing a ratio is motivated by very definite values, and that these values, in turn, are 
frequently biased against environmental and social interests (LS, 88-90). 
Firstly, Princen argues, efficiencies possess a “simplification bias.” This is because a two-
element ratio, expressed in quantitative terms, does not include any consideration of the 
unquantifiable, or immeasurable, consequences of efficiencies—such as those relating to quality 
(LS, 91). As Princen shows with reference to the efficiency revolution that American hospitals 
underwent in the 1990s, regarding so-called “immeasurables” as inconsequential to the 
calculation of performance, is fundamentally flawed. Briefly, when health maintenance 
organizations (HMOs) took control of health care in America, they claimed that through 
efficiencies such as specialization, waste elimination, and faster work, they would make health 
care more affordable and accessible. And they certainly achieved these goals through, for 
instance, “increase[ing] . . . the efficiency ratio of patient-visits per doctor”—but this came at the 
cost of a decrease in the quality of health care. Princen points out, with reference to various 
studies into this qualitative decrease, that neglecting this, ostensibly unimportant, ‘immeasurable’ 
of quality, has led to an increase in medical errors, from which “between 44, 000 and 98, 000 
Americans die” per annum (LS, 92-93). 
Secondly, Princen contends that when expressed by a ratio, efficiencies also have an 
“individualizing” effect. The ratio of miles per gallon (MPG), which is taken to indicate the fuel-
efficiency, (and hence the environmental benevolence), of a car, is a case in point. First of all, 
explains Princen, this ratio does not reflect the reality that fuel consumption is also linked to 
driving behavior—this latter variable is referred as the responsibility of the individual driver, who 
is, however, unlikely to question his/her driving behavior, particularly if he/she owns a fuel-
efficient car. And most importantly, this ratio does not reflect the fact that driving behavior is 
informed not only by the whims of the individual, but also by “the collective choices that enable, 
indeed encourage, even require, certain kinds of individual driving patterns”—such as minimum 
speed requirements and other traffic rules that influence fuel consumption. Thus, while someone 
may own a fuel-efficient car (as per its MPG ratio), his/her personal driving behavior, as well as 
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his/her obligation to comply with traffic rules, impact significantly on his/her overall fuel 
consumption. This would explain why, although there are far more fuel-efficient cars in the 
United States than ever before, pollution deriving from automobile use is on the increase (LS, 95-
96). 
Thirdly, Princen points out that whenever something is either in short supply (such as 
resources), or excessive (such as pollution), increasing efficiencies in order to “save” is always 
the answer (LS, 97). For example, the timber industry routinely claims that it is able to preserve 
numerous tracts of forest through managing limited areas of timberland intensively (which allows 
them to double the yield of each acre). However, as reasonable as this may seem, Princen 
indicates that he is “unaware of any institutional mechanism that actually implements such an 
exchange, or of evidence of a direct connection between an increment of intensification and an 
increment of preserved forest” (LS, 99). In other words, the claims made by the timber industry, 
concerning saving land for preservation and public use through such intensive management, are 
not necessarily carried out. 
Fourthly, argues Princen, efficiency ratios also tend to “shade” actual costs while 
highlighting obvious benefits. For instance, an internet service provider (ISP) may market itself 
to a potential client by arguing that email access would allow the client’s ratio of messages per 
hour to skyrocket, thus saving them a great deal of time. However, what this ratio employed by 
the service provider ‘shades,’ is that other people reap the same benefits from email access, and 
can therefore, by the same token, inundate the prospective client with messages, which are 
incredibly time-consuming to sort through. In other words, what this ratio hides, or ‘shades,’ is 
that the burden of email access can easily nullify the timesaving that was supposed to have 
derived from switching from pen and paper to emailing in the first place (LS, 101, 103). 
These and numerous other examples suggest that a dangerous reductionism is intrinsic to 
efficiencies, especially when they are promoted in the form of two-element ratios. However, what 
is crucial to mention here, is that Princen does not wish to do away with the concept of efficiency 
altogether. Rather, he argues that this concept must be re-appropriated, and its ratios be expanded 
through the inclusion of factors such as (physical and temporal) scale. For example, at present, 
the problem of pollution is commonly addressed with reference to the ratio of GDP: pollutant, 
which, as Princen points out, “has an implicit ‘year’ time frame—annual economic product per 
ton of carbon.” And, among other things, this ratio thus implicitly legitimates annual increases in 
pollution provided that GDP has also increased. However, argues Princen, one could decisively 
tackle the problem of pollution and its major effects in the long term, through extended ratios 
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such as GDP: pollutant: century, and effectively allocate climate-change responsibility, and 
“legitimize international comparison,” through extended ratios such as pollutant: country: planet 
(LS, 121-122). Be that as it may, Princen makes it clear that efficiency, as it is currently 
understood and employed, 
 
is a means of determining who gets what and how . . . of disguising and displacing costs . . . of leading 
everyone to believe that society is marching forward when, in fact, social and natural capital is being 
consumed. [And i]t is a crutch for those who believe that perpetual industrial expansion on a finite planet is 
possible, . . . scientific, modern, and just. (LS, 74) 
 
A radically alternative vision: Princen’s call for a sufficiency-orientated civilization 
 
Besides undermining the legitimacy of the dominant concept of efficiency, in the manner 
described above, Princen also dedicates large portions of The Logic of Sufficiency to the 
promotion of his own vision of a sufficiency-orientated civilization—a vision underpinned by the 
idea that we are not condemned to perpetually acquiescing to the gospel of efficiency, which so 
easily reduces us to little more than capitalist automatons. For Princen, this civilizational 
transformation hinges on the need to rupture what he refers to as the “more work/more 
throughput” cycle (LS, 131). On the one hand, he characterizes this cycle as ecologically 
destructive, insofar as it necessitates, among other things, a vast expenditure of natural resources. 
In short, Princen explains, the more people work and the more specialized and efficient this work 
becomes, the more they produce. Such productivity, in turn, leads to them earning higher salaries, 
with higher salaries, in turn, encouraging them to consume more products—resulting in the rapid 
diminishment of limited natural resources and the filling of waste sinks. On the other hand, 
Princen characterizes this cycle as socially destructive as well, because the economy under the 
auspices of which this cycle operates, is built upon powerful actors annexing the natural 
resources of a country, and in so doing depriving the poor of their capacity to subsist without 
money. Also, this cycle is socially destructive to the extent that even those who have 
employment, bent as they are on earning as much as possible, spend so many hours at work that 
they deprive themselves of non-economic activities and relationships that are crucial to 
happiness, and for which the accumulation of wealth or goods could never substitute. Having 
characterized the ‘more work/more throughput’ cycle in this manner, Princen advances that it is 
indeed possible to overcome this cycle—firstly, because pre-industrial peoples did not live in 
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terms of it, and secondly, because there are individuals and groups, in the contemporary era, who 
refuse to acquiesce to it.   
 Briefly, Princen advances that prior to the eventual transformation of society through the 
Industrial Revolution, the productivity of factories was severely hampered by a “backward-
bending supply curve for labor” (LS, 125). This phenomenon involved workers prioritizing their 
independence and their time over financial reward, through supplying their labor to factories for 
durations of their own choosing. And, as Princen points out, this behavior on the part of workers 
persisted even when factory owners began to offer higher wages in the hope of persuading 
workers to offer their labor for longer hours—thus proving that people are able to resist economic 
enticements in order to retain their self-governance. However, such behavior was eventually 
brought to an end: in part, through calls for greater discipline by members of the clergy, the 
government, and factory owners, and most forcefully, through the enclosure of land, which took 
place from the middle of the eighteenth century onwards. In short, enclosure marginalized the 
majority of the population by depriving them of the lands on which they had relied for 
subsistence; for example, as Princen explains, by 1876, about 50 percent of English and Welsh 
farmlands had been appropriated by little over two thousand individuals (LS, 126). Perhaps most 
notably, this process of enclosure rendered the proletariat far more dependent on employers, and 
hence far more vulnerable to exploitation at the hands of the latter, than ever before: now, devoid 
of land upon which to subsist, they were obliged to work for the duration dictated by factory 
owners. Even so, this dramatic change in the organization of labor was at first contested by 
workers, and employers had to devise various means to make them submit to the new work 
regime. Among other things, in the factory, employers “suppressed wages . . . installed bells and 
whistles and clocks . . . added timesheets and timekeepers, hired informers, and imposed fines 
and physical punishments” (LS, 127), while outside of the factory, children were taught of the 
value of industriousness and of the evils of sloth. Ultimately, one of the main conclusions that 
Princen draws from worker conduct prior to this drastic reorganization of labor, and from the 
resistance with which such reorganization was initially met, is that it is possible for people to live 
according to a non-economic, socially and ecologically sustainable, “working rationality” (LS, 
130). In fact, Princen goes so far as to suggest that these workers’ conduct and their resistance to 
being reduced to the level of automatons, indicates the possibility that 
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people have an innate tendency to work in a rhythm quite unlike that set by . . . timekeepers . . . that people 
have a tendency to judge for themselves . . . when they have done enough work[, and that] . . . people just 
know that . . . real working is the source of satisfaction, not purchasing and consuming. (LS, 128-129) 
 
In short, what Princen is arguably implying, here, is that a backward-bending supply curve for 
labor is quite a natural phenomenon. Also, he proceeds to advance that it is desirable, not just 
because it entails a lowering of industrial productivity, and hence, a decrease in the throughput of 
natural resources, but also because it affords individuals more independence and more time to 
foster invaluable personal relationships and to engage in other rewarding activities. And further, 
Princen advances that contemporary individuals would likely return to such a working rationality 
if they were given the opportunity to do so, yet that certain “structural factors” in our world 
prevent such opportunity from emerging—namely, those of “specialization,” “scale,” and the 
concept of the “sovereign consumer” (LS, 134, 141). Firstly, explains Princen, although 
specialization in the workplace increases productivity, it alienates workers and, very importantly, 
creates pockets of natural resource exploitation that are never assessed collectively, and thus 
never addressed with sufficient urgency. Secondly, although increasing the scale of one’s 
enterprise constitutes the (economically) logical outgrowth of either business success or an 
abundance of resources, Princen argues that large-scale enterprises cannot adequately respond to 
environmental warning bells, such as resource depletion. This is the case because, among other 
things, the vast scale of such an enterprise prevents most participants from dealing with the 
resource directly, and the vast number of participants in the enterprise makes effective, collective, 
decisions in relation to resource scarcity an impossibility. In turn, the third factor in the present 
that, according to Princen, prevents the adoption of a sufficiency-orientated working rationality, 
is the notion of the sovereign consumer. The existing economy, through such means as the mass 
media, (re)presents the accumulation of possessions as the key to happiness, while neoclassical 
economists concomitantly proclaim the ultimate goal of economics to be the satisfaction of 
consumer demand. This encourages consumers—even at the risk of burying themselves in debt—
to accumulate ever more goods, and to dismiss as archaic the idea of working less hours, earning 
less money, and thus making do with less purchasing power, in the interest of retaining their 
independence and gaining time (LS, 141-143, 148-151). 
However, Princen believes that in spite of these obstacles, all is not lost. Firstly, as 
already discussed, he indicates—with reference to worker conduct prior to the reorganization of 
labor around the time of the Industrial Revolution—that we, too, could operate in terms of a 
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working rationality, owing to (what are perhaps) our ‘innate’ tendencies to work according to 
more natural rhythms than the mechanical, to realize when we have had enough of an activity, 
and to know that contentment derives from good work rather than from the consumption of goods 
(LS, 128-129). Secondly, as will be discussed in what follows, Princen also argues for the 
possibility of adopting a working rationality on the basis of the fact that, even in the 
contemporary era, there exist individuals and groups who follow such a rationality, having 
rejected efficiency and luxury in favor of sufficiency and relative independence. The most 
significant cases that Princen presents in this regard are those of The Pacific Lumber Company, 
Monhegan Lobstering, and Toronto Island.70
Around the time that Albert Stanwood Murphy became the president of The Pacific 
Lumber Company (TPL), “public opinion, preservationism . . . government regulations [and] . . . 
market volatility” were together placing immense pressure on timber companies to either adapt 
their practices or to make one last profit before quitting the timber industry altogether. And the 
Murphy family, who had amassed great wealth through forest cutovers, radically altered their 
approach to the natural resource upon which their business depended—that is, for them, these 
pressures “meant innovating, constructing an enterprise for the long term” (LS, 168-169). In 
short, A. S. Murphy, who had spent his entire childhood gaining first-hand experience in the 
woodlands and the timber mills, proceeded to successfully implement relatively untested 
processes, such as “forestry—the deliberate management of timber stands,” and notions, such as 
“sustained yield” (LS, 173-174), within his timber company. That is, Murphy took cognizance of 
the fact that forests are exhaustible, and ultimately proved that there existed an ecologically 
rational alternative to the traditional approach of cutting out as much timber as possible from one 
area and then moving on to another. He experimented with ideas such as “reforestation” and 
“selective logging,” and refused to meet demand for timber if the felling of more trees would 
damage the timberlands’ regenerative capacities (LS, 177, 181-182). Also, in the knowledge that 
worker contentment depended on more than paychecks, TPL embraced a working rationality, by 
employing workers for life, transferring them “to less strenuous positions as their physical 
abilities declined,” discouraging “single-minded specialization,” and never treating workers “as 
machines” (LS, 211). Some, argues Princen, may have regarded Murphy’s strategy as illogical, 
yet he exhibited and practiced a rationality underpinned by the recognition that resources must be 
 
                                                 
70 See chapters Six, Seven and Eight, of Princen’s work. 
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preserved, and that a company must also be socially sustainable—all of which is only possible if 
one operates in terms of an ethic of self-restraint. 
In turn, the case of Monhegan Lobstering is similarly orientated around the issue of 
resource use. The lobstermen of Monhegan Island, much like A. S. Murphy of TPL, understood 
that the natural resource upon which they depend is inherently limited, and they adapted to such 
limitation through engaging in selective lobstering, and adhering to a collective agreement of 
lobstering for only six months of the year (LS, 225, 227-232, 242, 274-276). Also, they practice a 
working rationality, through, among other things, maintaining apprenticeship programs, 
cultivating community cohesion, and fostering dialogue (LS, 243, 247-249, 269-271, 283-285). 
And when, in 1995, the livelihood of these lobstermen was threatened by the intrusion of 
outsiders who had depleted their own ocean bottom, the Monheganers made a successful appeal 
to the government for the protection of their natural resource. That is, after much struggle, the 
state declared a certain area around Monhegan Island the exclusive fishing ground of 
Monheganers, which, in effect, meant that the ecological (and working) rationality practiced by 
these lobstermen received state sanction (LS, 243-247, 274). 
The third case that Princen presents is that of the Toronto islanders—a peculiar 
community of people who have persistently resisted pressure, on the part of the Toronto Metro, to 
increase automobile access to their island home. Over the years, explains Princen, the Metro has 
made numerous attempts at forcing this community to consent to the development of Toronto 
Island, through, for example, the construction of a connecting bridge between the islands and the 
city, and the creation of more parking space for visitors. But time and again, these strategies have 
been repulsed, in part through community protests and other forms of resistance, and in part 
through providence and chance political shifts (LS, 291, 299, 304, 308-311, 313, 329, 333-334). 
For Princen, what we can learn from the resistance put up by these islanders is that it is possible 
for a community to prioritize and fight for values that, far from being orientated around 
efficiency and accessibility, are centered on sufficiency and a certain degree of austerity. That is, 
these islanders resisted the conveniences that increased automobile access would bring, in favor 
of retaining a tranquil surroundings and a real sense of community. Also, very importantly, their 
skepticism concerning the automobile engendered the right questions. That is, while most people 
ordinarily worry about the cost of a car, or about escalating fuel prices—oblivious to the 
environmental and social costs of automobile use—the Toronto islanders questioned the 
potentially pernicious role of the car in “the consuming of physical space and safe space and the 
vitality of residential and commercial communities” (LS, 323). 
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Ultimately, Princen advances that all three of these cases clearly demonstrate people’s 
capacity to defend ostensibly inefficient practices, in the knowledge that these ‘inefficiencies’ are 
crucial to the maintenance of sustainable activities and livable spaces. It must be said, though, 
that Princen is far from naïve. He anticipates that these case studies may be construed as 
“fanciful, even quaint or nostalgic” (LS, ix), and that some will point out that these cases are 
exceptional—either because the participants are engaged in direct-use activities (in the case of 
The Pacific Lumber Company and of Monhegan Lobstering), or because the participants are 
located in a geographically exceptional area (in the case of Toronto Island). Yet, Princen 
maintains that these cases nevertheless demonstrate that sufficiency is practiced in the 
contemporary era. He adds to this that he “can only hope that the lessons of these cases will be 
generalizable, that readers will find applications in their daily lives, in their professional 
engagements, in their struggles to effect a more sustainable world” (LS, xii-xiii). 
As intimated in this last statement, Princen, like Sachs, is well aware of the fact that 
facilitating a civilizational shift towards a sufficiency-orientated society will constitute a great 
struggle. One of the many reasons that Princen gives for the difficulty of instigating such a 
transformation, is that the environmental troubles of our time are “of a wholly different order 
from those presumed in many environmental and economic institutions,” and that these 
institutions accordingly continue to propagate the erroneous idea that “a little adjustment here, a 
little retooling there” (LS, 10) will remedy what is in fact a tremendous crisis. For example, these 
institutions do not acknowledge that our environmental problems are immensely complex, of 
limited predictability, and not easily contained. Also, they do not take cognizance of the fact that 
“globalization, privatization and diminishing state control conspire with technological innovation 
and market manipulation to skew the benefits of economic activity, creating the illusion of 
environmental progress” (LS, 16). In other words, these institutions fail to address, for instance, 
the problem of developed nations overlooking the environmentally disastrous effects of their 
overproducing and overconsuming economies, owing to the fact that globalization facilitates the 
‘distancing’ of ‘sites of consumption’ from ‘sites of production’ and ‘sites of pollution.’ It is such 
distancing that also allows dominant institutions to continue to promote the fallacies that 
“increasing population and consumption can continue indefinitely; prices reflect all significant 
costs; . . . well-being correlates with gross domestic product; technology solves more ecological 
problems than it creates; more economic growth solves the problems of economic growth” (LS, 
ix). 
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Princen dismisses these notions as completely unfounded, and he posits a new way 
forward—one that is perhaps more worthwhile than “the facile prescriptions that come from the 
natural scientists, . . . the environmental community, and . . . the policymakers” (LS, ix). Briefly, 
Princen acknowledges that he is among “those . . . who struggle to envision a sustainable society” 
(LS, 281), and suspects that “society may only change when the true believers in economistic and 
legalistic rationality die off” (LS, 27). Yet he nevertheless maintains that, judging by the cases 
presented in his text, it is indeed possible for individuals, and even whole communities, to 
embrace sufficiency as a social organizing principle in the midst of our contemporary, hyper-
efficient world. Further, he contends that, given our existing problem of global ecological 
constraint, discarding our obsession with efficiency, in favor of embracing sufficiency, is not 
only logical, but also crucial to the survival of humankind and other species. In short, we live in 
an ecologically full world—a world plagued by scarcity of natural resources and waste sinks—
and we need to implement a more ecologically rational framework for behavior, which includes 
 
an inclination toward long-term societal investment, an understanding of the environment as life support, a 
sense of excess, a belief that meaning derives from engagement [rather than from consumption, and] a 
recognition of humans’ capacity to self-organize and innovate for collective self-management and restraint. 
(LS, 351-352) 
 
In the light of the above, it becomes evident that the alternative vision of Princen, much like that 
of Sachs, is focused on the transformation of individual and societal values and behaviors, rather 
than on the promotion of the existing economy or on the strengthening of global institutions 
alone. That is, unlike market liberals and institutionalists who would leave the resolution of our 
environmental predicament up to more economic growth, and institutionally guided economic 
growth, respectively, Princen demands a radical behavioral transformation of ordinary 
individuals themselves. 
In fact, one can glean from his text that Princen may wish for the eventual incorporation 
of the principle of sufficiency into institutional frameworks, but that he is, for the moment, 
focusing his efforts on convincing his readers to change their perspectives and behaviors. For 
example, in his first and second chapters alone, Princen on numerous occasions argues that his 
readers need to know that a sufficiency-orientated life is not only logical but also desirable, and 
suggests that through his book, he is attempting to furnish readers with much-needed political and 
rhetorical weapons to counter the dominant voice in society, which insists that production and 
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consumption can continue unabated (LS, 5-6, 27-28). Further, in his penultimate chapter, Princen 
offers a “Note to reader” that clearly indicates his objective of altering our frames of reference—
in it, he states: “If by this point you have read the chapters on timbering and fishing and, now, 
automobility and, let’s say, worked your way through a good share of the conceptual chapters . . . 
, sufficiency may seem a self-evident concept” (LS, 339). In short, it is possible to advance that 
through The Logic of Sufficiency, Princen seeks to counter not only opposing theoretical views on 
the impact of technology, politics and economics on the environment, but also numerous of his 
reader’s (un-ecological) thoughts, ideas and beliefs, which, as will be shown in what follows, can 
be directly associated with what Kilbourne, Beckmann and Thelen refer to as the dominant social 
paradigm (DSP) of contemporary society. 
As already discussed, in their article, “The Role of the Dominant Social Paradigm in 
Environmental Attitudes: A Multinational Examination,” Kilbourne and his colleagues argue that 
the technological dimension of the DSP involves people embracing technology with such fervor 
that they neglect to scrutinize its more insidious effects. That is, people simply assume that 
technology constitutes an unequivocal good, and that any environmental problems that we may 
encounter could be remedied through some or other “technofix.”71
In addition, Princen also problematizes what Kilbourne and his colleagues refer to as the 
political dimension of the DSP, particularly with reference to its instigation of acquisitiveness in 
contemporary individuals. For example, as we have seen, Princen laments the fact that people 
today believe that “meaning is achieved through consuming the products of other people’s work, 
not through the process of work itself” (LS, 81). And he proceeds to show that this belief, which 
is constantly reinforced through such means as the mass media, traps us in an environmentally 
and socially destructive ‘more work/more throughput’ cycle. 
 However, what one can gather 
from Princen’s arguments—especially from those that cast doubt on the value of technologies 
making everything more efficient—is that he is highly skeptical of the innocence with which 
technology is usually imbued. A case in point is his examination of the Toronto islanders’ 
resistance to automobility, where he meticulously and convincingly argues that the frequently 
overlooked (environmentally and socially) negative effects of automobility completely outweigh 
its benefits. For instance, he indicates the insidiousness of automobility by showing how it 
“elevates one value (private mobility) at the same time as it depreciates others (community, 
health, climate stability)” (LS, 293). 
                                                 
71 Kilbourne, Beckmann and Thelen, “The Role of the Dominant Social Paradigm in Environmental Attitudes: A 
Multinational Examination,” 196. 
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Finally, as aforementioned, Kilbourne and his colleagues hold that the economic 
dimension of the DSP is underpinned by a liberal economic perspective, informed by notions 
such as “free markets, self-interest as the sole motivator of behavior, prices as the mediator of 
exchange, and efficiency as the primary criterion for the effective functioning of markets.”72
Ultimately, what Princen appears to suggest is that if people were to reflect critically upon 
the dominant beliefs to which they adhere, and in so doing to realize that these beliefs have 
impelled them towards goals that are not only environmentally but also socially destructive, they 
would be quite capable of adopting completely different perspectives and behaviors. In fact, 
already in the preface to his work, Princen insists that the self-management which is central to 
sustainable practice is indeed possible, and explicitly “reject[s] prevailing assumptions about 
humans’ inherent short-term thinking, about their inability to self-organize for restrained resource 
use, about the insatiability of their consumption, about their incapacity to do much more than 
work (for others) and spend (on what others make)” (LS, ix). However, despite this show of 
confidence in people’s capacity for pro-environmental change, ambivalence on this matter is 
palpable in other parts of Princen’s text. For example, in his discussion of the possibility of 
people prioritizing their independence and wellbeing over their salaries and purchasing power, 
through embracing a more “‘natural’ rhythm of work,” Princen advances that, if “self-limitation 
in self-managed work is natural, as much a part of human nature as choosing a mate and 
organizing for self-defense, then it follows that so is self-restraint in consumption and, hence, in 
resource use.” Shortly thereafter, though, he indicates that he cannot guarantee this to be the case, 
because little research exists “on the self-restraining components of work patterns” (LS, 133, 140-
141). Similarly, in his discussion on the need to limit automobility, Princen intimates that people 
 The 
economistic type of rationality that motivates this perspective is something that Princen 
problematizes throughout his text. Perhaps most importantly, he points out that this rationality 
has people value “the efficient and the judicial” over all else (LS, 24), and that because these 
values, in turn, are diametrically opposed to principles such as sufficiency, adherence to them 
prevents people from adopting more ecologically and socially sustainable behaviors. Further, 
Princen undermines this economistic rationality through, among other things, disclosing the 
negative aspects of efficiencies, indicating that the neoclassical economists have abandoned the 
moral orientation of their classical predecessors, and showing how the contemporary economic 
system dehumanizes and alienates workers. 
                                                 
72 Ibid., 197. 
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should begin to “question . . . access,” and that this requires them “to step out of the dominant 
belief system,” and it “suggest[s] a paradigmatic shift away from the underlying principles of 
efficiency and mobility” (LS, 332). Yet, he proceeds to indicate, in no uncertain terms, that “to 
step back and watch the juggernaut is nearly impossible for members of the auto culture,” 
because for them, “it is all so normal, so natural” (LS, 337). And again, in his concluding chapter, 
Princen acknowledges that the idea that society can shift from its existing efficiency-orientation, 
to a more sensible sufficiency-orientation, is “mind-boggling,” especially to people like him, who 
find themselves in the midst “of an efficiency-crazed, growth-manic, technologically 
freewheeling society” (LS, 361). Yet in spite of this misgiving, he goes on to advance that people 
are indeed capable of effecting such a shift in their own lives, that they “do not have to wait for 
their leaders to lead,” and that the monumental civilizational change he envisions is no less 
possible than, say, the transformation “from South African apartheid to free state” (LS, 364). 
Arguably, these conflicting sentiments within Princen’s text indicate that, although he believes 
that people are rational and autonomous, he has reservations about their willingness to adopt the 
practices of restraint which would make possible his envisioned sufficiency-orientated 
civilization. If this is indeed the case, then his perspective, in this respect, is very similar to that 
of Sachs who, as aforementioned, advances that the self-limitation that is required of the 
individual for a sustainable society to be made possible “always implies a loss of power,” and “in 
what way a renunciation of power for the sake of the common good could be reconciled with the 
quest for individual liberty remains [a] . . . conundrum” (PD, 89). Briefly put, Sachs and Princen 
appear to share, on the one hand, an extreme confidence in people’s capacity to change their 
perspectives and behaviors, and, on the other hand, serious concerns about whether people are in 
fact prepared to change—whether they are prepared to commit themselves to more frugal ways of 
living. The disparity between such confidence and such doubt may be indicative of Sachs and 
Princen holding a Kantian conception of autonomy. Below, I aim to establish if this is indeed the 
case. 
 
 
Sachs’ and Princen’s Kantian conception of autonomy 
 
Central to Immanuel Kant’s ethical theory is the idea that autonomy is intrinsic to the very nature 
of rational (human) beings, and the correlative notion that such autonomy not only endows the 
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rational being with dignity, but also obliges him/her to respect other rational beings. Thus, while 
certain of Kant’s contemporaries, such as the natural law theorists, held that “God is the legislator 
of moral law, and humans his unruly subjects,”73 Kant, conversely, advanced that we give 
ourselves the laws of morality, and that we are perfectly capable of governing ourselves with 
reference to these laws. In these respects, Kant drew much inspiration from Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, who had similarly argued that “we make our own law and in doing so create the 
foundation for a free and just social order.”74
Yet, Kant’s emphasis on our innate autonomy does not imply that he believes our actions 
can never be influenced by external factors. On the contrary, he argues that although our wills are 
intrinsically rational and autonomous, we are always at risk of giving way to our (irrational) 
inclinations and desires, since we are beings of two worlds. That is, as rational beings we are 
members of the intelligible world, but as empirical beings we are members of the natural world, 
and because of this dual status we are, in effect, imperfect. In his Grounding for the Metaphysics 
of Morals, Kant elaborates on the implications of this dual status as follows: 
 
 
if I were solely a member of the intelligible world, then all my actions would perfectly conform to the 
principle of autonomy of a pure will; if I were solely a part of the world of sense, my actions would have to be 
taken as in complete conformity with the natural law of desires and inclinations, i.e., with the heteronomy of 
nature . . . But the intelligible world contains the ground of the world of sense and therefore also the ground of 
its laws; consequently, the intelligible world is (and must be thought of as) directly legislative for my will 
(which belongs wholly to the intelligible world). Therefore, even though on the one hand I must regard myself 
as a being belonging to the world of sense, yet on the other hand shall I have to know myself as an 
intelligence and as subject to the law of the intelligible world, i.e., to reason, which contains this law in the 
idea of freedom, and hence to know myself as subject to the autonomy of the will. Consequently, I must regard 
the laws of the intelligible world as imperatives for me, and the actions conforming to this principle as 
duties.75
 
 
In short, Kant firstly states that we are neither exclusively part of the intelligible world—in which 
case our actions would always perfectly accord with moral law, and in which case a categorical 
imperative would be superfluous; nor are we exclusively part of the natural world, or the world of 
sense—in which case our actions would be instinctive and automatically accord with our desires 
                                                 
73 J. B. Schneewind, “Autonomy, Obligation, and Virtue: An Overview of Kant’s Moral Philosophy,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Kant, ed. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 312. 
74 Ibid., 314. 
75 My emphasis. Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, 3d ed., trans. James W. Ellington 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993), 54-55. 
 87 
and inclinations, and in which case we could not be considered rational and autonomous nor 
capable of morality. However, Kant proceeds to advance that the intelligible world (and, by 
implication, our nature as intelligence), is more primary than the world of sense—an argument 
that has as its correlative Kant’s conception that “the mind . . . involves the activity of imposing 
different forms of order on the perceptual material that its passive receptivity gives it . . . [; that 
t]he forms of order are not externally imposed on the mind.”76 And, as Kant goes on to explain, 
this primacy of the intelligible world (and, therefore, the primacy of our position qua 
intelligence), obliges us to regard our rational wills as autonomous vis-à-vis our sensuous 
inclinations and desires, and thus, as perfectly capable of striving towards “the idea of moral 
perfection, which reason frames a priori and connects inseparably with the concept of a free 
will.”77 In short, in virtue of our autonomy as rational beings, we are able to impose upon 
ourselves an idea of moral perfection, or moral law. But because this law is authored by 
ourselves, and is thus inextricably intertwined with our autonomy, “i.e., the property that the will 
has of being a law to itself,”78 it cannot be associated with any influences or conditions that 
reside outside of the intelligible world. That is, in order for it to constitute something that we, as 
rational and autonomous beings, create by ourselves and impose upon ourselves, the moral law 
cannot be associated with the world of sense—it “must have no content provided by sense or 
desire, or any other contingent aspect of our situation,” and therefore, “it must be universal.”79 
Kant captures this universality of the moral law in his first formulation of the Categorical 
Imperative: “I should never act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should 
become a universal law.”80 The Categorical Imperative is, then, positioned solely in the domain 
of the intelligible world, and thus retains the a priori status necessary not to contradict the idea of 
the autonomy of rational beings. That is, insofar as it is an imperative, it does not command us to 
perform a certain action but instead concerns the manner in which we ought “to exercise our 
wills;” and correlatively, insofar as it is categorical, it is unconditionally applicable on account of 
the fact that “we possess . . . rational wills, without reference to any ends that we might or might 
not have.”81
                                                 
76 Schneewind, “Autonomy, Obligation, and Virtue: An Overview of Kant’s Moral Philosophy,” 315. 
 
77 My emphasis. Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, 21. 
78 Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, 446. 
79 John Christman, “Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy” (2008), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
ed. Edward N. Zalta. Available from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/autonomy-moral/. 
80 Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, 14. 
81 Robert Johnson, “Kant’s Moral Philosophy” (2008), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. 
Zalta. Available from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/kant-moral/. 
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In sum, for Kant, the Categorical Imperative is the perfect expression of our rational and 
autonomous wills, and our adherence to it by no means involves a negation of our freedom. This 
is because, as Kant argues, although we possess negative freedom (i.e. freedom from being 
determined by our inclinations and desires), the will does require at least some form of 
determination if it can ever be expected to act responsibly. Therefore, if the will imposes the 
(universal) moral law upon itself, of which it, itself, is the author, then “a free will and a will 
subject to moral laws are one and the same.”82 What is of primary importance for my purposes is 
that, from a Kantian perspective, the human being is perceived as an innately rational and 
eminently autonomous being, endowed with a free will, and determined by nothing other than 
itself and by the moral law that it has created for itself. In other words, the individual, as a 
rational being, is situated in a position outside of (i.e. undetermined by) discourse, and gives 
him/herself the (moral) law. It is arguably owing to such a perspective that Kant, in his essay 
“What is Enlightenment?,” would advance that the common man’s tendency to let others reason 
for him, rather than reasoning for himself, is something “self-incurred”—that it is underpinned by 
nothing more substantial than mere “laziness and cowardice.”83
I showed earlier that, in Planet Dialectics, Sachs advances a number of arguments that 
operate to counter not only competing theoretical perspectives, but also, very importantly, those 
thoughts, ideas and beliefs, possibly harbored by his readers, that can be directly related to the 
(ecologically incapacitating) dominant social paradigm (DSP) of contemporary society. This 
latter aspect of his work suggests that Sachs holds the (Kantian) conviction that his readers are 
possessed of sufficient power of reason and sufficient autonomy to engage in an overhaul of their 
perspectives and behaviors, after reflecting upon the validity of the arguments put forward in his 
text. This finds corroboration in the openly Kantian orientation of a number of the arguments that 
Sachs makes within Planet Dialectics. For example, he indicates his belief in our capacity to use 
our rational wills to impose the moral law upon ourselves, firstly, when he adapts Kant’s 
Categorical Imperative through advancing that “a society can be called sustainable only if the 
maxim of its action is such that this maxim can be the maxim of every other society;” and 
secondly, when he proceeds to prescribe this imperative as “a moral principle [for] guiding one’s 
own behaviour” (PD, 174). Further evidence of Sachs’ Kantian conception of humans, as rational 
beings who are capable of giving themselves the law, and of managing themselves in accordance 
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with this law in the absence of external coercion, is found in his argument that people are capable 
of the “intelligent self-limitation” that constitutes the basis of the implementation of any “rational 
strategy against systemic over-development” (PD, 49, 202). And Sachs also displays confidence 
in our ability to effectively separate ourselves from the (irrational) inclinations and desires of the 
world of sense, in favor of adopting a more austere, more rational, mode of being in order to 
ameliorate our global environmental and social crises. For instance, he argues that people “have 
the ability to change their point of view and to look with the other’s eye at themselves” (PD, 
107)—presumably with the eye of those who are suffering as a result of global inequality. Also, 
because people are capable of such rational reflection, or self-distancing, they are equally capable 
of “learning how to take less” (PD, 174), and of adopting a “new kind of rationality, . . . ‘the 
rationality of shortened chains of effect’ for meeting the crises of justice and of nature” (PD, 87). 
Finally, it is possible that even the title of Sachs’ text constitutes an expression of his Kantian 
orientation. That is, the very fact that he associates his text with ‘dialectics’ can, at least to a 
certain degree, be related back to Kant’s idea of dialectic. Briefly, Kant advanced that ‘dialectic’ 
within the “ancient world . . . was a type of specious argument, dressing up fallacious reasoning 
in pseudological garb,” and he, instead, “proposed to give the name ‘dialectic’ to a branch of 
philosophy that exposes such sophistries.”84
In turn, as examined earlier, in The Logic of Sufficiency, Princen delivers incisive 
arguments and employs illustrative case studies in order to problematize, on the one hand, an 
efficiency-orientated, economistic rationality (adhered to by who Clapp and Dauvergne refer to 
as the market liberals and institutionalists), and on the other hand, those thoughts, ideas and 
beliefs of his readers that fall within the dominant social paradigm (DSP) of contemporary 
society. The address that Princen directs to the reader, his historical unpacking of the concept of 
efficiency, along with his undermining of what are tantamount to the technological, political and 
economic dimensions of the DSP, are arguably indicative of his (Kantian) belief in people’s 
capacity to change their perspectives and behaviors following cognitive deliberation. In fact, 
Princen himself appears to indicate as much when he advances that in writing his text, he has 
 Accordingly, it is quite possible to associate the 
work of Planet Dialectics, with Kant’s (re-conceptualized) understanding of dialectic, because 
within his text, Sachs sets about exposing what he regards as the ‘fallacious reasoning’ intrinsic 
to such things as development, the neo-liberal economic perspective, and the technocentrism of 
the contemporary world. 
                                                 
84 My emphasis. Simon Blackburn et al., A Dictionary of Philosophy (London: Pan Books, 1983), 94. 
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“implicitly assumed that well-honed argument and good stories will enable a different sense-
making” (LS, 343), and when he rejects outright the view that people are intrinsically egoistic, 
lacking in restraint, and incapable of anything more meaningful than the consumption of goods 
(LS, ix). The presence of certain strongly Kantian elements within The Logic of Sufficiency, 
provide further evidence for my argument that Princen may hold the (Kantian) conviction that 
individuals are inherently rational and autonomous. For one, the idea that human beings, owing to 
their rationality and autonomy, are capable of exercising their wills in accordance with what is 
reasonable, rational, logical or ethical, rather than in accordance with what is instinctive and 
immediately pleasurable, arguably informs Princen’s attempts to convince his readers to embrace 
sufficiency-orientated practices. In short, Princen communicates that a sufficiency-orientated 
society would necessarily preclude the lavish lifestyles that are currently in vogue, yet that he 
believes people may give up these lifestyles and adopt more austere modes of existence, precisely 
because from the perspective of long-term sustainability, it is far more rational, not to mention 
more ethical, to do so. In turn, the (Kantian) authority that Princen attributes to reason, 
rationality, logic, and moral obligation, in influencing the perspective of his readers, is palpable 
in his argument that one of the goals of his book is “to show how rational ecological rationality 
is, how logical the organizing principles (sufficiency and others) are, [and] how moral a moral 
economy is that preserves the biophysical underpinnings of its material economy” (LS, 47). And 
the same can be said of Princen’s attempt to promote sufficiency, and its companion principles, 
specifically on the grounds of their being sensible (LS, 7, 152, 334, 339), logical (LS, 18, 49, 136, 
139, 159, 283, 334, 341, 358), and rational (LS, 6, 49, 139, 189, 233, 283, 286, 324). In addition, 
the inclusion of the term, ‘logic,’ in the title of his work, is possibly indicative of Princen’s 
appeal to readers—as rational and autonomous beings—to embrace sufficiency owing to the fact 
that it is logical to do so, given our existing problem of global ecological constraint. Ultimately, it 
is arguably on the basis of a Kantian understanding of the individual, as innately rational and 
autonomous, that Princen formulates his “alternative behavioral assumptions” that “amount to a 
behavioral framework for a theory of sustainability”—assumptions that include the idea that 
humans are possessed of “an inclination toward long-term societal investment, an understanding 
of the environment as life support, a sense of excess, a belief that meaning derives from 
engagement, [and] a . . . capacity to self-organize and innovate for collective self-management 
and restraint” (LS, 350-352). 
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Concluding remarks 
 
It is certainly not my intention to negate the value of the approach that Sachs and Princen adopt 
in their problematization of competing worldviews on how the environment is affected by 
contemporary technological, political and economic processes, and in their disclosure of the 
insidious aspects of seemingly benevolent concepts such as development and efficiency. 
However, I do contend that when it comes, specifically, to addressing their readers in an attempt 
to encourage the latter to desist from environmentally damaging behavior, a very important 
element is missing from Sachs’ and Princen’s approach. This is because, insofar as these 
theorists, at least in the above-mentioned texts, principally work with hypotheses concerning our 
thoughts, ideas and beliefs in relation to technology, politics and economics, and thereby operate 
at the general level of cognitive content, they do not give due consideration to the complexities of 
the predominantly non-cognitive/non-conscious processes involved in the discursive constitution 
of the individual, and thereby miss an important dimension in the explanation of human behavior. 
As I have shown, their focus on cognitive content suggests that these theorists adhere to a 
modernist paradigm/episteme dominated by systematic reason, which presupposes a Kantian 
conception of autonomy (the individual, as a rational being who gives him/herself the law, is 
situated in a position external to discourse). As such, it seems as though Sachs and Princen are 
suggesting that, once we are made sufficiently aware of why, for instance, economic 
development and technology constitute causes of rather than cures for our problems, and once we 
are shown that it is in fact possible to operate in more environmentally benign ways, we should 
be able to act in an ecologically rational, autonomous, manner, in the interest of effecting pro-
environmental change. Correlatively, it appears as though these theorists, for the most part, 
implicitly attribute our ecological apathy to the fact that not enough focused critical discourse—
undermining the legitimacy of the technological, political and economic trajectories of the 
contemporary era—has been generated to convince us to change our perspectives, and with these, 
our patterns of behavior. 
 Instead of proceeding along the trajectory posited by Sachs and Princen, through 
continuing to focus, at a general level of cognitive content, on why, among other things, a belief 
in the benevolence of development and efficiency is problematic from an environmental point of 
view, I focus my efforts on the discursive/psychological level of the individual. In other words, in 
what follows, my aim is to complement the valuable, cognitively-orientated, work of Sachs and 
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Princen, by considering the discursive constitution of the individual as a factor in explaining our 
ecological apathy, precisely because the process of discursive constitution principally operates at 
a non-cognitive/non-conscious level. Briefly, to account for our ecological apathy, I appropriate 
Michel Foucault’s arguments concerning the way in which, in contemporary societies, the 
discourses and micro-techniques of what he terms ‘disciplinary power’ and ‘bio-power,’ 
constitute individuals in a manner that severely problematizes any attempt to project onto them a 
Kantian conception of autonomy. In short, in terms of Foucaultian theory—and in direct 
opposition to the Kantian notion of the individual as external to discourse—the individual is 
conceived as something that is predominantly constituted through discourse. It is this insight that 
allows me to provide a more complex/nuanced account for our ecological apathy: instead of 
principally ascribing such apathy to the fact that our faith in economic development, efficiency, 
and related notions, has not been sufficiently problematized, I primarily ascribe such ‘apathy’ to 
an actual incapacity, on our part, to change our behavior—insofar as the discourses and micro-
techniques of disciplinary power and bio-power have, in effect, infantilized us. The implication 
of this is that, even if individuals were conceptually furnished with sufficient information to 
unequivocally undermine, at a cognitive level, the legitimacy of their economistic beliefs, the 
majority of them would still not change their behavior, because they have, at a non-cognitive 
level, been constituted through existing discourses and micro-techniques as inherently docile and 
prostrate. 
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Chapter Three: Foucault’s (re)vision of autonomy: The discursive 
production of the contemporary individual 
 
 
In his introduction to The Cambridge Companion to Foucault, Gary Gutting advances that the 
difficulty of Foucaultian theory has instigated an array of unifying interpretations of Foucault’s 
work, that have in common the objective of providing a comprehensive account of this 
philosopher’s thought. Accordingly, argues Gutting, Foucault has been identified as a 
“philosophical historian,” who constructs archaeological and genealogical historical methods and 
later shifts his focus onto ethics; he has also been categorized as a “historicist philosopher,” who 
develops increasingly meticulous and interwoven theories of knowledge, power and the self; and 
others, still, have argued that Foucault creates an entirely new method—“interpretative 
analytics”—which “‘goes beyond’ structuralism and hermeneutics.”85
Gutting proceeds to criticize these unifying interpretations, on the grounds that they 
involve a negation both of the marginality of Foucault’s works and of the fact that Foucault 
adopted methodologically and thematically diverse approaches within his texts. For example, 
Gutting explains, Foucault adopted two entirely dissimilar approaches to language in The Order 
of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, and in The Archaeology of Knowledge, 
respectively. That is, in the former text, Foucault treated language in terms of a Heideggerian 
framework of historical ontology, by assessing how language has, over time, existed in and 
referred to the world—in order to establish how the ‘being’ of language has undergone various 
changes. In the latter text, though, Foucault adopted a structuralist theory of language, that 
involves no consideration of any change in the ‘being’ of language, and that grasps language as 
historical only insofar as different sets of linguistic systems, that exist at different times, 
propagate different ways of thinking. All things considered, Gutting’s problematization of the 
oversimplification involved in any unifying interpretation of Foucault’s work, is valuable, insofar 
as it safeguards the complexity of Foucault’s thought. However, it must be noted that Gutting 
does acknowledge that unifying interpretations are helpful from a didactic point of view, and he 
indicates that Foucault, himself, was prone to providing unifying perspectives on his writings.
  
86
                                                 
85 Gary Gutting, introduction to The Cambridge Companion to Foucault, 2d ed., ed. Gary Gutting (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1-2. 
 
86 Ibid., 1-2, 4. 
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In view of such acknowledgement, on the part of Gutting, of the didactic value of 
unifying interpretations of Foucault’s work, I believe that I am completely justified in drawing, 
within the first part of this chapter, on Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow’s Michel Foucault: 
Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, in order to provide an overview of Foucaultian 
methodology and theory. The first edition of this ‘interpretative’ text was already published in 
1982—some two years before Foucault’s death—yet Gutting himself asserts that this work 
constitutes “one of the most intelligent and interesting general interpretations of Foucault.”87 
Further, the worth and accuracy of this guide to Foucault’s thought is in effect assured, as 
Foucault was actively involved in the creation of this work, through the provision of its afterword 
as well as through “endless hours of stimulating conversation [with the authors,] and patient and 
prompt revisions” of the text.88
Secondly, in view of Gutting’s admission that Foucault himself furnished unifying 
perspectives on his writings, and considering that it was completely within his right to do so, I 
believe that I can, within what follows, accept as legitimate Foucault’s remark that “The goal of 
[his] . . . work . . . has not been to analyze the phenomena of power, nor to elaborate the 
foundations of such an analysis[, but] . . . to create a history of the different modes by which, in 
our culture, human beings are made subjects.”
 
89
                                                 
87 Ibid., 2. 
 In short, through this statement Foucault 
acknowledges that all of his texts, in some way or another, have been motivated by the desire to 
investigate the role that power, and the discursive practices that operate under its auspices, play in 
the constitution of individual subjectivity. It is on the basis of this, and similar, claims made by 
Foucault, that I proceed to examine, within the second part of this chapter, the implications for 
individual subjectivity of the theories furnished by Foucault in his key ‘genealogical’ texts—most 
notably, in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, and in The Will to Knowledge: The 
History of Sexuality: Volume One. That is, I follow up my overview of Foucaultian methodology 
and theory with an examination of how, on the one hand, the discourses and micro-techniques of 
what Foucault terms ‘disciplinary power,’ produce individuals as docile bodies, and of how, on 
the other hand, the discourses and micro-techniques of what Foucault terms ‘bio-power,’ produce 
individuals as prostrate subjects. These analyses lead me to reflect, within the final part of this 
chapter, on the way in which the writings of Wolfgang Sachs and Thomas Princen mirror, and 
88 Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 2d ed. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1983), xiii. 
89 My emphasis. Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power” (1982), in Power: Essential Works of Foucault: 1954-
1984, ed. James D. Faubion (London: Penguin, 2002), 326. 
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differ from, Foucaultian theory, and upon the significance of these parallels and discrepancies 
alike. In other words, I thematize the ways in which Sachs’ Planet Dialectics and Princen’s The 
Logic of Sufficiency approximate Foucaultian theory, and also consider why, despite such 
approximation, neither theorist discards his arguably Kantian conception of autonomy, in favor of 
embracing a more circumspect approach to the issue of individual subjectivity. Thereafter, I 
advance that despite this divergence, the existing affinities between Sachs’ and Princen’s works 
and Foucaultian theory hold out something exceptionally promising, namely the possibility of 
complementing these environmental theorists’ writings through a (Foucaultian) consideration of 
the implications, for individual subjectivity, of the discourses and micro-techniques of 
disciplinary power and bio-power. Ultimately, while the findings of these latter analyses 
decidedly problematize projecting onto the individual a Kantian conception of autonomy—and 
thus involve an implicit criticism of Sachs’ and Princen’s conception of individual subjectivity—
this study is undertaken in a constructive spirit, insofar as it is aimed merely at instigating a 
reconsideration of the approach that may have to be adopted to achieve pro-environmental 
civilizational change.  
 
 
Situating Foucaultian Theory 
 
In their text, Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, Dreyfus and Rabinow refrain from boxing 
all of Foucault’s works into a single category, but they do argue that Foucault adopts two main 
forms of analysis within his texts, namely, that of archaeology and of genealogy. Archaeology 
involves the analysis of how meaning, or discourse, undergoes arbitrary changes as a 
consequence of irregular discursive shifts. As such, this form of analysis essentially serves to 
undermine the validity of the traditional idea that meaning forms part of the unified progression 
of truth; that is, archaeological analysis has as its task the identification of “the arbitrariness of 
the hermeneutic horizon of meaning.”90
                                                 
90 Dreyfus and Rabinow, Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 106. 
 Genealogical analysis, similarly, involves the 
undermining of notions such as continuity, truth and the evolution of meaning, but unlike 
archaeology, which focuses exclusively on discourse or language, this form of analysis focuses 
on the identification and the examination of the relationship between power, knowledge and the 
individual body. That is, the genealogist, like the archaeologist, rejects the idea of absolute truth, 
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but not merely because ‘truths’ change when discursive shifts take place. Rather, the genealogist 
rejects the idea of absolute truth, because knowledges, discourses and ‘truths’ are constructed—
they are instruments that operate to ensure the effective functioning of power. Accordingly, the 
genealogist holds “that power and knowledge directly imply one another; [that] there is no power 
relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does 
not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations” (DP, 27). To sum up, one of the 
most important insights of the genealogist is that what we call ‘truth,’ rather than being 
something immutable that liberates one from the grasp of power, is on the contrary, something 
manufactured that extends the reach of power. This is why Foucault would argue, for example, 
that “each society has its régime of truth,” and that this regime consists of the discourses that the 
society “accepts and makes function as true.”91 Also, this insight underpins Foucault’s contention 
that the objective of the genealogist is not that of “emancipating truth from every system of 
power . . . but of detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and 
cultural, within which it operates at the present time.”92
Yet, Foucault advances that most contemporary political theorists do not recognize this 
interrelation between power, and the production of knowledges, discourses and ‘truths,’ because 
they harbor a ‘sovereign’ conception of power as something that is exclusively associated with 
prohibition.
 
93 Accordingly, they focus their criticisms on the State and its apparatuses, which are 
construed as essentially repressive. From Foucault’s perspective, this focus not only prevents 
political theorists from grasping the dynamism of power, but also its pervasiveness—that is, the 
sovereign conception of power to which they adhere prevents them from realizing that the State is 
unable to occupy the whole field of power relations, and that it is dependent for its functioning on 
already existing power relations, such as those between men and women, and parents and 
children, “which have their own configuration and relative autonomy.”94 In short, what Foucault 
is trying to point out, here, is that the sovereign conception of power is flawed precisely because 
it does not include recognition of the fact that for power to be effective in the contemporary era, it 
has “to be able to gain access to the bodies of individuals, to their acts, attitudes and modes of 
everyday behaviour.”95
                                                 
91 My emphasis. Michel Foucault, “Truth and Power” (1977), in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other 
Writings 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon, 1980), 131. 
 This type of access, argues Foucault, would be nearly impossible to 
92 My emphasis. Ibid., 133. 
93 Ibid., 121. 
94 Michel Foucault, “The History of Sexuality” (1977), in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 
1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon, 1980), 188. 
95 My emphasis. Foucault, “Truth and Power,” 125. 
 97 
obtain if power involved only the imposition of restrictions, and if it only emanated from “a 
political structure, a government, a dominant social class, . . . and so on.”96
Furthermore, insofar as genealogical analysis brings to light the complexity of the 
linkages between relations of power and the production of knowledges, discourses and ‘truths,’ 
the tendency, within political criticism, of attributing “strategies of domination” to specific 
individuals or power groups, and then advancing the identification of these ‘culprits’ to be of 
paramount importance, also emerges as wholly inadequate.
 
97 For the genealogist, finding out 
precisely how power is exercised is a far more viable concern, because “even if we reach the 
point of designating exactly all those people, all those ‘decision-makers,’ we will still not really 
know why and how [a] . . . decision was made, how it came to be accepted by everybody, and 
how it is that it hurts a particular category of person.”98 In short, as Foucault indicates in this 
latter statement, from the perspective of the genealogist, individuals are not regarded as the 
‘movers’ of history—rather, they are conceived as caught up within nebulous networks of power 
relations, or, within “a structural field of clashes.” That is, for the genealogist, subjects do not 
“first preexist and later enter into combat or harmony,” but rather “emerge on a [discursive] field 
of battle and play their roles, there and there alone.”99
 
 Also, very significantly, owing specifically 
to this perspective on individuals as inadvertently caught up and constituted within relations of 
power and webs of discourse—of the subject as historically or discursively constituted—the 
genealogist explicitly rejects the notion of a constituent, or founding, subject. Briefly, as Foucault 
explains, it is necessary 
to dispense with the constituent subject . . . to arrive at an analysis which can account for the constituent 
subject within a historical framework. And this is what . . . genealogy . . . [is:] a form of history which can 
account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects etc., without having to make 
reference to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty 
sameness throughout the course of history.100
 
 
Finally, what Foucault also makes clear in the above argument is that historically-orientated 
analyses are central to the project of genealogy. However, as Dreyfus and Rabinow, in their text, 
                                                 
96 Michel Foucault, “The Ethics of the Concern for the Self as a Practice of Freedom” (1984), in Ethics: Essential 
Works of Foucault: 1954-1984, ed. Paul Rabinow (London: Penguin, 2000), 291. 
97 Dreyfus and Rabinow, Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 108-109. 
98 Michel Foucault, “On Power” (1978), in Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings 1977-1984, 
ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman (New York: Routledge, 1990), 103-104. 
99 Dreyfus and Rabinow, Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 109. 
100 My emphasis. Foucault, “Truth and Power,” 117. 
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point out, such analyses are far from orthodox. Firstly, they are underpinned neither by a pure 
interest in the past, nor by a desire to identify the primary or the overall significance of an earlier 
period. Secondly, they do not, as standard histories often do, fall prey to the error of 
“presentism,” by attempting to retrieve from the past an institution or notion, for instance, that is 
supposedly analogous to an institution or notion in the present. Thirdly, these analyses are not 
motivated by “finalism,” which involves attempting to “find . . . the kernel of the present at some 
distant point in the past and then show . . . the finalized necessity of the development from that 
point to the present.”101 On the contrary, as Foucault himself insists, all (genealogical) “analyses 
are against the idea of universal necessities in human existence . . . [as t]hey show the 
arbitrariness of institutions and show which space of freedom we can still enjoy and how many 
changes can still be made.”102 By avoiding, within his writings, the three above-mentioned 
tendencies that are, arguably, founded upon the erroneous idea that one can undertake a 
completely “objective, totalizing analysis” of past events, Foucault may be accused of 
“subjectivism.”103 However, Foucault never claims to focus on anything other than the 
subject(ive); his genealogical analyses are undertaken in an effort to provide, precisely, an 
account of the constitution of the contemporary subject. That is, Foucault’s analyses are centered 
on thematizing, among other things, the objectifying and subjectifying practices, within Western 
culture, that have played pivotal roles in the production of contemporary individuals as docile 
bodies and as prostrate subjects. Ultimately, it is possible to see these analyses—to which we 
now turn—as Foucault’s formidable response to what he regards as the central question of 
philosophy, namely: “What is happening right now, and what are we, we who are perhaps 
nothing more than what is happening at this moment?”104
 
 
 
The discursive production of the contemporary individual as a docile body 
 
Discipline and Punish constitutes Foucault’s most extensive account of the production of the 
contemporary individual as a docile (objectified and subjected) body. He begins this text with a 
                                                 
101 Dreyfus and Rabinow, Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 118. 
102 Michel Foucault, “Truth, Power, Self: An Interview with Michel Foucault” (1982), in Technologies of the Self: A 
Seminar with Michel Foucault, eds. Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman and Patrick H. Hutton (Amherst: The 
University of Massachusetts Press, 1988), 11. 
103 Dreyfus and Rabinow, Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 120. 
104 Michel Foucault, “Power and Sex” (1977), in Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings 1977-
1984, ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman (New York: Routledge, 1990), 121. 
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juxtaposition of two different ways of punishing by providing, on the one hand, a description of 
the brutal public torture of the eighteenth century regicide, Damiens, and on the other hand, an 
account of the mundane daily timetable, created in the nineteenth century, for the inmates of “the 
House of young prisoners in Paris.” However, rather than automatically attributing this 
transformation of punishment to “a process of ‘humanization’” (DP, 6-7), Foucault argues that 
we should in fact question the benevolence with which this punitive transformation has been 
imbued, by studying the changes in power relations and object relations that facilitated it in the 
first place. Foucault proceeds to carry out this study, not in order to furnish a complete history of 
imprisonment, but rather to bring to light the “historical reality of the soul, which, unlike the soul 
represented by Christian theology, is not born in sin and subject to punishment, but is born rather 
out of methods of punishment, supervision and constraint . . . [as] the effect and instrument of a 
political anatomy” (DP, 29-30). Surprising as this objective of providing a genealogy of the soul 
may seem, Foucault convincingly argues, within his text, that the creation of this soul is crucial to 
the efficacy of discipline in the contemporary era, because without it, the constant objectification 
and subjection of the contemporary individual would constitute an impossibility. In what follows, 
I examine the key arguments that Foucault makes to arrive at this conclusion, including his 
account of the shared history of power relations and object relations, and his analyses of 
disciplinary power, its project of docility, and its pervasion of the social sphere. 
 
Three figures of punishment 
 
Foucault traces the history of power relations and object relations, within our culture, with 
reference to three historically consecutive figures of punishment, namely ‘sovereign torture,’ 
‘generalized punishment,’ and ‘normalizing detention.’ Sovereign torture, or the “spectacle of the 
scaffold” (DP, 32), constituted the dominant figure of punishment up until the French 
Revolution. In feudal monarchy, explains Foucault, the law was equated to the will of the 
sovereign, with the consequence that when a person broke the law, his/her transgression was 
regarded not only as an offence against his/her victim, but also as an affront against the sovereign 
himself. Owing to this, the public execution of the criminal constituted “not only . . . a judicial, 
but also . . . a political ritual . . . [, and t]he intervention of the sovereign [was] . . . much more . . . 
than an action to enforce respect for the rights of the individual; it [was] . . . a direct reply to the 
person who has offended him.” Accordingly, after a highly secretive, meticulous investigation to 
ensure that accused was in fact guilty, the ‘spectacle of the scaffold’ would take place, during 
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which the criminal was forced to confess his/her crime (thus preventing martyrdom), and during 
which his/her body was systematically mutilated to evince the power of the sovereign and instill 
terror within all. In other words, this spectacle would “make everyone aware, through the body of 
the criminal, of the unrestrained presence of the sovereign,” and, correlatively, the execution 
itself “did not re-establish [social] justice; it reactivated [sovereign] power” (DP, 47-49). 
However, as Foucault indicates, the efficacy of this form of punishment could not at all be 
guaranteed. For instance, there was always the risk that the crowds would turn against the 
executioner and heroize the criminal if they felt the torture of the latter to be unjust. And above 
all, there was the problem that the sovereign’s power, demonstrated through this ritual of atrocity, 
would have to be reactivated each time the law was breached, and would each time run the risk of 
achieving quite the opposite of the desired effect. 
 Thus, in the second half of the eighteenth century, sovereign torture made way for 
generalized punishment—not because of any philanthropic concern over the brutality of the 
public executions, but rather because these executions were construed as representative of “a 
badly regulated distribution of power” which had led to the “paralysis of justice.” In other words, 
the advocacy of generalized punishment over sovereign torture constituted, from Foucault’s 
perspective, nothing other than “a strategy for the rearrangement of the power to punish, 
according to modalities that render it more regular, more effective, more constant and more 
detailed in its effects” (DP, 79-80). Because of this imperative to punish more effectively, the 
aims and techniques of generalized punishment differed greatly from those employed in 
sovereign torture. For one, unlike sovereign torture which, as discussed, constituted a reaction to 
the criminal’s violation of the will of the sovereign through his/her transgression of the law, this 
new figure of punishment constituted a corrective action to the criminal’s contravention of the 
social contract, and hence, to his/her affront against society as a whole. Consequently, rather than 
employing public execution, this form of punishment made use of what Foucault refers to as the 
“semio-technique,” aimed at redress of the crime, reform of the criminal, and the reinforcement 
of public morality. In short, the semio-technique operated in terms of representations, or 
“couplings of ideas” (DP, 128): a thief, for instance, would be robbed of his/her own possessions; 
a pompous person would be disgraced; poison would be thrown into the poisoner’s face before 
he/she is thrown into boiling water; and so on (DP, 105). In turn, the most effective means of 
circulating these representations and endorsing their validity was by placing the criminal within 
public view, where, in front of adults and children alike, he would suffer humiliation, operate as 
an object of ridicule, and constitute a potent warning against criminal activity. 
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One of the primary aims of the semio-technique, then, was not to restore the criminal as a 
“juridical subject” within society, but rather to create of both the criminal and the public onlooker 
an “obedient subject, the individual subjected to habits, rules, orders, and authority that is 
exercised continually around him and upon him, and which he must allow to function 
automatically in him” (DP, 128-129). And this aim was to be achieved by ordering the semio-
technique in accordance with six specific rules. Firstly, the semio-technique was founded on a 
“rule of minimum quantity,” which involved deterring people from committing a crime by 
showing that the disadvantages of the crime definitely outweighed its advantages. Secondly, it 
was grounded in a “rule of sufficient ideality,” insofar as punishment was inflicted more by way 
of representation rather than by way of pain. Thirdly, the semio-technique operated in terms of a 
“rule of lateral effects,” to the extent that the necessity of the punishment exercising a 
preventative effect on innocent onlookers was privileged over the necessity of the punishment 
exercising a reformative effect on the criminal him/herself. Fourthly, and very importantly, this 
punitive technique conformed to a “rule of perfect certainty”—as Foucault indicates, “the laws 
that define the crime and lay down the penalties [had to] . . . be perfectly clear, . . . so that each 
member of society may distinguish criminal actions from virtuous actions.” Fifthly, the semio-
technique was underpinned by a “rule of common truth,” insofar as the criminal could only be 
punished if his/her guilt was established with absolute certainty; and sixthly, it was ordered with 
reference to a “rule of optimal specification,” involving an exhaustive categorization of all 
possible crimes and of the specific penalties of each. This specification of penalties would be 
based on a consideration of the social status of the perpetrator—since the penalty would be 
completely ineffective if one were, for example, to humiliate an (already) notorious individual—
and it would also be informed by a scrutiny of the inherent quality of the criminal’s will, of 
his/her mental attitude, lifestyle, and past, such that “criminality, rather than crime, became the 
object of penal intervention.” Ultimately, though, this generalized form of punishment, with its 
“double taxonomy of punishments and crimes,” would within a brief period of time be succeeded 
by normalizing detention—a punitive form that would retain a number of the elements of 
generalized punishment, but that would far surpass the latter in its pervasiveness (DP, 94-100). 
Imprisonment had existed as a form of punishment since the Classical Age, but it had 
remained relatively marginal owing, among other things, to it being criticized for being extremely 
costly to society, for rendering convicts completely idle, and for instigating the proliferation of 
their vices. In addition to this, imprisonment was regarded as a despotic form of punishment 
because, in its uniformity, it failed to differentiate between the diverse reasons for which 
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criminals had to be punished in the first place (DP, 114, 119). However, in spite of such 
criticism, when generalized punishment was succeeded by normalizing detention, imprisonment 
became the primary means by which punishment was meted out—as Foucault explains, as early 
as 1810 imprisonment occupied almost the entire field of punishment, excepting fines for 
marginal transgressions, and death for the most extreme ones. Foucault proceeds to argue that 
this somewhat surprising embrace of imprisonment as a legitimate form of punishment can be 
attributed to the establishment of highly prestigious “models of punitive imprisonment” during 
the Classical Age. Briefly, within these institutions, prisoners were grouped together into cells, 
they were forced to work, and were made to undertake their activities in accordance with an 
exacting timetable; also, they were placed under constant supervision, and were provided with 
religious readings and guidance—all in an effort to have these prisoners “‘draw towards the 
good’ and ‘to turn away from evil.’” To this model, the English added isolation as a form of 
punishment, on the grounds that “the prison would be too much like a factory if one left the 
prisoners to work together[, and that] . . . isolation provides a ‘terrible shock’ which, while 
protecting the prisoner from bad influences, enables him to go into himself and rediscover in the 
depths of his conscience the voice of good” (DP, 121-122). But the Philadelphia model that was 
implemented in 1790 was arguably the most innovative and significant of all, because in addition 
to making use of the above-mentioned methods, it included other techniques which remain at the 
heart of contemporary systems of imprisonment. The innovations of the Philadelphia model were, 
firstly, that the penalty would no longer be made public knowledge, secondly, that both the 
punishment and the reformation of the prisoner would take place between the prisoner and his/her 
supervisors only, and thirdly (and most importantly), that this process of reformation required the 
development of knowledge on the prisoner in his/her individuality. Accordingly, normalizing 
detention, which was consolidated through the Philadelphia model, and which continues to be the 
dominant figure of punishment today, is orientated around “the body, time, everyday gestures and 
activities[, and most significantly,] . . . the soul,” of the criminal (DP, 128). 
 
The rise of disciplinary power and its implications for subjectivity 
 
Foucault, however, advances that we must not regard this transformation of punishment as 
something that occurred at a remove from general society. On the contrary, as he elaborates in his 
text, just as the prisoner was gradually rendered docile and objectified through various 
techniques, so too, the ordinary individual was steadily made “a useful body and an intelligible 
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body,” through what Foucault refers to as the “project . . . of docility” (DP, 136). It is tempting to 
identify this project of docility simply as something forming part of the development of capitalist 
society, but Foucault is wary of attributing its emergence, in the eighteenth century, exclusively 
to the rise of capitalism. In other words, while Foucault acknowledges that economic changes 
certainly played some role in its appearance, he nevertheless maintains that the tendency to begin 
any “critique of society . . . with the nature of the economy, which is effectively determining . . . 
neglect[s] the relations of elementary power that could be constitutive of economic relations,”105
However, it cannot be denied that the micro-techniques, intrinsic to this project of 
docility, lent themselves to a capitalist-orientated social organization that thrives on obedient and 
industrious workers. This is because the project was, firstly, focused on gaining control of the 
“movements, gestures, attitudes, [and] rapidity” of the individual body; secondly, centered on the 
manipulation of the body’s “economy, the efficiency of movements, their internal organization;” 
and thirdly, exercised through “an uninterrupted, constant coercion, supervising the processes of 
the activity rather than its result . . . according to a codification that partitions as closely as 
possible time, space, [and] movement” (DP, 137). In short, these three elements of the project of 
docility, which together imposed upon the individual a meticulous form of dressage, or 
discipline, were (and are still to this day) put to use in factories, schools, the military, and so 
forth. 
 
and that could, as such, play a far more significant role than economics in the emergence of 
phenomena. 
The factory provides perhaps the most lucid illustration of the manner in which these 
elements of the project of docility are implemented. As Foucault explains, workers’ dispositions 
come under miniscule scrutiny, their bodily activities become strictly regimented in order to 
ensure that their tasks are performed as efficiently as possible, and their actions are dictated by 
timetables and supervisors. In addition, workers are enclosed within the factory, and this building 
is, itself, partitioned in such a way that each worker is allocated a specific place in which to 
perform his/her tasks, while each of these partitioned spaces, in turn, operates as a functional site 
that “correspond[s] not only to the need to supervise, to break dangerous communications, but 
also to create a useful space.” And finally, each worker is accorded a certain rank that ensures the 
individualization of the worker, not within space, but within a field of power relations—which 
facilitates “the supervision of each individual and the simultaneous work of all” (DP, 142-147). 
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Foucault’s elaboration on how the project of docility is implemented within the factory 
allows one to appreciate the degree of restriction to which the worker is subject. Yet, the 
imposition of such restriction was, and still is, construed as vital to ‘progress,’ most commonly 
understood in an economic sense. And, accordingly, it is believed that even more ‘progress’ can 
be facilitated through an ever more meticulous imposition of restrictions and forms of ‘training’ 
on the worker, in the interest of transforming him/her through such discipline. Notably, however, 
Foucault points out that this project of docility, far from resulting in the creation of autonomous 
individuals, leads only to “a subjection [of the individual] that has never reached its limit,” since 
a society in the grip of disciplinary power is nothing other than “an efficient machine . . . whose 
effect will be maximized by the concerted articulation of the elementary parts of which it is 
composed” (DP, 160-162, 164).  
In addition to this conflation of the project of docility with (economic) progress, Foucault 
advances further reasons for the ease with which disciplinary power spreads throughout society, 
where it proceeds to produce “individuals both as objects and as instruments” of its exercise (DP, 
170). In short, he argues that the rise of disciplinary power can also be attributed to the 
simplicity, and relative modesty, of the three modalities through which this form of power is 
extended and exercised in general society. That is, when contrasted with the processes involved 
in sovereign torture, for instance, the three disciplinary modalities of “hierarchical observation,” 
“normalizing judgment,” and the “examination,” can barely be framed as brutal, and hence as 
utterly objectionable, mechanisms of power. 
In short, the first disciplinary modality, of hierarchical observation, compels individuals 
to behave in a disciplined manner, not through the threat of physical torture but through the 
exercise of a disciplinary gaze (DP, 173). Foucault clarifies the workings of this disciplinary gaze 
and, correlatively, the processes at the heart of hierarchical observation, with reference to Jeremy 
Bentham’s famous architectural model, the Panopticon, that helped to radically improve the 
efficacy of surveillance within prisons. Briefly, Foucault describes Bentham’s Panopticon as a 
highly illuminated, circular building, which is divided up into individual cells, and at the centre 
of which there stands a surveillance tower from which all of the activities in all of the cells can be 
monitored. This panoptical model is exceptionally economical, argues Foucault, because the 
prisoners cannot see into the central tower to ascertain whether or not there is a supervisor 
present, with the consequence that they all sense the supervisor’s gaze upon them simultaneously 
and indefinitely, which results in them monitoring themselves continuously. Also, this model is 
exceptionally “diabolical,” because even those stationed in the central tower do not truly profit 
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from their surveillance of the prisoners, precisely because the efficacy of their surveillance 
derives not from their own authority, but rather from the ingenuity of the architecture within 
which they, too, are caught.106 Very significantly, though, Foucault proceeds to advance that 
these economical and diabolical aspects of Bentham’s Panopticon are intrinsic to the hierarchical 
observation that occurs not only within modern prisons, but also within our (ostensibly) free 
societies. That is, hierarchical observation within general society is economical, because any 
individual who inhabits societies of surveillance such as ours, “is subjected to a field of visibility, 
and . . . knows it, [and thus] assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them 
play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he 
simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection” (DP, 202-203). 
Also, hierarchical observation within our societies is diabolical because, far from being 
something possessed by a certain individual or by a particular group of individuals, the 
disciplinary power which is extended and exercised through hierarchical observation is “a 
machinery that no one owns[;] . . . a machine in which everyone is caught, those who exercise 
power just as much as those over whom it is exercised,”107
The second disciplinary modality, of normalizing judgment, harbors a certain “judicial 
privilege,” as it involves the imposition of numerous disciplines upon the individual that are quite 
separate from the state’s legal mechanisms. The imposition of these disciplines, in turn, makes 
possible the generation of a near-infinite number of potential transgressions that could never bear 
sufficient weight to be tried in a court of law, but for which the individual is nevertheless judged 
and penalized within other domains. For example, under the auspices of normalizing judgment 
there exist, in schools among other institutions, micro-penalties of time (e.g. for tardiness); of 
activity (e.g. for inefficiency); of behavior (e.g. for audacity); of speech (e.g. for chitchat); of the 
body (e.g. for incorrect gestures); and of sexuality (e.g. for obscenity). Each of these micro-
penalties, in turn, has its own array of possible punishments, and punishment can be doled out for 
even the most marginal of transgressions—so much so that “each subject finds himself caught in 
 because everyone is ultimately 
accountable to another. In other words, to state things rather plainly, for Foucault, the pervasive 
and protean disciplinary technology of power is not something possessed by people; rather, the 
discourses and micro-techniques which form part of the workings of this technology of power in 
fact produce the subjectivity of people, be they factory workers or bureaucrats. 
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a punishable, punishing universality” (DP, 178). In his discussion, Foucault remarks that the 
majority of such punishments are corrective in orientation, insofar as they consist of forms of 
training aimed at the reformation of ‘deviant’ individuals. But he adds to this that normalizing 
judgment involves not only this negative, or prohibitive, element but also a positive, or incentive, 
aspect, because it entails not only the rooting out and punishing of so-called delinquent behavior, 
but also the highlighting and rewarding of compliant behavior. This double system of punishment 
and reward, he contends, is made possible through the quantification of each individual’s 
behavior in terms of a “continuous calculation of plus and minus points,” which allows the 
“disciplinary apparatuses [to] hierarchize . . . the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ subjects in relation to one 
another” (DP, 180-181). That is to say—and this is perhaps one of the most insidious facets of 
normalizing judgment—such quantification of behavior makes possible the production of a 
“punitive balance-sheet of each individual,” in reference to which the individual is either 
promoted to a higher rank or demoted to a lower one. Through such conferral of either privilege 
or punishment, this disciplinary modality, in effect, encourages the ‘normalizing’ of each 
individual. Paradoxically, though, in order to identify what aspects of the individual should be 
subject to normalizing training, this disciplinary modality entails the continuous thematization of, 
precisely, the most infinitesimal of differences between individuals (DP, 184). 
The third disciplinary modality, of the examination, operates through the binding together 
of the modalities of hierarchical observation and normalizing judgment, in order to effect, 
simultaneously, “the subjection of those who are perceived as objects and the objectification of 
those who are subjected.” While the workings of the examination are perhaps most pronounced in 
the pedagogic domain, Foucault asserts that far from signaling the consummation of an 
apprenticeship, the examination forms part of “a constantly repeated ritual of power” within our 
everyday lives. Most importantly, he attributes the resilience and continuity of this disciplinary 
modality to the fact that it involves a radical “superimposition of . . . power relations and 
knowledge relations.” That is, firstly, in the examination, visibility is employed as an instrument 
for the continuous exercise of power, in a manner that directly inverts its role in monarchism. In 
other words, while the sovereign would demonstrate his supremacy over his anonymous subjects 
by making his singularity and power visible to all through the spectacle of the scaffold, the 
efficacy of disciplinary power is guaranteed, conversely, by the fact that through the examination, 
it is able to remain invisible while imposing a permanent and individualizing visibility upon 
every single subject. In short, it is by means of the examination that disciplinary power, “instead 
of emitting signs of its potency [or] . . . imposing its mark on its subjects, holds them in a 
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mechanism of objectification.” Secondly, the examination not only situates individuals within an 
economy of visibility, but also ‘fixes’ them in their individuality, through writing in the form of 
registration and documentation. This is performed in order both to identify the individual’s own 
nature and propensity, and to constitute a “comparative system” for the description, 
measurement, and calculation of groups of individuals. And thirdly, by way of such processes of 
writing, the examination transforms every single individual into a “case” to be known; owing to 
this, it also involves an inversion of the role of writing in monarchism. That is, while, in pre-
disciplinary societies, only the lives and actions of the powerful would be chronicled, since such 
writing constituted a means of instantiating their power, in disciplinary society, this role of 
writing is reversed, insofar as the chronicle, or ‘dossier,’ of the individual now constitutes “a 
means of control . . . a method of domination [and] . . . a document for possible use” against the 
individual (DP, 184-192). 
Ultimately, according to Foucault, three significant processes took place in the wake of 
the rise to dominance of disciplinary power, through these modalities of hierarchical observation, 
normalizing judgment, and the examination. The first process involved a transformation of the 
aim of disciplines—while they were previously used to avert disasters, remedy irregularities or 
curb excesses, they became tools for augmenting the utility of individuals. For example, although 
the disciplining of factory workers still functions to avert theft and ensure order, it also “tends to 
increase aptitudes, speeds, outputs and therefore profits[,] . . . treat . . . actions in terms of their 
results, [and] introduce . . . bodies into a machinery, forces into an economy.” The second 
process that took place in the wake of the rise to dominance of disciplinary power, concerned the 
de-institutionalizing, or “swarming of disciplinary mechanisms,” which extended the reach of 
disciplinary power even further. As Foucault shows, the consequences of such ‘swarming’ is 
evident in the operations of most modern schools, because today, the school “must not simply 
train docile children; it must also make it possible to supervise the parents, to gain information as 
to their way of life, their resources, their piety, their morals.” And the third process that took 
place concerned the shifting, of the ‘right’ to discipline, from religious groups to the state. 
Foucault argues that “police power” is a manifestation of this shift—it involves the police 
engaging in the observation and the documentation less of actual transgressions than of “forms of 
behaviour, attitudes, possibilities [and] . . . suspicions,” to furnish “a permanent account of 
individuals’ behaviour” and to spot potential criminal inclinations in such behavior (DP, 210-
215). 
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Very importantly, though, Foucault is careful to emphasize that disciplinary power should 
not be construed as something that effects the oppression of the individual; rather, what must be 
grasped is that the individual is “a reality fabricated by this specific technology of power” (DP, 
194). That is to say, as Foucault points out, “it is not that the beautiful totality of the individual is 
amputated, repressed, altered by our social order, it is rather that the individual is carefully 
fabricated in it, according to a whole technique of forces and bodies”—we are disciplinary souls, 
and we reside “in the panoptic machine, invested by its effects of power, which we bring to 
ourselves since we are part of its mechanism” (DP, 217). And, notably, in virtue of his argument 
that we are, then, produced through the discourses and micro-techniques of disciplinary power, 
Foucault in this respect stands in diametric opposition to Kant, who, as discussed in Chapter 
Two, maintained, conversely, that the individual, as a rational being, is situated in a position 
outside of (i.e. undetermined by) discourse and thus gives him/herself the (moral) law. In fact, it 
is quite possible that Foucault had Kant’s Categorical Imperative in mind when he insisted that 
“what generalizes the power to punish . . . is not the universal consciousness of the law in each 
juridical subject; it is the regular extension, the infinitely minute web of panoptic techniques” 
(DP, 224).  
The implications, for environmental or political action, of Foucault’s arguments 
concerning this way in which “discipline produces subjected and practiced[,] . . . ‘docile’ bodies,” 
are disquieting to say the least. This is because what Foucault shows is that through the 
discourses and micro-techniques of disciplinary power, the individual is produced in a manner 
that “increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes these same 
forces (in political terms of obedience).” Otherwise stated, through disciplinary power, the 
individual is produced as economically potent but politically impotent, because in much the same 
way as “economic exploitation separates the force and the product of labour, . . . disciplinary 
coercion establishes in the body the constricting link between an increased aptitude and an 
increased domination” (DP, 138). Admittedly, Foucault does add that it is possible for us to 
revolt against this way in which we have been discursively produced. However, as I show in the 
final chapter of this dissertation, Foucault neither conceals the immense complexity and difficulty 
of such revolt, nor claims that all individuals are capable of this arduous task. In effect, he 
suggests that instead of attempting to revolt against the way in which they have been discursively 
produced, most individuals will remain economically useful and politically meek throughout their 
lives. Foucault argues this to be the case not only because the discourses and micro-techniques of 
disciplinary power produce individuals as controllable and docile objects, but also because this 
 109 
incessant disciplining of the individual—insofar as it leaves very little room for any possibility of 
self-determination—precipitates the formation of an infantilized subjectivity. Arguably, this 
additional, infantilizing, effect of the discourses and micro-techniques of disciplinary power was 
adumbrated as early as 1837, when a Fourierist, almost to the point of valorizing criminal 
activity, advanced the following: 
 
The social order dominated by the fatality of its repressive principle continues to kill . . . through the prisons 
those whose . . . robustness rejects or disdains its prescriptions, those who, too strong to remain enclosed 
within its tight swaddling-clothes, break from them and tear them to pieces, men who do not wish to remain 
children.108
 
 
 
The discursive production of the contemporary individual as a prostrate 
subject 
 
While Foucault, in Discipline and Punish, provides an extensive account of the production of the 
contemporary individual, as a docile body, through the discourses and micro-techniques of 
disciplinary power, in his subsequent text, The Will to Knowledge, he furnishes a correlative, and 
equally significant, account of the production of the contemporary individual, as a prostrate 
subject, through the discourses and micro-techniques of what he refers to as bio-power. In short, 
within the latter text, Foucault attempts to identify various shifts, in power relations and 
discourse, which engendered, “in the space of a few centuries, a certain inclination [that] has led 
us to direct the question of what we are, to sex” (HS, 78). And what he also aims to bring into 
conspicuousness through his study is that what we call our ‘sexuality,’ rather than being a natural 
phenomenon, is an arbitrary historical construct. That is, Foucault is intent on showing that the 
centrality of ‘sexuality’ in our lives derives not from any ‘truth’ intrinsic to it, but rather from the 
fact that the domain of sex constitutes a particularly effective instrument for the spread of power, 
insofar as it is through sex that power is able “to reach the most tenuous and individual modes of 
behavior . . . access . . . the rare or scarcely perceivable forms of desire, . . . penetrate . . . and 
control . . . everyday pleasure” (HS, 11). In what follows, I trace Foucault’s arguments 
concerning the above, but in view of the individual’s primary identification with his/her 
                                                 
108 My emphasis. La Phalange, (January 10, 1837), quoted in Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of 
the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin, 1991), 289. 
 110 
‘sexuality,’ I pay particular attention to the implications, for individual subjectivity, of the 
profound imbrication of sexuality with power and the production of knowledges, discourses and 
‘truths.’ Through such a study, I aim to clarify why Foucault would argue that, just as individuals 
are rendered docile through the discourses and micro-techniques of disciplinary power, they are 
rendered prostrate through the discourses and micro-techniques of bio-power—at the heart of 
which are the ‘deployment of sexuality,’ the practice of a medicalized form of confession, and the 
habituation of a deferment of authority to a sagacious other. 
 
Bio-power and the emergence of the deployment of sexuality 
 
According to Foucault, prior to the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, sex was 
predominantly perceived through the discursive lens of what he terms the “deployment of 
alliance,” which had as its primary objectives the preservation of the purity of bloodlines, the 
legitimate transfer of wealth, and the consequent perpetuation of established power hierarchies, 
or alliances. Sex was instrumental in the attainment of all of these objectives of the deployment 
of alliance, because of the ties of kinship that it fostered by linking certain individuals to one 
another. And owing to this instrumentality, argues Foucault, sex constituted an important theme 
in the practice of penance. However—and this is very significant to note—such attention was 
focused on sex purely on the grounds of its importance to the maintenance of relations of 
alliance; and as a consequence of this, any scrutiny of sex was exclusively focused on sexual acts 
that constituted threats to established power hierarchies or alliances, such as “adultery, 
extramarital relations, relations with a person prohibited by blood or statute,” etcetera (HS, 106-
107). 
During the late eighteenth century, however, the deployment of alliance was displaced by 
what Foucault terms the deployment of sexuality—a discursive transformation that was signaled 
by a shift in focus, within the practice of penance, away from “the problematic of relations 
toward a problematic of the ‘flesh,’ that is, of the body, sensation, the nature of pleasure, the 
more secret forms of enjoyment or acquiescence” (HS, 108). Foucault contends that what we 
refer to as our ‘sexuality’ was born out of the emergence of this new deployment, because it is 
through the discursive lens of the latter that sex became perceived as highly significant, not 
because of its instrumentality in the maintenance of power hierarchies or alliances, but rather 
because of its ostensibly inherent profundity. That is, through the deployment of sexuality, sex 
was transformed from a strategic act into an “agency which appears to dominate us and . . . [a] 
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secret which seems to underlie all that we are;” and to this day, we continue to accept as given 
that “it is through sex . . . that each individual has to pass in order to have access to his own 
intelligibility . . . to the whole of his body[, and] . . . to his identity” (HS, 155-156). Why this new 
perspective on sex, and hence, on ourselves, could take root so effectively is what Foucault 
endeavors to grasp, and of key importance to this endeavor is his analysis of the emergence of 
bio-power alongside disciplinary power. 
Foucault locates the emergence of bio-power in the second half of the eighteenth 
century—a time during which, he advances, “the body of society . . . becomes the new principle” 
as it is suddenly felt that “this social body . . . needs to be protected, in a quasi-medical sense.”109 
However, as benevolent as such a societal reorientation under the auspices of bio-power may 
appear, Foucault contends that bio-power, which applies to “man-as-species,” constitutes no less 
of an encroachment on the individual than disciplinary power, which applies to “man-as-body.” 
That is, although new techniques very different from those of disciplinary power are introduced 
under the auspices of bio-power—such as statistical studies concerning life expectancy, birth 
rates, etcetera—these techniques, and their associated discourses, entail an immense intervention 
in the activities of the population. For instance, it is through these ostensibly benevolent 
techniques that administrations determine whether or not “the mortality rate has to be modified or 
lowered; life expectancy has to be increased; the birth rate has to be stimulated.” In short, then, 
under the auspices of bio-power, numerous regulatory techniques are installed “around the 
random element inherent in a population of living beings,” in the interest of optimizing the 
wellbeing of this social body.110 But because such regulation targets many elements of existence 
hitherto left unhindered, bio-power involves a formidable encroachment on the individual. On the 
basis of this insight, Foucault maintains that the notion of the ‘social body’ is itself a construct 
completely enmeshed in the webs of power—that the “great fantasy is the idea of a social body 
constituted by the universality of wills[, as] . . . the phenomenon of the social body is the effect 
not of a consensus but of the materiality of power operating on the very bodies of individuals.”111
Ultimately, from Foucault’s perspective, the emergence of bio-power—focused as it is on 
the life processes of the social body, alongside disciplinary power—which focuses on the 
individual body, is of key importance to grasping why an increased significance was attributed to 
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sex from the end of the eighteenth century onwards. Briefly, he argues that such an augmentation 
of the significance of sex was likely motivated by the fact that sex exists at a point where the 
techniques and aims of bio-power and disciplinary power are particularly interwoven. That is, on 
the one hand, because sexuality involves procreative activity, it is something that pertains to the 
social body; it forms part of those “broad biological processes that concern not the bodies of 
individuals but . . . the multiple unity of the population.” As a consequence, sexuality is “a matter 
for regularization” under the auspices of bio-power. On the other hand, because sexuality also 
involves individual conduct, it “is a matter for individualizing disciplinary controls that take the 
form of permanent surveillance” and other micro-techniques that fall under the auspices of 
disciplinary power.112
 
 In short, then, according to Foucault, it is this position of sexuality as an 
interest common to both bio-power and disciplinary power which explains why it has become 
invested with such significance. Now, the consequences of such an augmentation of the 
significance of sex deserve examination, because their impact on subjectivity is anything but 
trifling. 
The implications, for subjectivity, of the medicalization of sex and of the practice of 
confession 
 
To begin with, the newfound importance of sex, as a matter of concern for both the individual 
and the population, and hence, as a phenomenon subject to both disciplinary measures and bio-
power regularization, led to “the medical idea that when it is undisciplined and irregular, 
sexuality . . . has effects at two levels.” Firstly, it was argued, the effects of a deviant sexuality 
are felt “at the level of the body, of the undisciplined body that is immediately sanctioned by all 
the individual diseases that the sexual debauchee brings down upon himself.” Secondly, it was 
claimed that sexual deviancy also has “effects at the level of the population,” insofar as the sexual 
debauchee is, for various reasons, perceived as a threat to the wellbeing of the social body as a 
whole.113
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 In short, this ‘medicalization’ of sexuality, which, Foucault argues, involved a 
fabrication of the so-called effects of sexual deviancy, fuelled a societal preoccupation with sex 
and with knowledges concerning it. And very importantly, as Foucault points out in his 
discussion of the proliferation of knowledges on sex, the medicalization of sex did not merely 
lead to the creation of one sexual type to vilify, namely the sexually debauched “perverse adult.” 
113 Ibid., 252. 
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On the contrary, during the course of the nineteenth century, the medicalization of sex instigated 
the creation of no less than four sexual types—“four privileged objects of knowledge, which were 
also targets and anchorage points for the ventures of knowledge: the hysterical woman, the 
masturbating child, the Malthusian couple, and the perverse adult” (HS, 105). 
Firstly, explains Foucault, the figure of the hysterical woman, the most common 
manifestation of which is the stereotypical ‘neurotic Mother,’ emerged in the wake of the 
“hysterization of women’s bodies.” This involved a new appraisal of the body of the woman as 
something which is sexually replete to the point of pathology, as something that consequently 
constitutes a concern for medical practice, and as something that should, in the interest of 
diffusing its inherent (pathological) dangers, be made useful by being “placed in organic 
communication with the social body . . . the family space . . . and the life of children.” Secondly, 
the disquieting figure of the masturbating child appeared as a consequence of “a pedagogization’ 
of children’s sex,” in terms of which it was held that all children are inclined to engage in sexual 
activity, and that they should be prevented from such premature use of their sexual potential since 
it “posed psychical and moral, individual and collective dangers.” Thus, a watchful eye was to be 
kept over children to prevent this hazardous, premature sexual activity from surfacing, and this 
important task was allocated not only to parents, but also to teachers, to doctors and, at a later 
stage, to psychologists. Thirdly, argues Foucault, the figure of the Malthusian couple emerged in 
the wake of “a socialization of procreative behavior” on economic, political and medical bases. 
This involved providing couples with guidance concerning issues such as fertility and birth 
control, and the necessity of becoming a responsible unit within the social body—the healthy 
perpetuation of which the couple is to guarantee. And fourthly, the figure of the perverse adult 
stemmed from “a psychiatrization of perverse pleasure,” which entailed the identification of 
sexuality as a separate instinct. Some of the more important effects of this psychiatrization were, 
firstly, an emphasis on the need to undertake scientific investigations of so-called aberrations of 
the sexual instinct, secondly, a pursuit of means of combating or rectifying such aberrations and, 
thirdly, a classification of behavior as normal or pathological, in reference to the sexual instinct 
of the individual in question (HS, 104-105). In relation to these four figures, an encyclopedic 
knowledge of sex could be developed, and individuals could be classified, and treated, in 
accordance with the kind of sexuality that they manifest. Notably, as Foucault indicates, this 
knowledge of sex is still considered legitimate today, since even we “spend our time prohibiting 
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children from masturbation, adolescents from having sex before marriage, adults from having sex 
in this or that manner with this or that person,”114
That said, though, Foucault emphasizes that sexuality does not merely involve 
prohibition. Rather, alongside prohibition there exist, firstly, an immense proliferation of 
discourses on sexuality, and secondly, the development of a seemingly obsessive preoccupation 
with sexuality, on the part of individuals themselves. With reference to the former point, Foucault 
explains that we have developed a monumental body of medical, psychological and moral 
literature on sexuality, the continual expansion of which is ensured through inciting individuals to 
discourse upon their own sexuality, and then (ostensibly) identifying within such discourse the 
motivations and/or pathologies underlying their sexual proclivities. In turn, with reference to the 
latter point, of individuals themselves developing a seemingly obsessive preoccupation with 
sexuality, Foucault advances that it appears as though individuals attach to, rather than distance 
themselves from, the discursive explosion on sexuality, the incitements to discourse upon it, and 
being classified with reference to a ‘sexual norm.’ However, he contends, it is not that individuals 
willfully subscribe to these discourses and consciously acquiesce to these imperatives that are 
orientated around sex—rather, individuals do not resist these discourses and these imperatives 
because they are produced through them. Foucault clarifies his perspective on this matter in a 
1978 presentation, where he argues that the West has  
 and so forth. 
 
develop[ed,] . . . starting with sexuality, an entire complex mechanism in which it is a question of the 
constitution of individuality, of subjectivity; in brief, of the manner in which we behave and in which we 
become conscious of ourselves . . . [I]n the West, . . . people individualise themselves through a certain 
number of methods; and . . . sexuality, much more than an element of the individual which could be discarded 
as external to himself, is constitutive of the bond that requires people to be tied to their identity under the form 
of subjectivity.115
 
  
For Foucault, then, sexuality is integral to the identity and, analogously, to the subjectivity, of 
individuals. And, as he goes on to explain, this intimate association between subjectivity and 
sexuality, especially insofar as it is reinforced through ‘medicalized confession,’ effects the 
prostration of the contemporary individual as a subject. 
                                                 
114 Michel Foucault, “Sexuality and Power” (1978), in Religion and Culture, ed. Jeremy Carrette (New York: 
Routledge, 1999), 129. 
115 My emphasis. Ibid., 129-130. 
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In short, in addition to the medicalization of sex, what also took place in the nineteenth 
century was a medicalization of the practice of confession. Foucault begins his discussion of this 
development by pointing out that the West has, for several centuries, depended on the practice of 
confession for the production of ‘truth.’ For instance, already in the thirteenth century, all 
Christians were ordered “to kneel at least once a year and confess . . . their transgressions, 
without omitting a single one,” and this imperative to confess to an authority figure in order to 
produce ‘truth’ has subsequently only gained in momentum. As Foucault remarks, today “the 
obligation to confess is . . . relayed through so many different points, is so deeply ingrained in us, 
that we no longer perceive it as the effect of a power that constrains us; on the contrary, it seems 
to us that truth, lodged in our most secret nature, ‘demands’ only to surface” (HS, 60). Owing to 
this immense historical impetus behind confession, and owing to the traditional (Christian) 
association of confession with the presence of a figure of authority, and with forgiveness or 
healing (occasioned through the revelation of ‘truth’ via confession), the practice of confession 
lent itself to the production of knowledges on sex within the medical domain, especially 
subsequent to the medicalization of sex, discussed above. Briefly, it was believed that knowledge 
of sex, including its nature and its treatment, could be obtained through an inclusion of the 
practice of confession within medicine. Yet, in order to arrive at what it claimed to be the 
scientific, objective ‘truth’ of sex, on the basis of the subjective confessions of individuals, 
medical practice needed to medicalize the practice of confession itself. According to Foucault, 
this was accomplished through five specific procedures. 
Firstly, argues Foucault, the medicalization of confession was effected “through a clinical 
codification of the inducement to speak,” which involved overlaying the individual’s subjective 
confessions of feelings and inclinations with properly medical examinations and procedures, in 
order to make the former (at least appear as) less tenuous, from a scientific point of view. 
Secondly, confession was recast in a scientific mold by means of a “postulate of a general and 
diffuse causality.” In terms of this postulate, individuals were compelled to confess all to the 
medical personage, since it was held that sex was possessed of “an inexhaustible and 
polymorphous causal power”—in other words, that any sexual act, however negligible it may 
seem, could have an enormous impact on the mental and physical dimensions of one’s life. 
Thirdly, through the instantiation of what Foucault refers to as “the principle of a latency intrinsic 
to sexuality,” confession became a thoroughly scientific practice that required the intervention of, 
specifically, the medical personage rather than the mere priest. What was advanced with 
reference to this principle, was the idea that drawing the sexual ‘truth’ from a confession 
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constitutes an arduous task, not simply because of the possible bashfulness or prudery of the 
confessing subject, but more importantly, because “the ways of sex were obscure; it was elusive 
by nature; its energy and its mechanisms escaped observation, and its causal power was partly 
clandestine.” In other words, what was suggested was that the ‘truth’ of sex was hidden from the 
confessing subject him/herself, and could only be retrieved through the involvement of an 
objective figure of science. In turn, the fourth procedure that facilitated the medicalization of 
confession was the establishment of a “method of interpretation,” which differed considerably 
from the procedures involved in the practice of confession in its traditional (religious) setting. In 
short, as Foucault explains, confession, within its traditional context, involved the one who 
confesses speaking the truth to the priest, in order to be forgiven and guided by the latter. 
However, the dynamics of confession altered dramatically when it was situated within the 
domain of medicine, most probably owing to the fact that the new principal subject of 
confession—namely ‘sexuality’—had become construed as something that possesses a latent and 
most opaque aspect. Accordingly, in medicalized confession, the one who confesses yields a 
message that contains a ‘truth,’ but apparently, it is a truth to which he/she has no access—it is a 
truth that can only emerge through the intervention of the medical personage, who is regarded as 
capable of deciphering the subject’s confession. The fifth procedure by means of which the 
practice of confession was rendered scientific was “through the medicalization of the effects of 
confession.” According to Foucault, this involved the idea that the ‘truth’ drawn from the 
subject’s confession by the medical personage, was possessed of immense therapeutic value (HS, 
65-67). 
To sum up, Foucault’s main criticism of the medicalization of confession, in the wake of 
the medicalization of sexuality, is that it has, for the most part,116
                                                 
116 Admittedly, psychoanalytic practice has as its objective helping the subject to become independent and capable of 
self-decipherment. However, it is likely that Foucault is, here, focusing his criticism on the fact that psychological 
practice, particularly in the hands of badly trained or inexperienced practitioners, frequently devolves into an 
authority/surrender relation. I have Andrea Hurst to thank for this important observation. 
 involved an endorsement of a 
strict hierarchical relation between the confessing subject and the medical personage, and led to 
the idea that the subject is incapable of self-decipherment, and hence, of an independence of 
mind. And, in addition to this, he contends that such an endorsement of hierarchy and such an 
(albeit implicit) acceptance of the impossibility of self-decipherment, is with great fervor 
perpetuated well beyond the walls of the psychologist’s consultation room. Why this is the case, 
argues Foucault, is not merely because of the fact that confession constitutes a centuries-old 
fixture in Western culture, or because of the fact that the medicalization of sex and of the practice 
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of confession have had such a significant impact on the subjective configuration of the 
contemporary individual. It is also because society accepts as self-evident a traditional, or 
‘sovereign,’ view of power as exclusively prohibitive and essentially repressive, with the 
consequence that the production of knowledges and ‘truths’ is construed as something which 
operates against (repressive) power. Accordingly, under the influence of this conception of power 
and of the assumptions that accompany it, individuals proceed to confess—to family, friends, 
physicians, psychologists, psychiatrists, talk show hosts and sexologists, to name but a few—
adamant that in doing so, they are transgressing the bounds of an oppressive power. However, as 
discussed in the preliminary pages of this chapter, Foucault rejects this traditional view of power 
on the grounds that the dissemination of knowledges, discourses or ‘truths’ is in fact crucial to the 
functioning of power. Thus, he would, on the contrary, argue that when contemporary individuals 
proceed to confess, what they are unwittingly doing is playing right into the hands of the power 
that they believe they are resisting—whence Foucault’s warning that “we must not think that by 
saying yes to sex, one says no to power; on the contrary, one tracks along the course laid out by 
the general deployment of sexuality” (HS, 157). From Foucault’s perspective, then, the effects of 
the individual’s confession are a far cry from enlightenment or liberation. Rather, they involve, at 
a macro-level, the continued discursive subjection of individuals within the machinery of power, 
and, at a micro-level, the inculcation of a habit of unquestioningly surrendering to the authority of 
another, in order for this other to tell individuals who and what they are and what they have to 
do.117
The implications, for environmental or political action, of Foucault’s arguments 
concerning the way in which the discourses and micro-techniques of bio-power produce the 
contemporary individual as a prostrate subject, are extremely worrying. Earlier in this chapter, we 
discussed how the discourses and micro-techniques of disciplinary power produce the 
 To sum up, it is the augmented importance attributed to sexuality under the auspices of 
bio-power, the concomitant medicalization of sexuality and of the practice of confession, and 
society’s continued adherence to a traditional view of power, within which confession is 
erroneously framed as liberating, that definitively bind together sexuality, subjectivity, and the 
prostration of the contemporary individual. 
                                                 
117 As Adrian Konik points out in Buddhism and Trangression: The Appropriation of Buddhism in the Contemporary 
West, this habit of surrendering to the authority of another at the micro-level of medicalized confession, has as one of 
its correlatives at a macro-level, “a belief in the legitimacy of constantly deferring to the authority of the . . . global 
economy—a deference that, on account of the instability and power involved [in global economics], is advanced as 
requiring the mediation of institutions such as the World Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO), which . . . 
undermines the possibility of . . . communities . . . assert[ing] their [economic] autonomy.” Adrian Konik, Buddhism 
and Transgression: The Appropriation of Buddhism in the Contemporary West (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 157. 
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contemporary individual in a manner that “increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of 
utility) and diminishes these same forces (in political terms of obedience)” (DP, 138). The effect 
that the rise of bio-power has had on the contemporary individual is equally deleterious, because 
the spread of the discourses and micro-techniques of bio-power, according to Foucault, 
constitutes “an immense labor to which the West has submitted generations in order to produce—
while other [i.e. disciplinary] forms of work ensured the accumulation of capital—men’s 
subjection: their constitution as subjects in both senses of the word” (HS, 60). In other words, 
while, under the auspices of disciplinary power, the contemporary individual has been produced 
as a docile, obedient body, whose principal function is that of generating profits, under the 
auspices of bio-power, the contemporary individual has been produced as a prostrate subject who, 
albeit inadvertently, surrenders to the authority of others. As I mentioned earlier, Foucault does 
advance that it is possible to revolt against this way in which we have been discursively produced 
as docile and prostrate. Yet, he goes on to emphasize that successful revolt, which would involve 
reconstituting one’s subjectivity in relation to alternative discourses, is an exceptionally arduous 
task for several reasons. First, it is difficult because it cannot be achieved through cognitive 
deliberation alone. That is, it requires that individuals adopt an ethic/culture of the self or, a day-
to-day working on the self, that is not exclusively conceptual in orientation, and that involves 
continually reforming one’s subjectivity by assimilating and putting into practice alternative 
discourses that counter the infantilizing effects of disciplinary/bio-power discourses and micro-
techniques. Second, it is taxing because it goes against the grain of almost everything that we 
accept as self-evident, such as the organization of our societies, the dominant discourses and 
micro-techniques that permeate these societies, and even the approach that we have adopted in 
relation to our own identity. Third, this task is exacting, because it demands that individuals 
situate themselves vis-à-vis the discourses of the day; in other words, the very possibility of 
successful revolt is predicated on individuals grasping that they have been discursively produced 
as entities that are economically useful, politically docile and to all intents and purposes 
incapable of any meaningful self-determination. These, then, are some of the arduous 
requirements to be met if individuals wish to successfully reconstitute their subjectivity, and in 
doing so, cultivate a nuanced form of autonomy that would make possible enduring 
environmental and political action. The labyrinthine nature of this process of reconstituting one’s 
subjectivity is only to be expected if one considers the complex and implicit nature of the 
production of the contemporary individual through the discourses and micro-techniques of 
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disciplinary/bio-power—a complexity and an implicitness which Foucault brings into view when 
he argues that 
 
power relations . . . materially penetrate the body in depth, without depending even on the mediation of the 
subject’s own representations. If power takes hold on the body, this isn’t through its having first to be 
interiorised in people’s consciousnesses. There is a network or circuit of bio-power . . . which acts as the 
formative matrix of sexuality itself as the historical and cultural phenomenon within which we seem at once 
to recognise and lose ourselves.118
 
 
 
Foucault, Sachs, Princen: Parallels and discrepancies 
 
Foucault’s argument that the subjectivity of the contemporary individual is discursively 
produced, at a primarily non-cognitive/non-conscious level, stands in opposition to any Kantian 
conception of autonomy, in terms of which the individual is conceived as a rational being, who 
may ‘give him/herself the law,’ and who is situated in a position external to discourse. By the 
same token, it is possible to argue that Foucault’s perspective, in this regard, runs counter to 
Sachs’ and Princen’s conceptions of individual subjectivity because, as already discussed, the 
highly cognitive approaches that Sachs and Princen adopt within their works suggests that they 
adhere to a modernist paradigm/episteme dominated by systematic reason, which presupposes a 
Kantian conception of autonomy. That is, insofar as these theorists principally work with 
hypotheses concerning our thoughts, ideas and beliefs in relation to what are tantamount to the 
technological, political and economic dimensions of the dominant social paradigm (DSP), they 
mainly operate at the general level of cognitive content, and therefore do not take into 
consideration the complexities of what Foucault argues to be the predominantly non-
cognitive/non-conscious processes involved in the discursive production of the contemporary 
individual. 
However—and this is highly significant—just because Sachs and Princen do not enter 
into a consideration of the complexities involved in the discursive production of the individual, 
this does not mean that their works do not contain any Foucaultian elements whatsoever. On the 
contrary, as I show in what follows, both Sachs and Princen criticize numerous aspects of what is 
tantamount to disciplinary power and, to greater and lesser degrees, criticize certain aspects of 
                                                 
118 My emphasis. Foucault, “The History of Sexuality,” 186. 
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what is tantamount to bio-power. Such proximity to Foucaultian theory makes it all the more 
surprising that neither Sachs nor Princen relinquish their Kantian orientation in order to draw out 
the implications, for individual subjectivity (and autonomy), of precisely those (disciplinary/bio-
power) aspects of our society that they thematize and censure. That said, such proximity to 
Foucaultian theory at the same time holds out something immensely promising, namely, the 
possibility of complementing the work of Sachs and Princen with a Foucaultian consideration of 
the implications, for individual subjectivity, of the discourses and micro-techniques of 
disciplinary power and bio-power. 
 
Foucaultian echoes within Sachs’ Planet Dialectics 
 
Within Planet Dialectics, Sachs discloses his understanding of power when he advances that 
“knowledge is intimately related to power,” and that because of this, “development thinking 
inevitably featured certain social actors . . . and certain types of social transformation . . . while 
marginalizing other social actors and degrading other kinds of change” (PD, 33). Such an 
understanding is in keeping with Foucault’s conception of power as something that is 
indissociable from the production of knowledges, discourses and ‘truths,’ and hence, as 
something that is not only prohibitive in nature but also a catalyst for immense discursive change. 
Yet, there exists an important (albeit highly nuanced) difference between Foucault’s and Sachs’ 
approaches to power. That is, while Foucault maintains that the nature of power relations 
themselves is the essential element to be grasped if we wish to understand contemporary 
discursive dynamics, Sachs appears to focus within his work on the need to investigate the power 
of the idea of development, and correlatively, the power of the contemporary economic system to 
which this idea is intimately related. Thus, while Foucault would proceed to examine disciplinary 
power and bio-power, and to thematize the immensely negative impact of the discourses and 
micro-techniques of these forms of power upon the contemporary world in general, and 
contemporary subjectivity in particular, Sachs would go on to emphasize the negative effects of 
the hold that the development idea and the contemporary economic system have on societies. 
This focus on the part of Sachs is epitomized in his argument that, today, “the degree of 
civilization in a country [is] . . . measured by the level of its production,” that society is perceived 
not as something that possesses an economy but rather as something “that is an economy,” and 
that it is consequently approached “as if it were a corporation” (PD, 4, 17, 80). 
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However, when it comes to Sachs’ discussion of how people are perceived and treated in 
our contemporary economistic world, this same focus on the economic system and development 
allows him to exhibit strong affinities with Foucault. The reason for this is relatively easy to 
grasp if one recalls that, in Discipline and Punish, Foucault advanced that through the discourses 
and micro-techniques of disciplinary power, individuals are made into “objects and . . . 
instruments” (DP, 170) and that this process, which he refers to as the project of docility, 
undeniably lends itself to a capitalist-orientated social organization that thrives on well-behaved 
employees. That is, while Foucault cautioned that the project of docility cannot simply be 
understood as underpinned by the development of capitalist society, he did concede that through 
disciplinary power, individuals are produced in a way that certainly “increases the forces of the 
body (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes these same forces (in political terms of 
obedience)” (DP, 138). Thus, while Sachs may not explicitly address either disciplinary power or 
this project of docility of which Foucault speaks, owing to his criticism of the contemporary 
economic system and development, he nevertheless ends up echoing Foucault’s arguments 
concerning the objectification of the contemporary individual. For example, Sachs explains that 
within our economistic societies, everything must run as smoothly as a machine in order to 
generate ever more profits, and for him, one of the direst consequences of this is that “people 
themselves turn into tools.” That is, people are systematically made into objects to be 
meticulously regimented in the workplace, and are treated as mere “commodities” (PD, 14, 19) 
that employers can dispose of if they exhibit any defects in ‘performance,’ or if financial crises 
necessitate the ‘streamlining’ of the workforce. 
In addition, Sachs, like Foucault, advances that numerous serious repercussions derive 
from the immersion of individuals within a mechanistic world such as ours, where they are 
treated as mere objects of use. Unfortunately, however, it is here that Sachs’ focus on the 
contemporary economic system and development, rather than on disciplinary power relations 
specifically, reveals its drawbacks. In short, although accurate, the repercussions of the 
mechanization of society that Sachs identifies, for the most part concern general cultural and 
political tendencies rather than the more specific issue of individual subjectivity. Sachs 
maintains, for example, that “a model of civilization follows hot on the heels of modern 
technology” (PD, 13), and that the embrace of this civilizational model causes individuals to lose 
touch with alternative traditions, in which the accumulation of profit is not of paramount 
importance. Also, Sachs contends, this model of civilization engenders a perception in terms of 
which “place” and “community” are reduced to mere sites and resources of economic activity, 
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respectively (PD, 6, 62, 132). Notably, in another of his arguments, Sachs closely approximates 
Foucault by advancing that “transistor radios and Dallas, agricultural advisers and nurses, the 
regime of the clock and the laws of the market have triggered unprecedented transformation” 
(PD, 93-94). However, again, he does not follow this statement up with any consideration of the 
way in which, in particular, this ‘regime of the clock’ that he mentions may operate with other 
micro-techniques and discourses of disciplinary power, to produce an individual onto which one 
cannot possibly project a Kantian conception of autonomy. Accordingly, when, a few pages later, 
Sachs does speak of autonomy, the discussion remains broadly focused on the fact that entire 
nations abandon their cultures of frugality in order to run the economic race, and that they 
consequently lose their independence in a number of ways. Briefly, he suggests that the moment 
countries prioritize economic development over all else, “what is overrun . . . is the space for a 
policy of self-determination. [That is, t]he categorical imperative of world market competition 
repeatedly thwarts attempts to organize societies creatively and differently . . . [such that t]here is 
scarcely a country left today that seems able to control its own destiny” (PD, 98-99). In short, 
then, Sachs may display an explicit awareness of the fact that new phenomena, such as the 
regime of the clock, have affected our perception of the world, but it seems as though he 
perceives such clock time, for instance, as part of the machinations of the economic juggernaut 
rather than as one of the numerous disciplinary micro-techniques that seriously affect not just 
economic and political trajectories but individual subjectivity as well. That is, his discourse lacks 
the Foucaultian insight that something like clock time not only speeds up life and economies, but 
also plays a decisive role in the production of the contemporary individual as docile and 
infantilized. Further, taking account of this Foucaultian insight invites one to question the 
Kantian conception of autonomy (namely the assumption that individuals are by nature capable 
of rational and autonomous action) that appears to underpin Sachs’ text.  
Within his text, Sachs also thematizes and criticizes several dynamics involved in the 
economic development of the world which, from a Foucaultian perspective, would be identified 
as forming part of the workings of bio-power. As discussed previously, Foucault argued that 
several new techniques, very different from those of disciplinary power, are introduced under the 
auspices of bio-power, such as statistical studies pertaining to life expectancy, birth rates, and so 
on. Also, he advanced that these techniques may be benign in appearance, but that they involve 
nothing short of an immense intervention in the activities of the population. These arguments on 
the part of Foucault are, to a certain extent at least, approximated by Sachs within Planet 
Dialectics, firstly, insofar as he identifies several of these (bio-power) techniques, and secondly, 
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insofar as he then proceeds to disclose the insidiousness of the implementation of these 
techniques—particularly in ‘underdeveloped’ Southern nations. That is, Sachs first advances that 
once Northern leaders had set in motion their development strategy by sending development 
teams to the countries of the South, there occurred in those countries “an unprecedented 
flowering of agencies and administrations . . . to address all aspects of life—to count, organize, 
mindlessly intervene and sacrifice, all in the name of ‘development’” (PD, 6). And after this, he 
pointedly criticizes such intervention on the part of the North in the affairs of the South on 
political grounds. Briefly, Sachs argues that through such intervention, Northern powers rode 
roughshod over the sovereignty of Southern nations, by imposing Northern models of 
government and of wellbeing upon the latter. Significantly, the imposition of such Northern 
models, and in particular, the immense influence of bio-power discourses and micro-techniques 
on these models, are evinced in a declaration, made by the World Bank president, Robert 
McNamara, whom Sachs cites within his text. In short, McNamara declared it to be singularly 
imperative “to eradicate absolute poverty” in the South through “the elimination of malnutrition 
and illiteracy, the reduction of infant mortality and the raising of life expectancy standards to 
those of developed nations.”119
What can be gleaned from the above is that Sachs’ criticisms of Northern intervention in 
Southern affairs are, for the most part, pitched at general political and cultural levels. Although 
Sachs’ work resonates with Foucault’s, in that he identifies, in particular, the (bio-power) 
techniques through which such intervention is implemented, and censures the North for utilizing 
such techniques to meddle, for instance, in matters of population in the South, his analysis does 
 With reference to this declaration, Sachs advances that this 
ostensible mission “to abolish poverty . . . has been—and still is—the single most important 
pretension of the development ideology” (PD, 60), because all that it really achieves is the 
encroachment of Northern powers upon territories not their own. In addition, Sachs criticizes 
Northern intervention in the affairs of Southern nations on cultural grounds, because for him, 
what such intervention also entails is the Westernization of those nations and, very importantly, 
the erosion of local cultures that are largely characterized by frugality. In other words, Sachs 
argues that the Westernization that occurs in Southern nations in the wake of Northern 
intervention in these territories, involves stripping these nations of their traditional cultures that 
are “free from the frenzy of accumulation” (PD, 10), and replacing these traditional cultures with 
an (ecologically and socially) unsustainable Western culture of consumerism. 
                                                 
119 Robert McNamara, “Address to the Board of Governors,” World Bank, Nairobi (September 24, 1973), quoted in 
Wolfgang Sachs, Planet Dialectics: Explorations in Environment and Development (London: Zed Books, 1999), 9. 
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not extend beyond this to consider the possibility that reasons other than the economic may 
motivate such a process of meddling. Accordingly, he does not thematize the discourses other 
than that of development which may accompany such a process, nor the possible implications, for 
individual subjectivity, of such discourses. Unlike Foucault, for example, Sachs does not 
elaborate upon the way in which the importance of sex was increasingly augmented under the 
auspices of bio-power, owing precisely to its role in the “broad biological processes that concern . 
. . the multiple unity of the population.”120
 
 Thus, there is no equivalent in his text of Foucault’s 
study of how this augmentation of the importance of sex lead to its medicalization, to the 
medicalization of the practice of confession, and ultimately, to the (predominantly non-
cognitive/non-conscious) discursive production of the contemporary individual as a prostrate 
subject. This would explain why, in spite of the Foucaultian echoes within his text, Sachs 
continues to adhere to a Kantian notion of autonomy that overlooks such non-cognitive/non-
conscious factors and admits to no such problematization of self-determination. That is, as 
discussed in Chapter Two, judging by his writings, it appears as though Sachs assumes that his 
readers are possessed of both sufficient power of reason and sufficient autonomy to engage in an 
overhaul of their perspectives and behaviors, after reflecting upon the validity of the arguments 
which Sachs puts forward in his text. 
Foucaultian echoes within Princen’s The Logic of Sufficiency 
 
In The Logic of Sufficiency, Princen articulates his conception of power in a manner that, at first 
glance, appears to be extremely Foucaultian in orientation. In short, he echoes Foucault’s 
arguments concerning the centrality of power to social relations by advancing that in societies 
throughout the ages, “the most prevalent principle has been, and arguably continues to be, power” 
(LS, 49). However, the way in which Princen approaches the phenomenon of power differs 
markedly from the approach adopted by Foucault. That is, while Foucault regards power relations 
themselves as the primary phenomena to be investigated in order to fathom contemporary 
processes in general and contemporary subjectivity in particular, Princen, among other things, 
tends towards a criticism of the power of a select group of individuals and of certain 
concepts/principles, in order to show that their unchecked supremacy comes at the expense of the 
marginalization of the majority of the world population and the wholesale destruction of the 
                                                 
120 My emphasis. Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 251. 
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environment. Such an approach to the question of power clearly underpins Princen’s contention 
that “those who command the armies, amass the gold, and write the rules get the resources, and it 
is they who decide who gets what’s left” (LS, 49). And it is arguably this same approach that 
leads Princen to advance that powerful individuals play an important role in dictating what 
amounts to the discursive trajectory of whole societies. For example, he intimates that the 
(mechanistic) principle of efficiency, which dominates in our present era, was in the first place 
adopted because in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, there emerged “a new set of ‘rulers’ . 
. . with . . . a new linguistic need” for a term that would complement and buttress the emergence 
of industrial society (LS, 51). Judging by such articulations, it is plausible to suggest that 
Princen’s conception of power, rather than being Foucaultian in orientation, is informed by 
something that, at least to a certain extent, approximates a sovereign notion of power. In other 
words, Princen’s attribution of great power, and hence, of enormous discursive agency, to certain 
‘rulers,’ runs contrary to Foucault’s view that subsequent to the French Revolution, power has 
“become . . . a machinery that no one owns”—that is, “a machine in which everyone is caught, 
those who exercise [it] . . . just as much as those over whom it is exercised,” with the 
consequence that it cannot be conceived as something residing “in the hands of one person” or of 
a group of people.121
However, this does not mean that no parallels exist between, on the one hand, Foucault’s 
theorizations concerning the rise of disciplinary power, and on the other hand, Princen’s critical 
examination of the contemporary economic system, industrialization, and the principle of 
efficiency. In particular, there is a striking resonance between Foucault’s and Princen’s respective 
elaborations on ‘discipline’ in the factory and beyond. As discussed earlier, for Foucault, the 
factory exhibits almost all of the features of what he refers to as the project of docility. That is, in 
the factory, the attitudes of workers are scrutinized; their physical actions are closely controlled; 
their activities are regimented through timetables; they are placed within enclosed and partitioned 
 I believe that it is precisely because of these differences between their 
respective conceptualizations of and approaches to power, that Foucault’s and Princen’s analyses 
take different paths. Thus, while Foucault would go on to investigate, specifically, the effects of 
disciplinary power and bio-power on society in general, and on individual subjectivity in 
particular, Princen would, among other things, proceed to undermine the legitimacy granted the 
efficiency-orientated organization of society championed by the ‘rulers’ of the contemporary era, 
and to promote the logic of a contrasting principle, namely, that of sufficiency (LS, viii). 
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spaces that make their supervision easier; and they are granted a rank appropriate to their degree 
of compliance with the regulations within this disciplinary microcosm. In addition, according to 
Foucault, this project of docility, rather than being unique to the factory situation, forms part of 
the workings of disciplinary power itself, and therefore extends beyond the factory into society as 
a whole. Significantly, Princen is close to Foucault on this matter, above all in virtue of his 
analysis of the straightening out of the “backward-bending supply curve for labor” (LS, 125). As 
discussed in Chapter Two, Princen argues that prior to the overhaul of society through the 
Industrial Revolution, workers decided for themselves when to supply their labor to employers, 
but that such behavior was eventually brought to an end—in part through the clergy, the 
government and factory owners calling for greater discipline, and in part through the enclosure of 
land, which rendered the majority of the population entirely dependent on factory wages. Also, 
argues Princen, after workers had been forced into the factories through this process of enclosure, 
they were systematically disciplined. That is, factory owners “suppressed wages . . . installed 
bells and whistles and clocks . . . added timesheets and timekeepers, hired informers, . . . imposed 
fines and physical punishments” (LS, 127), and set up hierarchies, in order to shape an obedient 
workforce. In addition, workers’ physical actions became subject to miniscule control in the 
interest of augmenting efficiency, with the likes of Frederick Winslow Taylor, for example, 
undertaking various calculations and studies to “derive a ‘science’ of shoveling, pig-iron lifting . . 
. etc., through a controlled variation of the isolated elements of each task.”122
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 By implementing 
techniques such as these in the factory, it was hoped that each worker would, quite literally, 
become a cog in the machine—an objective that has subsequently only gained in momentum 
because today, workers are regarded as mere “factor inputs” (LS, 62, 344). Princen adds to this 
that outside of the factory, schools similarly trained children to become industrious and to use 
their time optimally, while within the broader community there occurred an unprecedented 
proliferation of efficiency societies and efficiency-orientated literature, under the impetus of 
which not only governments and other institutions, but even homemakers, began to aspire to ever 
greater efficiency (LS, 64, 66, 70, 75). In other words, belief in the value of efficiency emanated 
from the factory and, ultimately, led to efficiency becoming the primary organizing principle for 
human behavior in general (LS, 86). 
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Furthermore, Princen also identifies several significant repercussions of this embrace of 
efficiency as a central social organizing principle, one of the most detrimental of which was the 
dramatic escalation of consumerism. As he explains, because the principle of efficiency, when 
implemented in the factory, involved stripping the majority of workers of all decision-making 
authority and reducing them to the level of hyper-efficient automatons, individuals turned to 
consumption as the principal activity through which they could reverse the subjugation that they 
experienced at work—insofar as in the supermarket aisle, they could give all the orders and make 
all of the decisions (LS, 75-76). In short, as Princen explains, disempowered and alienated 
workers began to construe consumerism as a means of empowerment and self-affirmation, and 
thus became caught up in the “more work/more throughput” cycle, in terms of which individuals 
try to earn as much as possible to be able to spend as much as possible in a concerted (yet 
misguided) effort to achieve meaning (LS, 131). And, as Princen intimates in reference to the 
work of E. P. Thompson, one of the many negative consequences of their bent on ‘earning,’ is 
that individuals acquiesce to the subordinating mechanisms integral to the workplace. That is, 
Princen quotes Thompson’s argument that 
 
as the industrial revolution proceeds, wage incentives and expanding consumer drives—the palpable rewards 
for the productive consumption of time and the evidence of new ‘predictive’ attitudes to the future—are 
evidently effective. By the 1830s and 1840s . . . the English industrial worker was [distinguished from others,] 
. . . not by a greater capacity for hard work, but by his regularity, his methodical paying-out of energy, and 
perhaps also by a repression, not of enjoyments, but of the capacity to relax in the old, uninhibited ways.123
 
 
To sum up, from the above, and from Princen’s other arguments concerning how, for example, 
schools even nowadays “routinely instruct children and their parents on the virtues of efficient 
time management” (LS, 81), it is undeniable that Princen’s text approximates Foucaultian theory, 
through criticizing what are tantamount to several of the discourses and micro-techniques of 
disciplinary power. That said, though, there are also several highly significant differences 
between Princen’s text and Foucaultian theory, particularly in relation to the impact of such 
discourses and micro-techniques upon individual subjectivity. 
Firstly, Princen appears to correlate the (disciplinary) micro-techniques that he criticizes 
with the industrialization of societies and the concomitant rise to dominance of the principle of 
efficiency; in addition, he seems to contend that this rise to dominance of efficiency was in the 
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main engendered by individuals, such as Frederick Winslow Taylor—whence his statement that 
the “mental revolution” dreamed of by Taylor has come to fruition, insofar as efficiency has been 
embraced by the masses as the organizing principle for behavior in general (LS, 86). Foucault, in 
contrast, would argue that the micro-techniques thematized by Princen form part of the workings 
of disciplinary power, and that this technology of power cannot be identified as something either 
precipitated by an economic determinant alone, or instigated by one person or a group of 
people.124 Also, he would contend that the apparent embrace of ‘efficient’ (i.e. disciplined) 
behavior on the part of the masses, rather than being underpinned by their consciously buying 
into an ‘efficiency craze’ (LS, 63), is the consequence of the way in which, through the discourses 
and micro-techniques of disciplinary power, they have at a predominantly non-cognitive/non-
conscious level been produced as disciplined and docile bodies. Secondly, Princen appears to 
take for granted individuals’ capacity for rationality; accordingly, as discussed above, he 
implicitly rationalizes their embrace of consumerism in our efficiency-orientated world by 
arguing that it constitutes an effort, on the part of these individuals, to reverse the subordination 
that they experience in the workplace (LS, 63). In contrast, Foucault would argue that because the 
subjectivity of contemporary individuals is infantilized through the discourses and micro-
techniques of disciplinary/bio-power, unless these individuals somehow situate themselves in 
opposition to these discourses and micro-techniques, they are relatively incapable of refraining 
from rapacious consumerism. Thirdly, within his text, Princen seems to hold that the individual is 
possessed of a natural capacity for autonomy. Such a perspective appears to underpin his 
inclusion, within his text, of Thompson’s argument that individuals willingly submit to the 
subordinating and disempowering mechanisms integral to the workplace, because such 
submission facilitates the monetary earnings that afford them superiority and authority in the 
domain of consumerism (LS, 128).125
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 Foucault would disagree with Princen in this respect, 
insofar as he would argue that it is not an autonomous individual’s conscious decision, but rather 
the discursively constituted individual’s docile and prostrate production, that has him/her operate 
in terms of disciplinary regulations. In short, for Foucault, “it is not that the beautiful totality of 
the individual is amputated, repressed, altered by our [disciplinary] social order, it is rather that 
125 As already discussed in Chapter Two, Princen exhibits a similar faith in the innate autonomy of the individual, 
when he suggests that such autonomy is of key importance to combating our existing culture of consumerism. That 
is, he argues that if “self-limitation in self-managed work is natural, as much a part of human nature as choosing a 
mate and organizing for self-defense, then it follows that so is self-restraint in consumption and, hence, in resource 
use” (LS, 141). 
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the individual is carefully fabricated in it, according to a whole technique of forces and bodies” 
(DP, 217). 
To sum up, then, while Princen is extremely Foucaultian in his criticism of numerous 
(disciplinary) micro-techniques that can be found within contemporary society, he for the most 
part identifies these micro-techniques as forming part of the development of the (capitalist) 
economy, of the industrialization of societies, and of the rise of the principle of efficiency. Owing 
to this, his text involves neither an investigation of the workings of disciplinary power itself, nor 
an investigation of what Foucault refers to as bio-power, yet such investigations are arguably 
important to grasping how subjectivity is produced in the contemporary era. Thus, although 
Princen’s text is otherwise extremely valuable, much like Sachs’ work, it does not include 
consideration of the complex, and predominantly non-cognitive/non-conscious, discursive 
production of the contemporary individual as docile and prostrate. Rather, it is possible to argue 
that Princen appears to harbor a Kantian conception of autonomy, within the compass of which 
there is little place for such non-cognitive/non-conscious factors or such discursive production, 
since in terms of this conception of autonomy, the individual is construed as a rational being who 
may ‘give him/herself the law,’ precisely because he/she is situated in a position external to 
discourse. As discussed in Chapter Two, such a Kantian orientation, on the part of Princen, is 
evinced in, among other things, his historical unpacking of the concept of efficiency, and his 
undermining of what are tantamount to the technological, political and economic dimensions of 
the dominant social paradigm (DSP) of contemporary society. In short, such highly conceptual 
endeavors appear to be underpinned by the belief that readers harbor a capacity to change their 
perspectives and behaviors following cognitive deliberation. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
Earlier, I indicated that the focus adopted by both Sachs and Princen within their texts is of 
immense value, insofar as it allows us to grasp the frequently concealed, yet exceptionally 
detrimental, effects of unabated technological proliferation and open-ended economic 
development, to name but a few. However, when it comes to addressing our unwillingness to 
change our environmentally damaging behavior, a very important element is missing from these 
theorists’ approach. That is, as discussed in Chapter Two, within their respective works Sachs 
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and Princen seem to make the (Kantian) assumption that the individual, as a rational being, is 
situated in a position undetermined by discourse and gives him/herself the (moral) law, with the 
consequence that he/she is possessed of sufficient autonomy to change his/her beliefs and 
patterns of behavior once the error of such beliefs and the damaging effects of such behavior are 
brought into conspicuousness at a conceptual level. Further, because they appear to harbor such 
an assumption, which leaves the individual’s capacity for autonomy unquestioned, they do not 
enter into a consideration of the possibility that predominantly non-cognitive/non-conscious 
processes are at work in a discursive production of the contemporary individual as docile and 
prostrate. 
 This dissertation is aimed at complementing the valuable work already done by Sachs and 
Princen, first and foremost, through a consideration of the discursive production of individual 
subjectivity around docility and prostration, insofar as such discursive production stands to 
severely hamper the pro-environmental civilizational transformation for which these theorists 
hope. To this end, this dissertation has been patterned upon Foucault’s following criticism of 
taking economics as one’s point of departure in the examination of societal phenomena: 
 
The relations of power are perhaps among the best hidden in the social body. [Yet] . . . since the 19th century, 
the critique of society has essentially started with the nature of the economy, which is effectively determining. 
A valid reduction of ‘politics,’ certainly, but a tendency also to neglect the relations of elementary power that 
could be constitutive of economic relations.126
   
  
Within this chapter, I have tried to take into consideration Foucault’s theorizations concerning 
precisely these more hidden, and consequently more intimate, workings of disciplinary power 
and bio-power. Accordingly, I have thematized the discourses and micro-techniques through 
which these forms of power extend themselves and, most importantly, argued that the role of 
such discourses and micro-techniques in the production of the contemporary individual are of 
immense concern to anyone who calls for global pro-environmental action, which would 
necessarily involve resistance against the status quo. Some of the conclusions that I have drawn 
from this endeavor—particularly those that unequivocally problematize the notion that the 
individual is possessed of an innate rationality and autonomy—can be construed as standing in 
diametric opposition to Sachs’ and Princen’s conceptions of individual subjectivity. But at the 
same time, I have through this chapter endeavored to demonstrate that several similarities exist 
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between other aspects of Foucaultian theory, and Sachs’ and Princen’s descriptions of the way in 
which contemporary societies are organized, and of the way in which people are treated within 
such societies. I believe that such similarities hold out much hope for the future adoption, within 
the works of theorists such as Sachs and Princen, of a more circumspect consideration of the 
issue of individual subjectivity, and consequently, of a revised approach to how individuals could 
possibly cultivate a nuanced form of autonomy in the interest of countering the un-ecological 
path that our civilization is currently traversing. 
With regard to this, while I have, within this chapter, attempted to legitimate why a more 
cautious approach to the issue of individual subjectivity is necessary, in the final chapter of this 
dissertation, I explore whether the contemporary individual, having been produced as docile and 
prostrate through disciplinary/bio-power discourses and micro-techniques, could ever ‘grow’ 
autonomy. That is, within Chapter Four, I attempt to provide an answer to the question of 
whether resistance to the way in which we have been discursively produced is at all possible. 
There, I proceed to argue that resistance is possible, but that owing to its difficulty, it is certainly 
not for everybody, with the consequence that to reach (environmentally) greener pastures, the 
majority of contemporary individuals would have to be led by the nose. In short, in Chapter Four, 
against the backdrop of an investigation of what Foucault refers to as the first/second century 
C.E. Hellenistic/Roman cultures of the self, I consider how individuals can reconstitute their 
subjectivity with reference to discourses other than those that dominate at present, and why it is 
that some individuals are, albeit inadvertently, already engaged in such a process of 
reconstitution. For example, I argue that, judging by certain aspects of their writings, it appears as 
though some environmental theorists have inadvertently been reconstituting their subjectivity 
around discourses opposed to those that fall under the auspices of disciplinary power and bio-
power, arguably because of the uniquely combative contexts within which they find themselves 
on a daily basis. In turn, in the light of my earlier analysis concerning the complexity of growing 
a nuanced form of autonomy by reconstituting one’s subjectivity, I advance that it is practically 
speaking very unlikely that one could successfully instigate the mass uptake of such a process of 
reconstitution. And finally, in the Conclusion of this work, I consider whether or not there is a 
way out of this quandary. 
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Chapter Four: The possibility of revolt 
 
 
In the previous chapter, I dealt at length with Foucault’s theorizations concerning the way in 
which, through disciplinary/bio-power discourses and micro-techniques, contemporary 
individuals are produced as docile, prostrate, and infantilized, leaving them with little room for 
meaningful self-determination. Furthermore, I touched briefly upon the fact that, although 
Foucault maintains that individuals are able to revolt against this way in which they have been 
discursively constituted—that revolt is “something irreducible” that “no authority is capable of 
making . . . utterly impossible”127
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—such revolt is nevertheless extremely difficult to achieve, for 
three reasons in particular. Firstly, far from being effected purely through cognitive deliberation, 
revolt is predicated on individuals constantly working, in both intellectual and practical terms, at 
the reconstitution of their subjectivity around discourses that counter the infantilizing effects of 
disciplinary/bio-power. Secondly, rather than being the natural consequence of any mere 
disgruntlement with society, revolt will have individuals go against the grain of much of what 
they have accepted as self-evident, including the approach that they have adopted in relation to 
their own identity. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, revolt is demanding insofar as its very 
possibility rests upon individuals becoming cognizant of the fact that their subjectivity has been 
molded by dominant discourses and micro-techniques in such a way that, although they may have 
previously believed themselves to be free, they have all the while been caught up within the webs 
of disciplinary/bio-power, as economically useful and politically docile entities that, to all intents 
and purposes, are incapable of any meaningful self-determination. One wonders whether most 
people would ever even admit to the latter possibility, namely, the possibility that their adherence 
to the contemporary mores—involving an unquestioning valorization of economic gain, 
acquisitiveness, and an ethic of selfishness rather than an ethic of the self—may signal their 
infantilization rather than their ‘upward mobility;’ yet in the absence of the recognition of such a 
possibility, it is highly unlikely that such individuals would ever undertake an ethic/culture of the 
self as a means of revolt, in terms of which one resists the dominant dictates of contemporary 
society and embraces the reconstitution of one’s subjectivity as an arduous, lifelong, conceptual 
and practical task.  
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To sum up, what I try to show in the first part of this chapter is that the unconventional 
conceptions, attitudes and undertakings mentioned above are some of the fundamental 
requirements to be met in order for individuals to successfully engage in an ethic/culture of the 
self, through which they would be able to reconstitute their subjectivity and cultivate the 
(nuanced) autonomy necessary for meaningful and enduring environmental and political 
engagement. Here, I again draw on Foucaultian theory, by tracing Foucault’s examination of the 
practices of the first/second century C.E. Hellenistic/Roman cultures of the self, which he posits 
as a collective model for the construction of an ethic of the self in the contemporary world. 
Through doing so, I hope to bring into conspicuousness the complexity of engaging in an 
ethic/culture of the self, including the vital obligation of combining theoretical deliberation with 
eminently practical work, the necessity of institutional support, and not least, the exclusivity 
which is the inevitable consequence of the intellectual demands of such movements. Further, I 
give particular emphasis to the fact that the practices of these cultures of the self are underpinned 
by a notion very different from the Kantian conception of autonomy, namely, by the notion that 
the transformation of behavior cannot proceed from cognitive deliberation alone. 
Thereafter, within the second part of this chapter and on the basis of the above 
examination, I explore why it is that within our contemporary era, dominated as it is by 
disciplinary/bio-power, some individuals may (however inadvertently) already be engaged in the 
reconstitution of their subjectivity around discourses other than those that dominate at present, by 
way of processes that at least to some degree mirror the processes at work in the reconstitution of 
subjectivity through an ethic/culture of the self. In my exploration of this question, Wolfgang 
Sachs’ Planet Dialectics and Thomas Princen’s The Logic of Sufficiency will once again 
constitute the main areas of focus, for the reason that there exist reflections of a decisive 
reconstitution of subjectivity both within these theorists’ own writings, and within the 
orientations of those individuals/groups they posit as exemplars of restrained, pro-environmental 
behavior. While this exploration will reveal that the reconstitution of subjectivity is indeed 
possible in the contemporary era, it will concomitantly bring into conspicuousness a subtle 
incongruity within Sachs’ and Princen’s texts—namely, the incongruity between their otherwise 
exceptionally Kantian conception of individual subjectivity, and their (arguably inadvertent) 
exemplification of, and valorization of those whose behavior constitutes a manifestation of, the 
effective reconstitution of subjectivity through processes that betray the fact that humans are not 
the rational and autonomous beings that Kant portrayed them to be. By giving attention to this 
incongruity I seek not to derogate the work of Sachs and Princen, but rather to instigate a highly 
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conscious reconsideration of the (complex) approach that may have to be adopted in order to 
effectively engender pro-environmental civilizational change. 
 
 
The present-day value of the ancient cultures of the self 
 
In some of his final works, such as The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de 
France: 1981-1982, Foucault gives a great deal of attention to the examination of the first/second 
century C.E. Hellenistic/Roman cultures of the self, on the grounds that these movements may 
provide us with much-needed examples of how we could go about the difficult task of 
constructing an ethic/culture of the self in the contemporary era. And while Foucault 
acknowledges that various attempts have been made to construct such an ethic of the self in 
recent times on the part of, among others, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Baudelaire, he 
emphasizes that these efforts have for the most part proved unsuccessful for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, failure in this regard can be attributed to the fact that at a certain point in history, mainly 
under the impetus of Christian morality, paying attention to the self became construed as 
egocentric and hence as something to be avoided—a notion that, in some quarters, continues to 
be granted credence even in the contemporary era.128 Secondly, our inability to successfully 
construct an ethic of the self can, equally, be attributed to the fact that when it has not been 
rejected as morally problematic for the aforementioned reasons, paying attention to the self has 
been rendered completely meaningless in the present era. That is, while the ‘progressive’ among 
us may use certain terms that were employed by practitioners of the first/second century C.E. 
Hellenistic/Roman cultures of the self, such as “getting back to oneself, freeing oneself, being 
authentic, etcetera,” Foucault argues that such terms are used so glibly and unreflectively today 
that they have become devoid of meaning, so that we should feel nothing other than shame if this 
is what we believe to be the successful accomplishment of a concern for the self.129 Thirdly, the 
frustration of recent efforts to build up an ethic of the self can also be ascribed to our adherence 
to “a secular tradition which respects external law [rather than] . . . respect for the self [as] . . . the 
basis for morality.”130
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failure to construct an ethic of the self, is the fact that within philosophy and thought ever since 
Descartes, and also under the influence of Kant, gnōthi seauton (knowledge of the self) has 
almost completely eclipsed epimeleia heautou (care of oneself). In other words, while, during 
Antiquity, it was held that the subject “is not capable of truth [i.e. wisdom and correct action] 
unless he carries out or performs a number of transformations and modifications [through the 
epimeleia heautou] that will make him capable of truth,” in the contemporary era, it is believed 
that the subject requires no such transformation to have access to truth. Rather, “the subject only 
has to be what he is for him to have access in knowledge (connaissance) to the truth that is open 
to him through his own structure as subject[, such that] . . . to be capable of truth you only have to 
open your eyes and to reason soundly and honestly.”131
It is primarily against the backdrop of this latter explanation for the contemporary failure 
to construct an ethic of the self, that Foucault undertakes his examination of the first/second 
century C.E. Hellenistic/Roman cultures of the self. This is because, by providing an exposition 
both of the practices of these movements and of the reasons for the insistence, within these 
movements, upon combining the epimeleia heautou with the gnōthi seauton,
  
132 Foucault aims to 
bring to light the likelihood that our inability to construct an ethic of the self—through which we 
may be able to alter our subjectivity and cultivate a (nuanced) autonomy—derives in great part 
from the fact that in our (Kantian) privileging of the gnōthi seauton, we have almost completely 
dispensed with the epimeleia heautou, the asceticism, needed for self-transformation.133 While 
Foucault warns that we cannot simply find “the solution of a problem in the solution of another 
problem raised at another moment by other people,” the example of the first/second century C.E. 
Hellenistic/Roman cultures of the self, to which we now turn, confirms the possibility of 
effectively cultivating an ethic of existence, “without any relation with the juridical per se, with 
an authoritarian system, [or] with a disciplinary structure,”134
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 in terms of which one works at the 
reconstitution of one’s subjectivity in the interest of attaining to a state of autarchy or self-
mastery. For us, though, such a task may be even more demanding than it was for inhabitants of 
the Hellenistic/Roman world, owing to the way in which, through the disciplinary/bio-power 
discourses and micro-techniques specific to our age, contemporary subjectivity has been 
132 Ibid., 68. 
133 Michel Foucault, “Friendship as a Way of Life” (1981), in Ethics: Essential Works of Foucault: 1954-1984, ed. 
Paul Rabinow (London: Penguin, 2000), 137. 
134 Michel Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics” (1983), in Ethics: Essential Works of Foucault: 1954-1984, ed. 
Paul Rabinow (London: Penguin, 2000), 256, 260. 
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constituted around exactly the opposite of autarchy—that is, around docility, prostration, and 
ultimately, infantilization.  
 
Context and limitations of the first/second century C.E. Hellenistic/Roman cultures of the 
self 
 
Foucault regards the first and second centuries C.E. as the “golden age” of the care of the self,135 
because even though the epimeleia heautou may have been valued very highly during earlier 
periods, it was only at this time that it became an autonomized, universalized and permanent 
undertaking. In reference to earlier periods, Foucault points out that we can, for example, glean 
from Plato’s Alcibiades and his Apology that the care of the self was a crucial task that had to be 
undertaken—but it would be undertaken with a political goal in mind, by a select few, and at a 
very specific age. That is, in the fifth century B.C.E., the care of the self was perceived as 
important, primarily insofar as it was construed as a remedy for the failure of Athenian education 
to adequately prepare future leaders of the polis, or city-state. In other words, young aristocrats 
on the verge of entering into political careers were, according to Plato, obliged to care for the 
self, because their formal education had not remedied their ignorance of themselves, of justice, 
and of the affairs of life in general. Thus, what was being advanced was that it is only through the 
care of the self that the young Athenian would come to know himself, to govern himself, and, 
ultimately, to govern others, because “learning” alone could not achieve what took place through 
the epimeleia heautou; it could not facilitate the effective “formation of the self, the Selbstbildung 
[i.e. the self-formation].”136
In contrast to this predominantly political valuation of the care of the self during the era of 
Greek city-states, the Stoics and the Epicureans of the first and second centuries C.E. proceeded 
to frame the epimeleia heautou very differently, arguably because the rise of the Roman Empire 
annulled the political function that the care of the self had previously served—namely, that of 
“training” a select number of aristocratic youths in the interest of ensuring their competent 
governance of the city-state in the future. Instead, in the first and second centuries, the care of the 
self became a “corrective” undertaking that anyone, of any age, could assume in the interest of 
the proper formation of the self.
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with the idea of a tekhnē tou biou (art of existence), or, a lifelong task that the individual 
embraces not because they desire to wield political power over others, but rather because they 
strive towards a state of independence and mindfulness through the development of a permanent 
relationship of mastery over the self. And lastly, also owing to this transformation of the goal of 
the care of the self, in the epimeleia heautou there occurred another shift in focus—away from 
the idea that youth constitutes the ideal moment of life, insofar as it is the point at which the 
individual prepares for their political calling, and towards old age as the “privileged moment of 
existence,” insofar as the fruition of the care of the self may only occur at an advanced stage of 
life, after very many years of effort.138
Within this Hellenistic/Roman context, the epimeleia heautou assumed three functions far 
removed from its erstwhile, specifically political, function in ancient Greece—namely, the 
functions of criticism, of struggle, and of cure.
  
139 That is, firstly, the care of the self came to serve 
a “critical function,” in terms of which individuals unlearn vices, such as selfishness and 
intemperance, which they had unwittingly acquired through their upbringing at home, their 
formal education, and their surroundings in general. In particular, the care of the self became 
construed as an indispensable corrective measure for the wrong values and attitudes engendered 
in children by their ignorant parents—a misfortune against which the Roman Stoic, Cicero, 
speaks most strongly when he advances: “As soon as we are born and admitted into our families 
we find ourselves in an entirely distorted milieu in which the perversion of judgment is so 
complete that we can say we took in error with our nursemaid’s milk.”140 The epimeleia heautou, 
secondly, took on a “function of struggle,” serving to equip the individual with the various skills 
and attitudes necessary to endure the trials of life. That is, within the context of the 
Hellenistic/Roman cultures of the self, the care of the self is engaged in as a continuous practice 
that prepares individuals for whatever fortuitous events may befall them during the span of their 
existence.141
                                                 
138 Ibid., 108, 126. 
 And finally, the care of the self also proceeded to serve a “curative” or “therapeutic” 
function, with some philosophers, such as Epictetus, even referring to their schools as medical 
centers. Foucault suggests that such association of the care of the self with medicine may have 
been underpinned by the fact that the Greek term pathos was used to describe both the source of 
the excesses of the soul, and the source of the illnesses of the body. But at any rate, this 
139 Ibid., 495-496. 
140 Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, III.I.2, quoted in Michel Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at 
the Collège de France: 1981-1982, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 95. 
141 Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 87. 
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association of the care of the self with medicine appears to have engendered an emphasis, within 
the first/second century C.E. Hellenistic/Roman cultures of the self, on the incorporation of the 
care of the body into the practice of the epimeleia heautou.142
While the epimeleia heautou could certainly perform the three above-mentioned 
functions, and while absolutely anyone was permitted to engage in this care of the self, this did 
not mean that everyone could, through the care of the self, successfully unlearn vices, become 
equipped for life’s events, and cure whatever spiritual ailments afflicted them. On the contrary, 
the care of the self could only truly be practiced by a small number of individuals, because of the 
grueling, time-consuming and manifestly difficult nature of the reconstitution of subjectivity that 
is central to the epimeleia heautou—as Foucault contends, although the care of the self is 
formulated around values to which everyone is permitted to subscribe, in actuality these values 
are “only accessible to a few,” since “a number of precise and regular forms of conduct are 
necessary for individuals to be able to reach these values . . . to [which] . . . you must be able to 
devote your whole life.”
 
143 In other words, the care of the self entails far more than individuals 
simply having to make the conceptual decision to change their conduct and their attitude to life in 
general; rather, the critical, preparatory and curative functions of the epimeleia heautou can only 
be achieved through an array of arduous theoretical, meditative and practical activities, for which 
one not only needs a great deal of time, but also some or other institutional framework of support, 
along with sufficient aptitude. And as a consequence of these requirements, the only people who 
could effectively engage in the epimeleia heautou proper were those who formed part of the 
intellectually astute (and predominantly elite) echelons of society. That is, firstly, for the most 
part, only philosophers and the wealthy had sufficient free time (otium) to engage in the various 
practices required for the effective reconstitution of the self—the philosophers, because their 
daily activity was informed at least as much by the care of the self as it was by purely conceptual 
engagement,144
                                                 
142 Ibid., 107-108, 496. 
 and the elite, because they could direct others to cultivate their lands and take 
care of the mundane affairs of the household, leaving them with sufficient otium to engage in the 
various activities involved in the care of the self. Secondly, the care of the self, as a rule, was 
practiced by distinct groups of individuals who differentiated themselves from other groups and 
from society in general. Very significantly, it appears as though it was only in such 
143 My emphasis. Ibid., 179. 
144 That is, as Foucault emphasizes in The Hermeneutics of the Subject, with the exception of Aristotle, who had very 
little interest in spirituality, “throughout the period we call Antiquity . . . the philosophical question of ‘how to have 
access to the truth’ and the practice of spirituality (of the necessary transformations in the very being of the subject 
which will allow access to the truth), . . . were never separate.” Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 16-17. 
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“organizations of fraternity, brotherhood, school and sect” that sufficient support could exist for 
the practice of the care of the self, because in such closed groups, “networks of friendship” could 
be maintained through which “individuals [are] linked to one another by a set of services and 
obligations” that have a direct bearing on the epimeleia heautou. Thirdly, because no class 
divisions were sanctioned within these groups, every individual, no matter how rich or poor, was 
at least in principle deemed capable of the care of the self; however, in addition to the need for 
free time and institutional support, a number of other factors relating to the individual’s personal 
aptitude also determined his/her capacity to engage in the epimeleia heautou. That is, as Foucault 
points out, it is clear from the writings of, among others, Epicurus, Epictetus, and Seneca, that 
many people were unable to engage in a care of the self owing to a “lack of courage, strength, or 
endurance, an inability to grasp the importance of the task or to see it through,” or a shortage of 
intelligence or patience. Epictetus, for instance, argues that it was precisely because of the 
general scarcity of these latter mentioned qualities that even the great Socrates, himself, failed to 
persuade people to undertake the care of the self.145
To sum up, then, personal aptitude, institutional support, and free time, are all considered 
to be crucial to the successful practice of the epimeleia heautou, because this care of the self 
involves both difficult theoretical reflection and arduous forms of practical exercise. The most 
notable difference between this perspective and the general understanding of subjectivity in the 
present day, is that in terms of the former, it was believed that the reconstitution of subjectivity 
cannot be achieved through conceptual deliberation alone—that such deliberation must be 
combined with “real practices,” because “even [though] . . . Greek philosophy [may have] 
founded rationality, it always held that the subject could not have access to the truth if he did not 
first operate upon himself a certain work . . . [There is] no access to truth without ascesis.”
  
146
 
 
Thus, any embrace of a care of the self, through which individuals would be able to reconstitute 
their subjectivity and attain to a state of autarchy or self-mastery, would involve a great deal of 
complexity and labor, which can arguably only be fully appreciated if one examines the principal 
elements of this process—of this marriage between theory and practice—this combining of 
mathēsis (knowledge of the world) and askēsis (practical exercises undertaken by oneself on 
oneself). It is to such an examination that we now turn. 
Principal elements in the practice of the epimeleia heautou: Mathēsis 
                                                 
145 Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 112-114, 118-119. 
146 My emphasis. Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics,” 277-279. 
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In terms of the first/second century C.E. Hellenistic/Roman cultures of the self, true discourses 
(logoi) were crucial to the care of the self, because without them, one would be unable to 
effectively reconstitute one’s subjectivity which, as already discussed, was construed as having 
been (mal)formed through the wrong or false discourses propagated by parents, educators, and 
society in general. In short, while these philosophical movements certainly did not harbor the 
(Kantian) idea that individuals, owing to their rationality and autonomy, are able to impose upon 
themselves an idea of moral perfection or conformity to ‘universal’ moral law,147 their 
proponents did advance that through judicious study one is able to gather together “ethopoetic” 
discourses, or, discourses that are useful for the formation of an ethic of the self. In other words, 
discourses were regarded as useful only if they formed part of “knowledge of a kind which, 
considering all the things of the world (the gods, the kosmos, others, etcetera) in their relation to 
us, we will be able to translate immediately into prescriptions” that, if thoroughly appropriated, 
will “change what we are[;] . . . change the state of the subject who knows them.” And other 
discourses lacking in this ‘ethopoetic’ quality, however true (i.e. factual) they may be, were 
merely regarded as contributing to “cultural embellishment,” because while they may augment 
the individual’s general knowledge, they in no way stand to alter the subject’s mode of existence 
itself.148
The Epicureans, accordingly, distinguished between useful discourses and ornamental 
ones on the basis that useful discourses help prepare (paraskeuei) the individual for the events of 
life, in such a manner that in even the most dire circumstance the individual would remain 
autarchic, independent and serene, while ornamental discourses, in contrast, merely equip 
individuals with the (artificial) rhetoric needed “to sell and make a profit,” and to become popular 
in the eyes of the mob in virtue of their capacity as “word-spinners.”
 
149 In other words, the 
Epicureans only esteemed discourses that aid individuals in cultivating independence from 
external events, and in developing “a . . . recalcitrance and spiritedness . . . which enables [them] 
. . . to stand firm not only against the many beliefs that others wish to impose on [them,] . . . but 
also against life’s dangers and the authority of those who want to lay down the law.”150
                                                 
147 See Chapter Two. 
 But what 
is perhaps most notable about the Epicurean approach to the incorporation of knowledge in the 
practice of the epimeleia heautou, is that not only carefully chosen ethical and moral writings, but 
148 Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 236-237.  
149 Ibid., 239. 
150 Ibid., 240. 
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also knowledge of the world/nature itself (phusiologia), is regarded as crucial to the formation of 
the self, insofar as such phusiologia assists the individual in the attainment of an immanence of 
mind, or, an ability to focus exclusively on the present in order to effectively engage in the care 
for the self. That is, firstly, for the Epicureans the study of natural science allows for the 
dissolution of some of humankind’s most perennial fears—of death, of the wrath of the gods, and 
of judgment in the afterlife—fears that otherwise cause one to develop an overwhelming, 
negative, preoccupation with the future that greatly inhibits the possibility of one positioning 
oneself in the here and now in order to practice the epimeleia heautou. It is for this reason that the 
Epicureans advocated the study and appropriation of theoretical physics, such as the atomic 
theory of Democritus; they believed that the internalization of such forms of knowledge, over 
time, leads one to grasp that all corporeal matter, including the soul—the seat of consciousness—
is subject to dissolution, with the consequence that it is completely unfounded to fear death, the 
gods, or judgment in any hereafter.151 The value of knowledge of the world in this particular 
respect is emphasized by Epicurus himself, when he advances that “if we were not troubled by 
our suspicions of the phenomena of the sky and about death, fearing that it concerns us, and also 
by our failure to grasp the limits of pains and desires, we should have no need of natural 
science.”152
                                                 
151 That is, Epicurus endorsed Democritus’ argument that the soul is composed of “sleek, round, spherical atoms of . . 
. fire [that, although] . . . carriers of sensation and will,” shall like the ‘unfeeling’ atoms out of which the body is 
composed, disperse at the time of death. Felix M. Cleve, The Giants of Pre-Sophistic Greek Philosophy (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), 421. It is on the basis of this argument that Epicurus would advance that “death, the most 
terrifying of ills, is nothing to us, since so long as we exist, death is not with us; but when death comes, then we do 
not exist.” Epicurus, “Letter to Menoeceus,” 125, in The Extant Remains, trans. Cyril Baily (Hildesheim: Georg 
Olms Verlag, 1975), 85. 
 Secondly, insofar as theoretical physics thus affords us the understanding that the 
soul is corporeal and therefore does not survive the death of the body, the individual who 
appropriates this knowledge of the world cannot fall prey to an overwhelming, positive, 
preoccupation with the future either. In short, because their internalization of phusiologia 
prevents individuals from laboring under the misconception that an eternal life of plenitude 
awaits them at the end of their chaotic earthly existence, they can in no way remain fixated on 
such a utopian future, which would otherwise impel them to implicitly reject, and hasten through, 
this life, wasting the precious little time that they have and neglecting the care of the self. Instead, 
as Epicurus writes in his “Letter to Menoeceus,” the realization that death marks the endpoint for 
the body and the soul/consciousness alike, “makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not because it 
152 Epicurus, “Principle Doctrines,” XI, in The Extant Remains, trans. Cyril Baily (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 
1975), 97. 
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adds to it an infinite span of time, but because it takes away the craving for immortality,”153
The Stoics, like the Epicureans, held that not all discourses are beneficial to the epimeleia 
heautou, because while some complement this art of existence by aiding the individual in the 
reconstitution of the self, or, the sculpting of subjectivity, around independence and mindfulness, 
other discourses could operate on the individual in a manner that runs counter to these goals of 
the care of the self. Thus, the Stoics emphasized the judicious selection of discourses, with some 
proponents, such as Seneca, going to great lengths to classify discourses in terms of their utility 
in regard of the epimeleia heautou. In particular, Seneca criticizes those who strive to acquire 
historical knowledge, arguing that while many study history in order to show off their general 
knowledge, historical writings are for a number of reasons of no use to the care of the self. 
Firstly, historical texts frame barbarity as gallantry and are, as such, of no moral value to the 
individual practicing the care of the self; secondly, history recounts and frequently commends the 
(excessive) passions of kings, while the individual who cares for the self should, conversely, be 
engaged in the tempering of their passions; and thirdly, insofar as history generally frames the 
“fragile victories and uncertain fortunes” of base and intemperate men as things of greatness, it in 
no way instructs the individual in “the true features of greatness, which are precisely not the 
visible forms of brilliance and power, but individual forms of self-mastery.”
 thus 
allowing one to work creatively with one’s time in the interest of attaining fulfillment through the 
relationship one cultivates with oneself, in this life and in this life alone.  
154
                                                 
153 Epicurus, “Letter to Menoeceus,” 124-125, in The Extant Remains, trans. Cyril Baily (Hildesheim: Georg Olms 
Verlag, 1975), 85. 
 In a word, then, 
individuals who seek to engage in the care of the self should not preoccupy themselves with such 
historical learning, nor for that matter with any type of learning that is purely vocational in 
orientation, because what should be of principal concern to them is not the achievement of 
supremacy in the world of men but rather the attainment of self-mastery through the work done 
by oneself on oneself. Seneca, accordingly, advises his friend Lucilius not to read himself to 
ruins, so to speak, but rather to study a few books in depth, in order to appropriate from these 
works maxims that he can use to construct his own ethical framework. And as Foucault points 
out, Seneca himself adopted precisely such an approach in relation to the works of Epicurus, 
selecting from them the aphorisms he deemed worthy of regular contemplation. Furthermore, the 
Stoics also echoed the Epicureans in their insistence that the epimeleia heautou—through which 
one unlearns vices, becomes autarchic and temperate, and achieves one’s fulfillment through the 
154 Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 264. 
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relationship one cultivates with oneself—requires not only ethical or moral knowledge but also 
knowledge of the world/nature itself.155 This is because, from a Stoic perspective, the scientific 
study of nature is construed as an essential “means for producing a right moral attitude,”156 since 
such study over time leads individuals to fathom their situation in the world by having them come 
to grips with their fragility, with the brevity of their life and, consequently, with the 
ridiculousness of becoming attached to luxury and power. Seneca develops a particular argument 
in relation to this, by advancing that the study of nature enables us to adopt an ‘elevated’ 
perspective on existence; that is, it permits us to gaze down at the world from its “summit,” in a 
manner that not only “opens up to us the secrets of nature,” but also allows us to break free of our 
slavery to our egoism through having us comprehend, quite literally, “how small we are . . . to 
grasp the pettiness and the false and artificial character of everything that seemed good to us 
before we were freed[, and to] . . . see how few things matter and endure.” Also, very 
importantly, far from distancing or alienating us from the world, this heightened perspective 
allows “us to grasp ourselves again here where we are;” it allows us to develop an attitude of 
immanence insofar as we become conscious of the fact that “our perfectly real existence . . . is 
only a punctual existence[—]punctual both in space and in time;” it has us take as our “object of 
contemplation . . . ourselves in the world.”157
                                                 
155 Ibid., 260, 265-266. 
 Notably, from this same idea that the study of 
nature is crucial to engagement in the epimeleia heautou, another important proponent of 
Stoicism, Marcus Aurelius, derives an alternative argument, namely, that the study of nature 
allows us, conversely, to “plunge . . . into this world,” insofar as it enables us to study “this 
world, down to its smallest details, as if to focus the gaze of a nearsighted person onto the finest 
grain of things.” In short, for Aurelius, by studying the most intricate aspects of any object 
(re)presented to us by the mind, we are able not only to become cognizant of the transience of the 
object, to assess its value and to determine what qualities—such as “gentleness, courage, 
sincerity . . . simplicity, abstinence, etcetera”—one needs to adopt in relation to it. Also, through 
this form of study, we learn to judge “what is good for the subject;” we embrace the idea that 
with regard to any object presented to us “we are always free to form an opinion as we wish;” and 
we gradually become aware of our immanence, insofar as we learn that “the only level of reality 
156 Eduard Zeller, The Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics, trans. Oswald J. Reichel (New York: Russel & Russel, 1962), 
381. 
157 My emphasis. Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 276-279. 
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that exists for the subject is the moment itself: the infinitely small moment that constitutes the 
present, prior to which nothing exists any longer and after which everything is still uncertain.”158
In sum, then, carefully chosen ethical and moral forms of knowledge, as well as 
knowledge of the world/nature itself, were regarded as crucial to the practice of the epimeleia 
heautou within the context of the first/second century C.E. Hellenistic/Roman cultures of the self. 
However, as indicated earlier, in order for such true discourses (logoi) to have any lasting effect 
on subjectivity, they had to become ‘embedded’ in the subject through processes of askēsis. That 
is to say, as I show in what follows, in terms of the first/second century C.E. Hellenistic/Roman 
cultures of the self, it was believed that the reconstitution of subjectivity cannot be effected 
through conceptual engagement alone—that it is also largely dependent on practical exercises 
accomplished by individuals upon themselves. 
 
 
Principal elements in the practice of the epimeleia heautou: Askēsis 
 
In The Hermeneutics of the Subject, Foucault goes to much effort to explain precisely what is 
involved in this askēsis, which is considered to be so crucial to the practice of the care of the self. 
And he does so not only to highlight the complexity that askēsis involves, but also to correct an 
error frequently committed by many contemporary individuals in relation to it, namely, that of 
glibly equating askēsis with Christian asceticism, which “refers to an attitude of renunciation 
[and] . . . mortification.” Foucault, in fact, argues that askēsis is so different from Christian 
asceticism that the two processes can be contrasted point for point: for example, askēsis 
constitutes a conversion to the self rather than a renunciation of the self; it entails an embrace of 
this life rather than a rejection of this world in favor of another; it involves the cultivation of an 
increasingly autonomous, sovereign self, rather than self-mortification and obedient observance 
of divine law; and so on. In short, askēsis does not, like Christian asceticism, involve a practice 
through which individuals submit themselves to the supreme law of an omnipotent Other. 
Instead, it refers to sets of practices through which individuals strive to embed within their 
subjectivity the true discourses (logoi) that they have, themselves, chosen as appropriate guiding 
principles for life—in askēsis, one undertakes “the subjectivation of a true discourse in a practice 
and exercise of oneself on oneself,” in the interest of becoming autarkhos, one’s own master.159
                                                 
158 My emphasis. Ibid., 290-292, 296. 
 
Yet, as intimated above, what Foucault also aims to bring into conspicuousness in his elaboration 
159 Ibid., 323-324, 333, 416-417. 
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on askēsis, is that these practices and exercises of subjectivation are extremely demanding, owing 
to their multifaceted nature and to the fact that they do not yield instant results. That is to say, 
(and as will be elaborated upon below), askēsis involves an array of complex practices and 
exercises of listening, reading, writing, speaking, meditation, and testing, which need to be 
engaged in not once, but on a recurrent basis in the interest of the effective reconstitution of 
subjectivity. This is why the “epimeleia implies a labor,” and why “one of the big problems of 
this cultivation of the self [is] to determine the portion of one’s day or one’s life that should be 
devoted to it.”160
Even though, in terms of the first/second century C.E. Hellenistic/Roman cultures of the 
self, correct listening constituted merely the initial step to be taken by those wishing to engage in 
the epimeleia heautou, this is not to say that this practice is devoid of difficulties. On the 
contrary, listening is construed as problematic for several reasons: for one, because hearing is our 
only completely passive sense, we are as susceptible to listening to wrong discourses as we are to 
listening to useful ones; and further, even if we are exposed to speech informed by useful 
discourses, we may not know how to pay proper attention to such speech, nor know to which 
parts of such speech we should give most consideration. It is for reasons such as these that the 
practice of listening had to be purified through numerous methods, namely, through silence, 
immobility, the use of semiotic systems, dedication, and the correct focusing of attention. 
Foucault explains that silence was used as a pedagogic instrument for many years prior to the 
first and second centuries C.E., with the much earlier Pythagorean school, for example, imposing 
a five-year rule of silence on its initiates. It was advocated as the principal means by which 
students would be able to learn to develop absolutely focused listening, because in the absence of 
such a rule of silence, it is quite possible that students, rather than truly paying attention to the 
speech of their philosopher-guide (hēgemōn), would be preoccupied with formulating the 
response that they hoped to give in reaction to his speech, in order to display their own sagacity. 
In turn, because it was believed that too much fidgeting similarly distracts one from intent 
listening, silence would be accompanied by a complete immobility of the body, save for students’ 
use of certain signals to indicate that they are following the speech, that part of it confuses them, 
that they agree with what is being said, etcetera. And in addition to silence, immobility, and the 
cautious use of such a semiotic system, students were obliged to undertake their practice of 
listening with a sufficient degree of dedication, making it clear to the speaker that they support 
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his discourse and that they are capable of listening to him with the respectful demeanor “of 
someone who seeks the truth.” Finally, students would also have to learn how to focus their 
attention not on the rhetorical quality or the digressions of a speech, but rather on those aspects of 
the speech that are relevant to the cultivation of the self, namely those “true proposition[s that] . . 
. can be transformed into . . . precept[s] of action.” Yet after all of this, these propositions would 
still have to be assessed with reference to their capacity to help prepare (paraskeuei) the student 
for the events of life, and then be either discarded or committed to memory.161
A similarly cautious approach was advocated in relation to the ascetic exercise of reading, 
because it was not considered to be sufficient simply to read a vast expanse of texts in an 
indiscriminate fashion. Instead, as already discussed earlier on in relation to mathēsis, individuals 
engaged in the care of the self would have to exercise extreme caution in their choice of texts and 
of authors, and in addition to this, they would have to be very astute in their selection of passages 
from what they deem to be even the most worthy of texts, because it is these passages that they 
would subsequently use to constitute an ēthos. That is, once the individual has read a text and has 
extracted from it the most important passages, he/she must then meditate upon these passages, 
reread them, repeat them aloud, think them over, and imagine applying them in real events—all 
in order for the truth of these passages to become “engraved in the mind in such a way that it is 
recalled immediately as the need arises, . . . consequently making it a principle of action.”
 
162
This leads us to another important practice of askēsis, namely that of writing, which 
allows one to further subjectivize what one has read. Seneca, for instance, argues that those who 
are engaged in the epimeleia heautou must pay at least as much attention to writing as they do to 
reading, because while reading allows them to gather together true discourses (logoi), writing 
constitutes one of the most effective means of assimilating these discourses. Briefly, if one makes 
summaries and anthologies of the passages that one has read, one is able to effectively 
appropriate the truths inherent in these passages—to make these truths one’s own, in order that 
they inform one’s subjectivity, and accordingly, one’s actions. But if one does not, “one is liable 
to retain nothing, to spread oneself across different thoughts, and to forget oneself.”
  
163
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 Also, 
because written correspondence between individuals constituted a customary, if not obligatory, 
convention within the context of the first/second century C.E. Hellenistic/Roman cultures of the 
self, writing served an additional function, of assisting others. Letters of correspondence were 
162 Ibid., 355-357, 360. 
163 Michel Foucault, “Self Writing” (1997), in Ethics: Essential Works of Foucault: 1954-1984, ed. Paul Rabinow 
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routinely exchanged between a person well advanced in the practice of the epimeleia heautou and 
a more novice correspondent, with authors of the letters providing descriptions of what they had 
done during a particular day, detailing their state of health, and depending on their standing in 
regard of the epimeleia heautou, either proffering or soliciting ethical/moral counsel. For 
example, Seneca, by writing to Lucilius in precisely such a manner, helps his young friend by 
providing him with his own example of how one must conduct oneself in everyday life, and with 
useful discourses with which Lucilius could adequately prepare (paraskeuei) himself for 
whatever events may befall him. And by the same token, through writing such a letter, Seneca 
benefits himself, because he gives himself both an opportunity for “introspection” through 
reflecting upon the relationship he has developed with himself, and another chance to 
subjectivize the true discourses that he offers to his friend as subjects for contemplation.164
A further important element in askēsis was the practice of open and honest speaking 
(parrhēsia), but this obligation did not fall on students, because as discussed, they would have to 
remain silent in order to acquire the true discourses (logoi) needed to reconstitute their 
subjectivity. Rather, this obligation of parrhēsia fell on the philosopher-guide (hēgemōn), who 
was well-versed in the practice of the epimeleia heautou, and who could for this reason provide 
honest criticism of his students in the interest of helping them to achieve self-mastery, and put 
himself forward as a living example of autarchy for such students to follow. That is, on the one 
hand, it was not simply sufficient for the philosopher-guide to be a rhetorician, because rhetoric 
could easily be used to persuade a student of something which is not necessarily true; neither was 
it appropriate for the philosopher-guide to be a flatterer, because flattering a student would work 
against the care of the self by concealing, rather than revealing, the faults of the latter. In short, 
the value of parrhēsia derives precisely from the fact of its openness, which allows for the 
communication of true discourses that aid students in reaching a state of independence, and from 
the fact of its honesty, which has the philosopher-guide criticize students in order for the latter to 
become utterly aware of their weaknesses, to which they must subsequently attend through the 
cultivation of the self. And, on the other hand, because the philosopher-guide thus plays the role 
of mediator in the student’s engagement in the care of the self, over and above speaking openly 
and honestly, his words need to be matched by his behavior. In other words, as Foucault indicates 
in The Hermeneutics of the Subject, “there can be no teaching of the truth without an exemplum . . 
. without the person who speaks the truth being the example of this truth, . . . not just because the 
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example makes it easier . . . to perceive the truth expressed, but because [a] . . . pact is constantly 
reproduced in the chain of examples and discourse.”165 The philosopher-guide, as such, plays an 
instrumental role in the student’s engagement in the care of the self; however, very importantly, 
in contrast to Christianity, in terms of which “there is no element in the life of the monk which 
may escape from [a] . . . fundamental and permanent relation of total obedience to the master,” 
the philosopher-guide mediates in the student’s engagement in the epimeleia heautou only “to 
lead the disciple to a happy and autonomous life.”166
 In addition to these practices of listening, reading, writing, and speaking, askēsis also 
involved engagement in meditative and practical exercises—meletan and gumnazein—through 
which the individual could subjectivize true discourses even further, and test the degree to which 
he/she has already accomplished this task. While the Epicureans certainly engaged in meditation, 
the Stoics were arguably its most fervent proponents, incorporating into the epimeleia heautou an 
array of meditative exercises such as the praemeditatio malorum (the premeditation of 
misfortune), the meletē thanatou (the meditation on death), and the examination of conscience. 
Briefly put, in the praemeditatio malorum, those meditating would conjure up the idea that their 
absolutely worst fears for the future will be realized immediately, and they would then consider 
how they would endure such misfortune bravely—their behavior being guided by the relevant 
true discourses (logoi) which they have accumulated and subjectivized through the care of the 
self. By imagining the ‘unthinkable’ in this manner, and by realizing that they would in fact be 
able to live through it, in addition to allowing themselves to mentally prepare for such a 
potentiality, meditators would also be able to develop an attitude of immanence—that is, a 
condition of being present in the moment, rather than lost in their concerns for the future—in 
order to better engage in the cultivation of the self and to enjoy existence as such. While the 
Epicureans strongly opposed this latter meditative exercise on the grounds that it causes 
unnecessary disturbance of the mind through conjuring up events that may never actually occur, 
like the Stoics, they supported the practice of meditating upon one’s death (meletē thanatou), 
because of all possible misfortunes, death is perhaps the only one of which everyone can be 
certain. And this meditative practice, over and above allowing for the realization that death—the 
most supreme blow—must be faced by everyone, and that there is nothing wicked about it, also 
invites one to question whether what one is doing with one’s life is truly valuable. That is, by 
reflecting in the meletē thanatou upon the inevitability of one’s death, one is able to take stock of 
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one’s existence and of one’s contribution to the world. This important function of death 
meditation is something which the Roman Stoic, Epictetus, thematizes most powerfully when he 
advances: 
 
Don’t you know that illness and death must take us in the middle of some activity? They take the laborer at 
his work, the sailor navigating. And what activity would you like to be engaged in when you are taken? For 
you will be doing something when death takes you. If you can be taken . . . while engaged in something better 
than your present activity, practice that.167
 
 
Lastly, practitioners of the epimeleia heautou were also encouraged to engage in the examination 
of conscience, both in the morning, when they should consider what duties they have to carry out 
during the day and how they should conduct themselves in this, and in the evening, when they 
can gauge whether or not they have carried out their duties and conducted themselves in a 
manner informed by the ethical framework that they have constructed through the subjectivation 
of true discourses (logoi). As such, through the examination of conscience one would be able, 
firstly, to mindfully prepare for one’s day; secondly, to judge, at the end of the day, the degree to 
which one’s conduct has been consonant with one’s ethics; and thirdly, to memorize those 
discourses that one requires to better conduct oneself in the future.168
Finally, as indicated earlier, the above forms of meditation (meletan) would be 
accompanied by practical exercises of askēsis, namely gumnazein, through which one would be 
able to test, in real experience rather than in thought, the degree to which one has subjectivized 
true discourses, and hence, the progress that one has made in the epimeleia heautou. Practices of 
abstinence constituted an important part of this gumnazein within the Stoic and the Epicurean 
schools alike. The Stoic, Seneca, for example, not only maintained that one must never engage in 
any excessive or immoderate behavior, but also advanced the necessity of routinely taking to 
‘living poorly’ for days on end, by “sleeping on a pallet, wearing coarse clothes, eating little, and 
drinking [only] water,” if one wishes to train oneself to endure even the gravest of misfortunes 
with dignity and composure, and to become “sufficiently detached to be able to treat the wealth 
and goods around [one] . . . with the necessary indifference and with correct and wise 
nonchalance.”
  
169
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existence. That is, because pleasure, which is posited as the ultimate good within the Epicurean 
framework, is defined negatively, as the absence of pain, this philosophical school recommended 
that one satisfy only desires that are absolutely “necessary;” thus, if one were hungry, it would 
suffice to eat a simple slice of bread rather than another, more sumptuous, dish.170
 
 By the same 
token, the Epicureans scorned any extravagance in possessions, not only on the grounds that it is 
unnecessary to the wellbeing of the body, but also on the grounds that it in no way benefits the 
mind. Lucretius, the Roman proponent of Epicureanism, accordingly writes: 
Nothing is more gladdening than to dwell in the calm regions, firmly embattled on the heights by the teaching 
of the wise, whence you can look down on others, and see them wandering hither and thither, going astray as 
they seek the way of life, in strife matching their wits or rival claims of birth, struggling night and day by 
surpassing effort to rise up to the height of power and gain possession of the world. Ah! miserable minds of 
men, blind hearts! in what darkness of life, in what great dangers y[ou] . . . spend this little span of years! to 
think that y[ou] . . . should not see that nature cries aloud for nothing else but that pain may be kept far 
sundered from the body, and that, withdrawn from care and fear, she may enjoy in mind the sense of pleasure! 
. . . [F]iery fevers [do not] more quickly quit the body, if you toss on broidered pictures and blushing purple, 
than if you must lie on the poor man’s plaid. Wherefore since in our body riches are of no profit, nor high 
birth nor the glories of kingship, for the rest, we must believe that they avail nothing for the mind as well.171
 
 
Ultimately, within the context of the first/second century C.E. Hellenistic/Roman cultures of the 
self, over and above testing one’s capacity for self-governance and wise restraint through an array 
of precise exercises such as the gumnazein mentioned above, life itself was embraced as an 
ongoing test, not least because it is inevitably strewn with unanticipated difficulties that provide 
an opportunity for the strengthening of the epimeleia heautou. Within this ‘life-test,’ misfortune 
is construed as educational; it is seen as preparing one not for any future beyond this world but 
for a fulfilling existence within it—as Foucault himself explains, from the perspective of the 
Hellenistic/Roman cultures of the self, “one must live one’s life in such a way that one cares for 
the self at every moment and that at the enigmatic end of life . . . what one finds . . . is precisely a 
certain relationship of self to self which is the crown, realization, and reward of a life lived as a 
test.”172
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The care of the self, the care of others, and discursive revolt 
 
The unlearning of false discourses, the concomitant reconstitution of subjectivity in relation to 
useful discourses, and the development of a meaningful and sovereign relationship to the self, 
are, then, the principal goals of those who participate in the epimeleia heautou. But this does not 
mean that the care of the self does not benefit others, taken to mean the natural world surrounding 
us, other human beings, and the discursive terrain in general. Rather, firstly, insofar as the care of 
the self involves “a spiritualization of knowledge of the world” through positing the study of 
nature as a crucial means to developing both an attitude of immanence and detachment from 
prestige and possessions, those who engage in such study simultaneously become increasingly 
aware, and respectful, of the natural environment within which they find themselves situated.173
 
 
In short, those who engage in the epimeleia heautou actively cultivate a state of ‘being in the 
world,’ so to speak, by grasping the brevity of their own existence, their smallness in relation to 
the cosmos, and, consequently, the absurdity of spending their entire life plundering the earth, 
harming fellow living beings, and wasting the precious little time that they have at their disposal 
in the accumulation of ever greater ‘wealth’ and ever more ‘goods.’ That the epimeleia heautou is 
able to foster such a bearing is evident from the fact that as early as the first century C.E.—
hundreds of years before industrialization, even—the Stoics already exhibited the critical 
awareness that humankind’s insatiable appetite for amassing completely unnecessary and truly 
un-natural riches has an immensely negative impact on the natural environment. It is such a 
critical awareness that, for example, informed Pliny the Elder’s following lament: 
In fact in regard to [even] one of nature’s elements we have no gratitude. For what luxuries and for what 
outrageous uses does she not subserve mankind? She is flung into the sea, or dug away to allow us to let in 
the channels. Water, iron, wood, fire, stone, growing crops, are employed to torture her at all hours, and much 
more to make her minister to our luxuries than our sustenance. Yet in order to make the sufferings inflicted on 
her surface and mere outer skin seem endurable, we probe her entrails, digging into her veins of gold and 
silver and mines of copper and lead; we actually drive shafts down into the depth to search for gems and 
certain tiny stones; we drag out her entrails, we seek a jewel merely to be worn upon a finger! How many 
hands are worn away with toil that a single knuckle may shine resplendent! If any beings of the nether world 
existed, assuredly even they would have been dug up [h]ere now by the burrowings of avarice and luxury!174
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The second consequence of engaging in the care of the self is that individuals end up benefiting 
others through their example, their discourse, and their friendship. That is, on the one hand, the 
care of the self must necessarily precede the care of others, insofar as it is only through the 
epimeleia heautou that one can reconstitute one’s subjectivity in such a manner that one is able to 
deal properly with others—“to occupy [one’s] . . . rightful position in the city, the community, or 
interpersonal relationships.”175 Yet, on the other hand, insofar as one has dealings with other 
people while one is cultivating the self, one cannot help but have at least some kind of positive 
influence on them. And further, as Foucault explains, once one has successfully engaged in the 
care of the self and realized that increased self-mastery, independence, and serenity, are all 
possible to cultivate, then one inevitably seeks this kind of “salvation [for] . . . others, or 
[develops] that way of being concerned about others that will . . . help them in their own 
salvation.” Accordingly, while the care of others always stands in a secondary position to the care 
of the self, it is nevertheless indissociable from the epimeleia heautou—whence the focus on the 
value of friendship within the Epicurean school, the Stoics’ emphasis on the benefits that the 
community necessarily derives from the one who cultivates the self, and, not least, the crucial 
role that a highly specific form of friendship plays in facilitating the care of the self, namely the 
relationship between the experienced exemplar or philosopher-guide (hēgemōn), and his 
students.176
Thirdly, because the care of the self is tied up with an ethic of existence that is completely 
distinct from the status quo and separate from dominant societal organization—insofar as it has 
no ties whatsoever “with the juridical per se, with an authoritarian system, with a disciplinary 
structure”—engagement in a version of the care of the self could provide an opportunity for 
resistance against the dominant societal discourses through which individual subjectivity is 
constituted. Thus, even though our discursive terrain, and hence our subjectivities, are very 
different from the discursive terrain of, and the subjectivities of those in, the first and second 
centuries C.E., with the consequence that we cannot simply duplicate the ancient forms of the 
care of the self, these ancient forms nevertheless yield numerous “devices, techniques, ideas 
[and] . . . procedures” which we may take up in our own endeavor to build up an ethic of 
existence that has no ties whatsoever with the (disciplinary/bio-power) infrastructure and 
discourses of our societies.
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urgency of reconstituting one’s (badly formed) subjectivity, they illustrate how to go about this 
process in an effective manner, and in addition, they involve a powerful emphasis on the 
importance of self-mastery, of moderation, and of the development of an environmentally aware 
attitude of immanence. Thus, were we to construct a ‘modified’ ethic of existence that draws on 
these notions and methods, but that directly addresses the problems of the disciplinary/bio-power 
discursive terrain of the present, it is conceivable that we would be able to reconstitute our 
subjectivity with reference to discourses that counter docility and prostration, making possible 
not only individuals’ cultivation of a nuanced form of autonomy, but also, by implication, 
enduring environmental and political engagement through effective discursive revolt.  
That said, though, Foucault warns us that the idea of embracing the care of the self as a 
lifelong project—and at that, a project informed by values and attitudes that are diametrically 
opposed to both the dominant discourses of our society and the subjectivity such discourses 
produce—is utterly foreign to, if not beyond the capacity of, most people. Accordingly, when 
people nowadays decide to ‘take care’ of themselves and to ‘live their best life,’ what they 
understand this to mean is partaking in what Foucault refers to as “the Californian cult of the 
self,” which is something as compliant with the dominant discourses of contemporary society as a 
genuine culture of the self would be hostile. Notably, Foucault elucidates this difference in one of 
his interviews, where he states: 
 
Among the Stoics, . . . the experience of the self is not a discovering of a truth hidden inside the self but an 
attempt to determine what one can and cannot do with one’s available freedom . . . [In contrast,] in the 
Californian cult of the self, one is supposed to discover one’s true self, to separate it from that which might 
obscure and alienate it, to decipher its truth thanks to psychological . . . science, which is supposed to be able 
to tell you what your true self is. Therefore, not only do I not identify this ancient culture of the self with what 
you might call the Californian cult of the self, I think they are diametrically opposed.178
 
 
And then there are also the practical problems relating to the reconstitution of subjectivity, 
because even if we desire to resist the dominant discourses that have shaped us, and even if we 
realize that what we must engage in to this end is something distinctly different from the 
Californian cult of the self, then we are still faced with the problem of the contemporary 
dominance of gnōthi seauton (knowledge of the self) and the relative obscurity of epimeleia 
heautou (care of oneself). That is, as already discussed, owing largely to the philosophical legacy 
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of Descartes and Kant, contemporary individuals assume that they can change their perspectives 
and behaviors through cognitive deliberation alone, while during Antiquity no doubt was ever 
cast upon the idea that the transformation of one’s perspectives and behaviors can only occur 
through a process of subjectivation—involving challenges of acquisition, of choices of discourse, 
of the assimilation of discourse, of testing the degree to which the assimilation of discourse has 
occurred, etcetera. In view of such seemingly overwhelming obstacles to the construction of an 
(anti-disciplinary) ethic of existence, or care of the self, today, one has to wonder how it can be 
that, as evinced in Sachs’ Planet Dialectics and Princen’s The Logic of Sufficiency, some 
individuals/groups enjoy forms of subjectivity that have been shaped by discourses that stand in 
opposition to those that dominate in the present era. In what follows, I explore how this could be 
the case. 
 
 
Reflections of alternative subjectivities in Sachs’ Planet Dialectics and in 
Princen’s The Logic of Sufficiency 
 
In Chapter Two, I examined Sachs’ Planet Dialectics and Princen’s The Logic of Sufficiency in 
an effort to reveal the degree to which these theorists adopt a Kantian approach to individual 
subjectivity. That is, I attempted to bring into conspicuousness that Sachs and Princen, insofar as 
they encourage their readers to desist from environmentally damaging behavior by principally 
working with hypotheses concerning our thoughts, ideas and beliefs in relation to what is 
tantamount to the dominant social paradigm (DSP), appear to harbor the (Kantian) assumption 
that individuals are possessed of both sufficient power of reason and sufficient autonomy to 
engage in an overhaul of their perspectives and behaviors following cognitive deliberation. In 
Chapter Three, though, I showed that these theorists’ writings, at least to a certain extent, 
concomitantly (and somewhat paradoxically) exhibit affinities with Foucaultian theory, which is 
not at all Kantian in orientation—thus opening up the possibility of complementing their works 
through a (Foucaultian) reconsideration of the implications, for individual subjectivity, of the 
discourses and micro-techniques of disciplinary power and of bio-power. Within what follows, I 
endeavor to point out a similar incongruity, namely, that between, on the one hand, Sachs’ and 
Princen’s apparently Kantian conception of subjectivity and, on the other hand, their 
exemplification of, and valorization of those whose conduct manifests, the constitution of an 
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(anti-disciplinary) subjectivity through processes that do not involve cognition alone, and that, as 
such, suggest the possibility that Foucault may have given a more accurate account of the 
constitution of subjectivity than did Kant. Through this study, I aim to emphasize the need to 
reappraise the approach to be adopted in order to facilitate pro-environmental civilizational 
change, insofar as such an approach may have to frame as imperative the reconstitution of 
individual subjectivity with reference to alternative discourses, which counter the docility and 
prostration engendered through the discourses and micro-techniques of disciplinary/bio-power. 
 
Un-Kantian subjectivities in Sachs’ Planet Dialectics 
 
As already discussed, within Planet Dialectics, Sachs characterizes contemporary society as a 
technologically, politically and economically dominated domain that is principally guided by the 
imperatives of “‘Faster’ . . . ‘Further’ . . . [and] ‘More’” (PD, 201). It is a world in which the 
planet, and the beings that inhabit it, are perceived as valuable only insofar as they may be of 
some use within the economic chain of events. The possibility “that the economic system is 
subordinate to the natural system” is never taken into consideration, and neither is the idea that 
prosperity can derive from something other than the accumulation of capital and of goods (PD, 
185). In the light of this diagnosis of society, Sachs prescribes a manifold remedy: we must alter 
our goals; we must make sure that “the humanities . . . join in the research on resource 
productivity [in order to assess] . . . how productive society’s economic output is in terms of 
welfare, use value, beauty and meaning;” we must “design . . . cultural/political limits to 
development;” we must evaluate our perspectives on the world, taking into consideration the 
problem of resource scarcity; we must develop “an attitude of care;” we must foster “an 
enlightened restraint of demand on the one hand, and . . . deal diligently with the available means 
on the other;” etcetera (PD, 36, 41, 48, 181, 197, 201). 
These are some of the (somewhat overwhelming) demands that Sachs makes of the 
reader. And, as examined in Chapter Two, he attempts to motivate his reader to action in this 
regard by way of his rhetorical style of writing, his archaeological dismantling of the ostensibly 
benign concept of development, and most importantly, his systematic invalidation of the beliefs 
associated with what are tantamount to the technological, political and economic dimensions of 
the dominant social paradigm (DSP) of contemporary society. From this highly conceptual 
approach, it may be deduced that Sachs in no way doubts the ability of individuals to change both 
their perceptions of the world and their behavior in general, following cognitive deliberation. As 
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such, he appears to adhere to a Kantian conception of subjectivity, in terms of which the 
individual is construed as a rational being that, situated in a position outside of (i.e. undetermined 
by) discourse, is completely capable of autonomous choice in relation to his/her views and 
conduct. In Chapter Three, though, I explained that such a Kantian conception of individual 
subjectivity stands in diametric opposition to a Foucaultian conception of it, insofar as, from a 
Foucaultian perspective, individual subjectivity, far from being undetermined by discourse, is in 
fact discursively produced. However, this perspective on the discursive constitution of 
subjectivity not only problematizes projecting onto the individual absolute rationality and 
autonomy. In addition, it also implies that in order to reconstitute one’s subjectivity, it would not 
be sufficient simply to engage in cognitive deliberation concerning the negative aspects of those 
discourses through which one has hitherto been constituted and in terms of which one has lived. 
Rather, as thematized within this chapter, with reference to the example of the first/second 
century C.E. Hellenistic/Roman cultures of the self, it would also be necessary to carefully select, 
and constantly subjectivize through conceptual effort and practical application, alternative 
discourses around which one wishes one’s subjectivity to be sculpted; it is arguably owing to this 
that the process of subjectivation is seen as making of one’s life a work of art. 
Yet, while Sachs may well adhere to a strongly Kantian conception of individual 
subjectivity throughout the greater part of Planet Dialectics—even to the extent of “loosely 
improvising the Kantian imperative” in order to apply it to the question of sustainable behavior at 
a societal level (PD, 174)—the individuals/groups he proffers as exemplars of restrained, pro-
environmental behavior are markedly un-Kantian, insofar as it is evident that their subjectivity 
(and, hence, their behavior), is determined by their discursive situation. In short, within his work, 
Sachs on numerous occasions valorizes the lifestyles of indigenous tribes, and in one instance in 
particular, he explains that these tribes have 
 
cultures free from the frenzy of accumulation[, and that] . . . the necessities of everyday life are won mostly 
from subsistence production, with only the smaller part being purchased from the market. To our eyes, [he 
advances, these] people have rather meagre possessions—perhaps a hut and some pots . . . with money 
playing only a marginal role. Instead, everyone usually has access to fields, rivers and woods, while kinship 
and community duties guarantee services that elsewhere must be paid for in hard cash . . . In a traditional 
Mexican village, for example, the private accumulation of wealth results in ostracism; prestige is gained 
precisely by spending even small profits on good deeds for the community. Here is a way of life maintained 
by a culture that recognizes and cultivates a state of sufficiency. (PD, 10-11) 
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Sachs’ characterization of the lives of these people may be correct, but what is telling from the 
above descriptive example alone is that these people—these exemplars—operate in terms of an 
ethic that is not at all based on any rationalizing, on any concerted cognitive deliberation. That is, 
their way of life (and indeed their subjectivity) is informed by traditions and values that have 
been passed down for generations and that, owing to their focus on moderation, frugality and 
community, are happily pro-environmental and pro-social in orientation. This is the discursive 
world into which these people were born, and no extrication from this world of tradition and 
values is required of them—a far cry from the demands that are placed upon contemporary 
‘postmodern’ individuals who must divorce themselves, conceptually and in practice, from the 
societal norms of insatiable consumerism and uninhibited egocentrism, among others. Moreover, 
what is also clear from the above description is that these people live in conditions that are 
conducive to the formation of a type of subjectivity that is completely different from the 
subjectivity of an individual situated in a disciplinary/bio-power discursive terrain. That is, such 
tribes or traditional villagers are on the discursive margins of, and often geographically distanced 
from, disciplinary/bio-power society: they live not in the city but in areas surrounded by ‘fields, 
rivers and woods;’ they are employed not in the factory but in their own labor of ‘subsistence 
production;’ they may not have personal fortunes but they have community support; ‘to our eyes’ 
their ‘meagre possessions’ may be laughable, but they pride themselves on their frugality 
precisely because their subjectivity has been informed ‘by a culture that recognizes and cultivates 
a state of sufficiency’ and independence. In short, the conditions that they enjoy can almost be 
contrasted to the conditions in disciplinary/bio-power society point for point. Something similar 
can be said of the example of Mohandas Ghandi, to whom Sachs refers and whom he implicitly 
valorizes within his text. In short, Sachs explains that Ghandi was completely opposed to the idea 
that India should mimic industrialized, technocentric nations such as England, and instead 
“insisted on a society that, in accordance with Hindu tradition, gave priority to a spiritual way of 
life . . . [rather than embracing a ‘Western’ model] that knew no more sublime end than that of 
minimizing bodily effort and maximizing physical well-being.” In other words, what Ghandi was 
suggesting was that “India’s tradition, undisturbed for thousands of years, [may] have more 
substantial things to offer” than the un-sublime aspirations of Western culture (PD, 16). While 
what Ghandi was arguing here was certainly sensible, and while we are definitely in dire need of 
perspectives such as his in the contemporary era, the above descriptions alone suffice as evidence 
for the legitimacy of a Foucaultian, rather than a Kantian, conception of individual subjectivity. 
This is because, from the above, it is evident that even Ghandi’s ‘alternative’ ethics was to a large 
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extent underpinned by the formidable weight of an age-old cultural tradition with which he, and 
the Indian nation in general, were completely familiar. That is, arguably, owing in part to this 
traditional impetus and in part to his exceptional erudition and spirit of recalcitrance, Ghandi was 
able to resist the temptations of the newfangled technological and cultural inventions of the West, 
which promised an easy life and material plenitude in contrast to the traditional Indian life of 
austerity and frugality.  
In sum, Sachs is undoubtedly correct to advance that, considering the existing crises of 
nature and justice, the cultures of such individuals/groups certainly hold out more hope than the 
problematic culture of the West—because in contrast to the latter, these “non-modern cultures . . . 
have a greater awareness of the fragility of human action;” they “see nature as a living being [and 
thus] tend to carefully circumscribe the range of human intervention;” they “understand trees, 
rocks or animals as animated beings in a wider cosmos, where each element possesses its 
separate but related identity;” and they consequently advocate living in respectful harmony with 
nature and with fellow human beings, through practicing sufficiency and moderation (PD, 55, 66-
67, 165). But again, it must be emphasized that, for the most part, those who adhere to these non-
modern cultures do so because they have, as it were, been born into it. Unlike us, they do not 
have to reject their ‘original’ discursive world in favor of another, far more demanding one, in the 
interest of environmental wellbeing. Correlatively, even when some have opted for another 
discursive orientation, as Ghandi’s contemporaries did through their unfortunate embrace of 
Western culture, they opted for a lifestyle that is far less taxing than their traditional one—a 
lifestyle that demands not austerity and frugality but one that encourages profligacy and 
rapacious consumerism. And what frustrates matters even more, is that these pre-modern cultures 
are steadily dissolving as economic development takes precedence over, if not completely 
obliterates, the traditional goals of non-Western societies (PD, 19, 29). 
Yet, it is in the light of examples such as these that Sachs advances that we should work 
towards no less than a ‘civilizational change,’ involving a return to a life of frugality and a 
discarding of our obsessive interest in accumulation. In other words, what he appears to suggest 
is that, while we may not be able to mimic these individuals/groups by giving up our jobs in the 
cities and embracing a pre-modern or agrarian lifestyle in some ‘backward’ part of the world, we 
can certainly adopt a similar ethic by embracing the values inherent in these traditions—values 
such as moderation, environmental care, and community autonomy. However, what Sachs seems 
not to realize, arguably owing to him harboring a Kantian conception of subjectivity, is that 
precisely those conditions we can supposedly do without, are what facilitate the formation of 
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these people’s alternative subjectivities in the first place. That is to say, without the weight of a 
cultural/discursive tradition that encourages self-mastery and independence, without being able to 
apply their ‘alternative’ ethics or values in daily life in the absence of conflicting external 
pressures, and without institutional/community support, ordinary individuals, however sincere 
their intentions may be, could hardly be expected to reconstitute their subjectivity in such a 
manner. In short, from a Foucaultian perspective, when it comes to individuals who are obliged 
to operate within the disciplinary/bio-power terrain of contemporary societies, these individuals’ 
cognitive decisions and intentions alone could not effect the reconstitution of their subjectivity, 
which has for the duration of their lives been (and on a daily basis continues to be) constituted 
through the discourses and micro-techniques of disciplinary/bio-power, around notions not of 
self-mastery, independence and frugality but of docility, prostration and infantile acquisitiveness. 
This brings us to another important issue, which may shed light on why Sachs would 
believe that ordinary people, caught up within the machinations of disciplinary/bio-power 
societies, are in fact capable of reconstituting their subjectivity in the absence of the conducive 
conditions enjoyed by those individuals/groups he posits as exemplars of restrained, pro-
environmental behavior. If one judges by Sachs’ writings—to the extent that they are 
diametrically opposed to the dominant discourses of contemporary (disciplinary/bio-power) 
society—it is indisputable that Sachs is anything but a cut-and-dried disciplinary/bio-power 
subject. How is it possible that he could reconstitute his subjectivity in a world thoroughly 
saturated by the discourses and micro-techniques of disciplinary/bio-power, that render 
individuals docile, prostrate and infantilized? How is this possible in a world which leaves little 
to no room for the reconstitution of subjectivity, insofar as it lacks any tradition of frugality, 
offers little freedom to conduct oneself in a manner opposed to the mechanistic disciplinary/bio-
power ethos, and is devoid of meaningful community or institutional support for the cultivation 
of an alternative subjectivity? Recall that, as discussed with reference to the example of the 
first/second century C.E. Hellenistic/Roman cultures of the self, firstly, a great deal of discerning 
intelligence and determination is required of individuals if they are to succeed in the difficult 
tasks of dissociating themselves from the dominant dictates of the society in which they find 
themselves, and of rejecting the way in which their subjectivity has been constituted through the 
discourses of that society—tasks which involve, among other things, accurately diagnosing the 
discursive ills of their society, and constructing an alternative discursive/ethical framework from 
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scratch.179
In turn, as was made clear in the earlier examination of the Hellenistic/Roman cultures of 
the self, insofar as the subject is discursively constituted, the effective reconstitution of 
subjectivity requires not only such personal capacity, but also, secondly, the necessary external 
conditions, namely institutional support and, correlatively, the opportunity to apply one’s 
alternative ethic of existence within one’s everyday life. In view of that, it is possible that Sachs 
may have been able to distance himself from the status quo and reconstitute his subjectivity with 
reference to a different discursive/ethical framework—a distancing and a reconstitution that are 
clearly reflected in his work—precisely because in addition to harboring the above-mentioned 
personal capacity, Sachs, as a “dissident” academic (PD, 87), may be one of the fortunate few 
who enjoy the external conditions required for the effective reconstitution of subjectivity in the 
midst of disciplinary/bio-power society. This is because, in academia of a dissident kind, one is 
able to immerse oneself in the study and assimilation of diverse discourses that stand in 
opposition to those of the status quo; and to the extent that one is able to receive at least some 
measure of support from one’s colleagues and one’s university/institute in the acquisition, 
development and transmission of such oppositional discourses, it is possible that one can 
harmonize one’s professional career and one’s life in general with such a goal as the 
subjectivation and embodiment of ‘oppositional’ discourses/ethics. This is not to imply that the 
processes involved in resisting the status quo and reconstituting one’s subjectivity through 
alternative discourses is not trying or exhausting—academia, as a rule, demands more than most 
people could possibly imagine in terms of both conceptual engagement and (life)time. But it is 
precisely because of the complexity, the strain, and the perpetual nature of academic work that 
such an occupation affords one an opportunity to develop an alternative ethic of existence and, 
correlatively, a different type of subjectivity—provided, of course, that one is engaged in 
academic work that problematizes, rather than buttresses, dominant societal discourses.
 In this regard, Sachs’ own writings bear implicit testimony to the fact that he is in 
possession of these qualities of intelligence and determination, and that he is aware that most of 
those surrounding him are not; accordingly, he laments that “in the maelstrom of modern life[, 
people] . . . have lost their clarity of purpose and determination of will” (PD, 211).  
180
                                                 
179 That is, as noted earlier, even in the Hellenistic/Roman period—a time marked by the absence of disciplinary/bio-
power and its infantilizing effect on subjectivity—it was held that very few people are able to successfully undertake 
the epimeleia heautou, because most suffer from a “lack of courage, strength, or endurance, [and] an inability to 
grasp the importance of the task or to see it through.” Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics,” 277-279. 
 
180 Recall that, even within the context of the first/second century C.E. Hellenistic/Roman cultures of the self, in 
actuality only the philosophers and the very rich were able to properly engage in the epimeleia heautou, because of 
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However, we, as Sachs’ readers, may not find ourselves in such a position. Firstly, 
however unpalatable it may be, it is likely that not all of us possess the personal capacity and 
determination required to engage in the difficult processes of rejecting the dominant discourses of 
society, and of undertaking the lifelong task of reconstituting our subjectivity with reference to a 
completely different ethical framework, in an effort to “refuse what we are . . . to promote new 
forms of subjectivity through the refusal of this kind of [docile, prostrate and infantilized] 
individuality that has been imposed on us for several centuries.”181
To sum up, then, from a Foucaultian perspective, and as evinced in the cases of those 
individuals/groups Sachs proffers as exemplars of restrained, pro-environmental behavior, 
individual subjectivity is revealed to be something that is produced through rather than separate 
from discourse, and accordingly, as something that is greatly constrained by the external 
conditions within which the individual is caught. And what such a finding implies is that even 
though Sachs may harbor a Kantian conception of individual subjectivity, the ‘civilizational 
 And secondly, even if we do 
harbor such personal capacity and determination, it is unlikely that all of us are lucky enough to 
be in a professional position that allows for dissidence in thought and in conduct. For example, 
more people work for energy suppliers, automobile manufacturers and construction companies 
than for universities and environmental agencies, and in workplaces such as the former, which 
are overrun by disciplinary/bio-power discourses and micro-techniques, workers are forced to 
become ever more docile and prostrate—Sachs admits as much when he advances that in 
workplaces today, people are commonly reduced to the level of “tools” in the interest of 
productivity (PD, 14, 19). Thus, it would mean ‘career suicide’ if a person in the employ of such 
a workplace was, somehow, able to begin working at the reconstitution of his/her subjectivity 
with reference to an (anti-disciplinary) ethical framework, to engage in the study of texts 
antagonistic to the profiteering, technocentric, and egotistical mores promoted within his/her 
place of employment, and to proceed to conduct him/herself in a suitably unorthodox fashion. 
The risky nature of such an undertaking is hinted at by Sachs himself, in his contention that 
“where acceleration is the everyday norm, slowness becomes a non-conformist adventure,” and 
in his statement that “a sustainable community will ultimately be dependent on economic 
underachievers who are uninterested in, or even antagonistic towards, a mounting volume of 
consumption” (PD, 195, 208). 
                                                                                                                                                              
the grueling, the manifestly difficult, and above all, the time-consuming, nature of the reconstitution of subjectivity 
which is central to the care of the self. 
181 Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” 336. 
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change’ for which he hopes may only be effected through a process that, far from merely 
involving cognitive decision and an accompanying resolve to embrace pro-environmental 
behavior, is hugely laborious, convoluted, and contingent. That is, if one accepts that subjectivity 
is discursively produced, this means that before even thinking of setting out on the dissident quest 
proposed by Sachs (which is itself greatly contingent upon the amenability of one’s external 
circumstances), contemporary individuals have first to initiate the arduous work of reconstituting 
their subjectivity around notions other than docility, prostration and infantilization (a process 
which is, in turn, predicated upon the personal capacity of individuals to detach themselves from 
dominant societal discourses, to identify how their subjectivity has been produced through these 
discourses, to construct a workable ethical framework through which to undo this form of 
subjectivity, and to consequently dedicate themselves to this arduous process of reconstitution). 
 
Un-Kantian subjectivities in Princen’s The Logic of Sufficiency 
 
As already examined in Chapter Two, within The Logic of Sufficiency, Princen, in a manner akin 
to Sachs, diagnoses our society as one in which “the allures of abundance and the ethics of 
material plenty have prevailed;” one in which “the idea of the sovereign consumer demanding 
ever more goods to meet an endlessly insatiable appetite is fundamental;” and, most significantly, 
one in which frugality—a principle of overwhelming importance to any attempt at skillfully 
reorganizing society in the face of global ecological constraint—is perceived as something 
unfashionable owing to its “irrelevan[ce] . . . to the designs of society’s major institutions: the 
factory, the laboratory, the market” (LS, 7-8, 150-151). And in order to remedy these ills of 
society, Princen relies not on the ‘powers-that-be’ but on ordinary individuals, suggesting that 
rather than “wait for [our] . . . leaders to lead,” we should begin to live in terms of a new ethic—
one “that celebrates not consumers as purchasers but workers as citizens, not unending expansion 
but working and living within immutable constraints.” This would involve, among other things, 
developing theories and principles to be used to guide human behavior so that we can ultimately 
“operate within the earth’s regenerative capacities;” focusing our attention on the question of 
self-restraint; taking the risk of stepping “out of the dominant belief system” and initiating “a 
paradigmatic shift away from the underlying [societal] principles of efficiency and mobility;” and 
so on (LS, 155, 332, 351, 364). 
From the above alone, it is evident that Princen demands a great deal of his readers, yet 
his demands are entirely matched by his confidence in our capacity to meet them—a confidence 
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that may well stem from Princen harboring a Kantian conception of individual subjectivity, in 
terms of which the individual is regarded as an eminently rational being that, situated in a 
position outside of discourse, is completely capable of autonomous action. That is, as already 
discussed in Chapter Two, it appears as though Princen, for the most part, does not question our 
actual capacity to alter our perspectives and our conduct following cognitive deliberation, and it 
is arguably under the impetus of such a Kantian conviction that he attempts to convince his 
readers to change their views and behavior, by way of theoretically dismantling the concept of 
efficiency, unequivocally undermining the legitimacy of what is tantamount to the dominant 
social paradigm (DSP), and emphasizing the benefits of embracing an alternative, ecological, 
rationality and a corresponding behavioral framework. In fact, Princen himself admits that he has, 
in his writing, “implicitly assumed that well-honed argument and good stories will enable a 
different sense-making” that draws on what is rational, what we sense to be right (i.e. sufficiency 
and self-management), and what is evident in the example of those who manage to live 
sufficiently, despite being caught up within our contemporary, efficiency-crazed world (LS, 343). 
As such, what Princen seems not to consider is the possibility that individual subjectivity may be 
constituted through, rather than external to, discourse, and that the individual may thus wield far 
less autonomy than he presumes. The correlative of this is that Princen seems not to take into 
account the arduous processes that would, perhaps, have to be engaged in for individuals, who 
find themselves in the midst of disciplinary/bio-power society, to reconstitute their subjectivity 
around alternative discourses that work against docility, prostration, and infantilization, in order 
to cultivate the nuanced form of autonomy required to successfully undertake the kind of 
environmental and political action prescribed by Princen. 
But this leads us to a subtle incongruity within Princen’s text. In short, in spite of 
Princen’s arguably Kantian conception of individual subjectivity, on the basis of which he 
appears to place great faith in his readers’ ability to reorganize their behavior once they have 
taken cognizance of what amounts to the ‘logic’ of sufficiency, when one examines the 
conditions of those individuals/groups he elevates as exemplars of a sufficiency-orientated way 
of life, it becomes evident that the subjectivity of these people, rather than being Kantian in 
orientation is, on the contrary, constituted through discourse and influenced by a number of 
related conditions such as exceptional aptitude and/or privilege, institutional support, and the 
possibility of application. While the example of these individuals/groups certainly constitutes 
evidence of the possibility of living in terms of an alternative ethic of existence in the 
contemporary era, this ethic emerges as being facilitated by a very particular conglomeration of 
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discursive and other conditions that allows for the formation of a very different subjectivity—
which decisively calls into question whether individuals in the midst of disciplinary/bio-power 
society would be able to adopt a similar ethic in the absence of such conditions. To sum up, 
through looking into the specific conditions enjoyed by these individuals/groups, it may be 
possible to see why they have been able to develop forms of subjectivity alternative to those 
created through disciplinary/bio-power discourses and micro-techniques, and hence, why they 
have been able to cultivate the nuanced form of autonomy needed to resist the economistic and 
technocentric dictates of the contemporary world. And by the same token, it may be possible to 
see why other people, caught up within ‘unexceptional’ societies, or, societies devoid of such 
conditions, would not be able to perform the same deeds through cognitive deliberation alone. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, Princen presents the cases of The Pacific Lumber Company 
(TPL), Monhegan Lobstering, and Toronto Island, as manifestations of the possibility that we can 
even in the contemporary era, firstly, live in terms of an ecological rationality, in accordance with 
which our behavior is guided by what is ecologically sustainable rather than by what is 
economically profitable, and secondly, live in terms of a (pre-industrial) working rationality, in 
accordance with which we adopt more natural rhythms of work, gain sovereignty over our time, 
and derive meaning from work and social engagement rather than from the amassment of capital 
and the acquisition of goods. In the case of The Pacific Lumber Company (TPL), Princen 
explains how Albert Stanwood Murphy, the erstwhile president of TPL who had grown up amid 
the woodlands and within the timber mills, initiated a dramatic transformation of the timber 
industry—and in due time proved that it is possible to practice sufficiency even in an industry 
notorious for its overexploitation of a natural resource. In short, under the impetus of “public 
opinion, preservationism . . . government regulations [and] . . . market volatility,” and owing also 
to his acceptance of emerging knowledges concerning the exhaustibility of timberlands, Murphy 
radically altered the approach of his company by abandoning a style of timbering in terms of 
which one fells entire forests and then moves on to others, in favor of experimenting with such 
ideas as “reforestation” and “selective logging,” in order to safeguard the forests’ regenerative 
capacities (LS, 177, 181-182). And in addition to embracing such an ecological rationality, 
Murphy advocated what is tantamount to a working rationality, insofar as, having learned that 
worker contentment cannot be achieved through salaries alone (if at all), he continued to support 
the TPL tradition of never treating his “workers . . . as machines,” through resisting the urge to 
have them specialize in only one particular function, through encouraging them to form a  
protected community of employees (most of whom resided in the relatively self-sufficient 
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company town of Scotia), and through employing workers for life and encouraging their children 
to join the company once they have completed their schooling. Ultimately, while those who took 
over TPL in the 1980s rejected Murphy’s sufficiency-orientated legacy in favor of increasing 
efficiency and boosting profits, for Princen, the approach that Murphy adopted while he was in 
control of TPL furnishes us with proof that sufficiency is possible—it “offer[s a] lesson . . . for 
sufficiency in practice” (LS, 168-169, 202, 211). From Princen’s study though, it is clear that The 
Pacific Lumber Company case is special—that is, Murphy’s advocacy and application of an 
alternative ethic of ecology and of work was in large part facilitated by the existence of very 
specific conditions that are largely absent from the lives of most people. First of all, as mentioned 
above, Murphy was, as it were, born into the timber industry, and grew up directly experiencing 
life in the woodlands: he saw the natural resource for which he would in time become 
responsible, and such direct contact may have gone a long way towards Murphy’s decision, as 
TPL president, to engage in sustainable logging practices rather than pillaging whatever 
timberlands he had left and then closing down the family business for good. Clearly, too, Murphy 
must have been possessed of an exceptional capacity to read the circumstances within which he 
found himself, and to be receptive to new notions concerning the scarcity of the natural resource 
upon which his company depended. Princen suggests as much when he argues that just as “The 
Pacific Lumber Company was different [to other timber companies,] . . . Murphy was different 
[to other timber owners,] . . . retaining perhaps an element of his family’s pioneering spirit yet 
applying it in new ways and against hitherto unforeseen circumstances.” And a recalcitrance of 
spirit—a quality that, as discussed earlier in relation to the Hellenistic/Roman cultures of the self, 
is crucial to the ability to embrace values opposed to those of the status quo—is something that 
Murphy surely possessed, because he continued in his “deviant practices” even though he “took 
heat from many quarters, especially from other members of the industry, for TPL’s departure 
from industry norms” (LS, 177, 183). Further, in addition to Murphy’s direct experience and 
exceptional aptitude, his presidency of TPL understandably played an instrumental role in his 
instantiation of an ethic of sufficiency, because as company president, he had the necessary 
authority to ensure that his company operated in terms of an ecological rationality as well as a 
working rationality; he was able to conceive, and thereafter to decisively implement and 
engender, what amounted to an ethic of sufficiency within his business. Admittedly, in his 
discussion of this case, Princen, who is anything but naïve, indicates an awareness of the obvious 
difference between his conceptual approach to nurturing the ability to embrace the logic of 
sufficiency, and the experiential or circumstantial emergence of sufficiency in the practices of the 
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likes of Murphy—but he maintains that the two, nevertheless, have something fundamental in 
common. Accordingly, he writes: 
 
Although they [i.e. Murphy’s sufficiency-orientated practices] originated from the confluence of personal, 
organizational, cultural, and ecological factors, not deductive reasoning as presented in the preceding 
[conceptual] chapters of this book, they are consistent with the findings there. Indeed, the deductive and 
inductive methods are complementary, one from conceptual development and the other from practice, both 
addressing the same analytic question: How can human behavior be organized given immutable ecological 
constraint and humans’ twin desires for material wealth now and material security into the future? (LS, 204-
205) 
 
One cannot dispute Princen’s above contention, namely, that his theory and Murphy’s practice 
converge upon the problem of human behavior in the light of humankind’s seemingly insatiable 
yearning for prosperity. But what I do contest is whether Princen’s theoretical approach to 
limiting the excesses of human behavior could effectively motivate actual ‘sufficient conduct,’ on 
the part of individuals who do not find themselves in a domain akin to the unique microcosm that 
was TPL under Murphy’s leadership. This question emerges as all the more legitimate if one 
reconsiders The Pacific Lumber Company case from a Foucaultian perspective, or, from the 
perspective that individuals, rather than being Kantian and thus capable of the transformation of 
their perspectives and conduct following cognitive deliberation, are constituted through discourse 
and can thus only transform their perspectives and conduct through the process of subjectivizing 
alternative discourses—a process that involves not only relevant knowledge acquisition 
(mathēsis), but also daily application (askēsis). Briefly, if one ‘lives’ one’s work, and if this work 
is guided both by an exceptional leader or exemplar, and by discourses or traditions that are 
different to those of (disciplinary/bio-power) society in general, then over time one’s subjectivity 
would inevitably alter. And at TPL, the conditions that make possible the constitution of such an 
alternative (i.e. less docile and prostrate) form of subjectivity were certainly in place, firstly, 
because for Murphy and his employees their work was their life—an attitude helped along by the 
residence of many in the company town; and secondly, because the manner in which this work 
was to be done was exemplified by the brilliant and deviant Murphy himself, and was, very 
importantly (and albeit inadvertently), antagonistic to the excessively hierarchical, panoptical, 
mechanistic, and persecutory operations that characterize most workplaces in contemporary 
(disciplinary/bio-power) society. In short, TPL was a workplace very different from others: it was 
a place where people were encouraged to pride themselves on their ‘deviance’ from industry 
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norms through embracing moderation rather than plundering their natural resource under the 
impetus of the profit motive; a place where people were not reduced to docile, specialized 
machines but empowered and motivated to adapt their work, or change the kind of work that they 
do, in accordance with their own ageing and with changing conditions of the natural resource; 
and ultimately, it was a place where people were guided in a tradition of sufficiency rather than 
coerced to operate in terms of a regime of efficiency (LS, 183, 185, 203-204, 209, 211). 
Arguably, owing to these factors, TPL employees were over time able to cultivate the nuanced 
form of autonomy necessary for self-management, and to derive meaning from such self-
management—this, in stark contrast to individuals, caught up within unexceptional 
circumstances, whose subjectivity is constituted around notions of docility, prostration and 
infantilization, and who consequently derive meaning only from their earnings, to the extent that 
the latter afford them expensive ‘toys’ (SUVs, yachts, etc.) that can be played with over 
weekends and shown off to others. To sum up, it remains questionable whether Princen’s readers, 
and others like them, who are obliged to work within the machinations of disciplinary/bio-power 
society, would be able to reject the way in which their subjectivity is constituted through 
disciplinary/bio-power discourses and micro-techniques, in favor of gradually reconstituting their 
subjectivity, and cultivating a nuanced form of autonomy—through the subjectivation of 
alternative discourses absent from, and discouraged within, their workplaces and society in 
general. 
In turn, as we also saw in Chapter Two, Princen shows how the Monhegan lobstermen, 
most of whose families have lived on Monhegan Island for generations, in a manner akin to 
Murphy engage in an ecological rationality, by taking cognizance of the scarcity of the natural 
resource upon which they depend and, in view of this, drastically moderate their fishing through a 
process of selective lobstering, through adhering to a collective agreement of lobstering for only 
half of each year, and through running an apprenticeship program for prospective lobstermen. 
Further, Monheganers also operate in terms of a working rationality, insofar as their rhythm of 
work follows not the dictates of the mechanical clock but rather “the rhythm of the natural 
resource,” insofar as they regard their occupation as a calling rather than as a means to an 
economic (and acquisitive) end, and insofar as their work leaves them with sufficient time for 
social interaction and, consequently, for the maintenance of community cohesion. But this 
alternative ethics of ecology and of work in terms of which the Monheganers live, is, again, 
largely contingent upon a unique conglomeration of conditions, including the existence of an 
oppositional discursive infrastructure within the Monhegan community. For one, the 
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Monheganers live on a limited and isolated terrain—an island—and have for generations 
depended directly on a limited natural resource; as a consequence of this, they have to live 
frugally and to moderate their fishing out of necessity, and are guided in this by a tradition of 
sufficiency cultivated through decades of direct experience. Also, since they are the only people 
permitted (at first by community decision and later through government sanction) to engage in 
lobstering around the island, and since they themselves impose further limitations on lobstering 
through, among other means, the implementation of apprenticeship programs, within their unique 
domain a tradition of sufficiency has been explicitly endorsed and is continually engendered by 
all of the islanders. And in addition, owing to their geographical isolation, they have had to 
reckon with their independence as a community and organize themselves accordingly—through 
supporting one another financially and otherwise when the fishing season is over, undertaking 
whatever kind of work is required of them to survive as families and as a community, and very 
importantly, coordinating the community themselves and making their own rules, always guided 
by their long-standing tradition of sufficiency (LS, 228, 240-243, 248-249, 258, 270-274, 276, 
280-283). Significantly, it is not as though Princen does not recognize the ‘anomalousness’ of 
these conditions and perspectives; on the contrary, he is well aware of them and of the criticism 
that can consequently be leveled at him, and thus writes the following defense: 
 
It is tempting to dismiss the apparent sustainability of Monhegan fishing and community life as an artifact of 
island life. Islanders are isolated and insulated. They have to do things differently. They cannot, as one 
Monheganer after another said, just hop in the pickup and get another job down the road when things get 
rough . . . On the mainland, by contrast, there are always alternatives . . . But if island life is different from 
mainland life, the important question . . . is whether it is merely an anomaly or potentially a model. In 
searching for insights into the behaviors and institutions necessary for long-term resource use . . . I have 
[made] . . . the assumption that island life might be more than a quaint throwback, more than an existence 
inordinately constrained by geography, transportation, and communications. If this assumption is reasonable, 
then what distinguishes island life for individuals and communities is limits . . . [Yet,] from a global 
ecological perspective, the denizens of New York, Tokyo, and Geneva are no less resource dependent than 
those of Monhegan . . . [W]e’re all on one island, planet earth. (LS, 285-287)  
 
However, from a Foucaultian perspective, it is not merely the ‘limits’ of island life that 
distinguishes the conduct of the Monheganers from that of mainlanders. Rather, in the light of a 
Foucaultian understanding of subjectivity as something that is not ‘given’ but discursively 
produced, it becomes evident that the Monheganers’ alternative perspectives and behaviors can 
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be ascribed precisely to the fact that the relative isolation and the uncompromising demands of 
‘island life’ have prevented disciplinary/bio-power discourses and micro-techniques—through 
which subjectivity is constituted as docile, prostrate and infantilized—from having as much 
purchase on the subjectivity of the islanders as they do on the subjectivity of mainlanders. In fact, 
the discursive infrastructure in terms of which the islanders operate can almost be contrasted to 
the disciplinary/bio-power infrastructure of ordinary societies point for point. Firstly, on the 
island, individuals are not constantly rendered docile through hierarchical observation, but are 
rather encouraged to manage themselves and their behavior, in view of the looming realities of 
resource scarcity and of their own isolation. Secondly, although, as Princen shows, prospective 
lobsterman are subject to a program of apprenticeship, once they have passed through this 
program they are not, like workers in a factory, continuously subjected to normalizing judgment 
involving micro-penalties of time, of activity, of behavior, of speech, of the body, etcetera, meted 
out in the interest of ensuring ever greater efficiency. Thirdly, rather than being prone to constant 
examination by supervisors who aim to ensure conformation with efficiency-orientated 
(disciplinary/bio-power) workplace rules, the islanders, under the impetus of a long-standing 
tradition of sufficiency, and in the interest of the continued thriving of Monhegan Island as a 
unique and independent domain, out of their own ensure that they operate in a moderate and self-
restrained manner. To sum up, the relative weakness of disciplinary/bio-power institutions, 
discourses and micro-techniques within the context of island life, and correlatively, the presence 
and daily endorsement of institutions, discourses and traditions that diametrically oppose the 
docility and prostration engendered through the swarming of disciplinary/bio-power mechanisms 
in ordinary societies, not only mitigate the infantilization of Monhegan subjects but also allows 
them to cultivate a nuanced form of autonomy. Thus, while we may well live on the same rock 
stranded in the universe, with the exception of those who inhabit unique discursive (and at times 
geographical) terrains, such ‘universal’ isolation and resource dependence do not necessarily 
imply that all of us are possessed of sufficient autonomy, as discursively constituted subjects, to 
act in the interest of ecological and social sustainability. 
The third major case that Princen presents as proof of the possibility of living in terms of 
a logic of sufficiency, is that of Toronto Island. As already mentioned in Chapter Two, the way of 
life enjoyed by those on Toronto Island has for decades been threatened by ambitions, of the 
Toronto Metro, to make Toronto Island more accessible (in terms of automobility) and to develop 
it (commercially), in the interest of benefiting more people than the island residents. However, 
the Metro’s efforts in this regard have proved unsuccessful, owing in large part to the islanders’ 
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unflagging resistance against the Metro’s technocentric and economistic ethos. That is, rather 
than opting for the convenience that increased automobility would afford them, and the economic 
benefit that further development of their islands would bring, the residents have consistently 
fought, “in court and on the streets,” for the preservation of what they consider to be the essential 
ingredients of a fulfilling existence, namely tranquility, a sense of community, and an 
unregimented mode of existence that contrasts markedly to mainland life. Princen, in fact, argues 
that this case provides a lesson of sufficient living which is even more compelling than the case 
of either The Pacific Lumber Company or Monhegan Lobstering, insofar as, while “the timber 
and lobster cases can be seen as representing restraint in production with their attendant, yet 
indirect, curtailment of consumption and, hence, total throughput[, t]he auto cases[—most 
notably that of Toronto Island—]focus the analytic gaze directly on consumption” (LS, 291, 300, 
388). In other words, the Toronto Island case is notable precisely because it is end-users, rather 
than producers, who have chosen to limit themselves, on the grounds that a lack of limitation in 
consumption harbors many hidden costs, rather than on the grounds that a lack of limitation in 
production will, owing to resource scarcity, ultimately spell the end of the business in question. 
Yet, just as he did in his treatment of the timbering and lobstering cases, Princen does 
acknowledge that a number of factors have played a significant role in the success of the Toronto 
Island case—most notably, the history of resistance and the unique geography of Toronto Island. 
That is, first of all, he explains that Toronto Island has a “unique history [that] . . . cannot be 
replicated elsewhere,” involving generation upon generation of island residents—construed by 
Toronto authorities as “non-conformists,”182
                                                 
182 Sally Gibson, More Than an Island: A History of the Toronto Island (Toronto: Irwin, 1984), quoted in Thomas 
Princen, The Logic of Sufficiency (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2005), 297. 
 “social misfits,” and as “mostly a ragtag bunch of 
deviants” (LS, 292, 297-299, 303)—forming autonomous organizations, the role of which has 
been to ensure that the islanders’ quality of life is not obliterated by an influx of automobiles, by 
forms of noise pollution, and by excessive development, all of which precipitate the immensely 
constricted existence and severe social alienation so characteristic of city life. And secondly, the 
geographic location of Toronto Island affords islanders, quite literally, the ability to maintain a 
healthy distance between themselves and what happens in the city—practically as well as 
culturally. Accordingly, when one resident states: “One hates to approach the city with its canopy 
of smoke . . . [a]nd coming home to the island, what a contrast to city traffic, where you are 
crowded like a sardine in a street car or plodding along . . . in a car like so many links in a 
sausage chain,” what is actually being driven at is that the islanders resist not only “the 
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technology, but [also] the culture of the automobile, the worship of mobility and speed and 
convenience,” which brings more claustrophobia and restriction than it does ease and freedom 
(LS, 293, 298). While these above-mentioned conditions—along with the support of prominent 
persons sympathetic to the islanders’ cause and the revolutionary fervor generated by, among 
other events, the 1968 student revolts—certainly augmented the Toronto islanders’ ability to fight 
for the maintenance of “a different kind of neighborhood,” what Princen seems to suggest is that 
they are not completely essential. That is, he proceeds to argue that the fundamental lesson we, 
who do not enjoy these special conditions, can derive from the Toronto Island case is “that a 
sufficient level of automobile access can be deliberately chosen by a community . . . —at least at 
scales such as this” (LS, 291-292, 303, 313). Thus, although Princen in one instance argues that 
the ‘Gap’ between Toronto Island and the mainland constituted “a boundary as distinct as 
national boundaries or formidable mountain ranges[, yet] . . . separated . . . not peoples but modes 
of access [and, consequently,] . . . modes of living,” what he does not appear to take into serious 
consideration is the possibility that this same Gap also signifies a difference between the 
discursive terrain, and hence, the subjectivity, of the islanders and the mainlanders—a difference 
that may be essential to the islanders’ capacity for enduring resistance against the demands of the 
Metro. That is to say, it is possible that the subjectivity of the islanders may have become 
constituted in a manner that affords them more autonomy and recalcitrance than the mainlanders: 
firstly, owing to the physical distance between the islands and the mainland, which augments the 
island community’s cohesion and sense of independence; secondly, owing to the rebellious 
tradition that is adhered to by the islanders and that is relatively absent from the discursive terrain 
of the (disciplinary/bio-power) mainland; and thirdly, owing to what amounts to an anti-
disciplinary discursive infrastructure which underpins Toronto Island life. As such, although 
many of the islanders would by day have to work on the mainland which swarms with 
disciplinary/bio-power discourses and micro-techniques, their jealously guarded ‘home ground’ 
is, albeit implicitly or inadvertently, organized in a manner antagonistic to the hierarchical, 
panoptical, mechanistic, and persecutory operations of most of their places of work—with the 
consequence that island residence allows them a recurrent reprieve from disciplinary/bio-power, 
and hence, facilitates the constitution of their subjectivity in a manner that is not as docile, 
prostrate, and infantilized as the subjectivity of mainlanders, who experience no such reprieve. 
For instance, on Toronto Island, rather than being constantly driven by some or other activity that 
has to be done as efficiently (i.e. in as disciplined a manner) as possible, people live 
spontaneously: they “stroll up and down, stop for a bite to eat, and talk with fellow passersby” in 
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a manner so foreign to contemporary (disciplinary/bio-power) domains that one would, as 
Princen points out, assume that “the scene is . . . a vestige of former times, . . . or is . . . created 
for tourists[, while i]t just happens day in and day out, in part, apparently, because it is tradition 
and in part because people just seem to enjoy it.” Further, rather than constantly regimenting their 
activities with reference to what is tantamount to the disciplinary timetable, the islanders’ 
“personal interaction . . . differs from the means of association common in modern life . . . 
[insofar as t]here is no schedule, no appointments, no reservations” (LS, 327). In addition, in 
diametric opposition to the disciplinary/bio-power imperative of partitioning space in such a way 
that individuals are allocated a specific place in which to perform their tasks, with the partitioned 
spaces, in turn, operating as functional sites that “correspond not only to the need to supervise, to 
break dangerous communications, but also to create a useful space” (DP, 142-144), as Princen 
himself explains, the street life enjoyed in places like Toronto Island “has little segmentation, 
little specialized functioning that would make for ‘efficient’ use of space and time” (LS, 329). 
Also, the Toronto Island community is not organized, implicitly or explicitly, in terms of a 
system of rank through which everyone is individualized, (and discriminated against and 
alienated from others), by being placed “within a field of power relations” (DP, 146-147). Rather, 
the very architecture of the domain obviates rank and its accompanying discrimination and 
alienation: among other things, a community meeting house invites the participation of all in the 
affairs of the islands, while the streets themselves “are profoundly egalitarian: everyone has equal 
opportunity to transport oneself and use the street as one wishes; there is no membership and no 
exclusion[, and] . . . the participants employ technologies that do not exclude others” (LS, 314, 
327). To sum up, Princen frames such differences between the kind of life enjoyed by those on 
Toronto Island and the existence of those in ordinary societies as attractive, but if one takes into 
consideration the role of discourse in the formation of subjectivity, such differences should, 
perhaps, be framed as imperative. This is because the relative absence, of disciplinary/bio-power 
discourses and the associated micro-techniques of hierarchical observation, normalizing 
judgment and the examination, from the domain of Toronto Island—an absence that has been 
safeguarded both by the geographical distance between this unique domain and the mainland, and 
by the long-standing tradition of (anti-disciplinary) recalcitrance upheld by the islanders—may 
certainly have contributed to the formation of the islanders’ subjectivity in a way that is at least 
partially different from the subjectivity of mainlanders. In short, when they are at home, the 
islanders not only experience a reprieve from the discourses and micro-techniques of 
disciplinary/bio-power, and hence, a weakening of the constitution of their subjectivity around 
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notions of docility, prostration, and infantilization. In addition, the special conditions and the way 
of life promoted at home, on the island, works against such docility, prostration, and 
infantilization, as evinced in the fact that the islanders treasure the difference between their home 
and the city, jealously guard their alternative way of life, fight for their independence as a 
community, and promote the Toronto Island legacy of deviance from the status quo—a deviance 
that, far from being petulant or infantile, is founded on social and environmental responsibility. 
Thus, this case, too, arguably shows that subjectivity, far from being Kantian in nature, is 
constituted through discourse and influenced by a number of related conditions, in this case that 
of geographical privilege, the weight of tradition, institutional (community) support, and the 
possibility of the daily application of an alternative ethic of existence. 
This leads us to a final question to be addressed, namely, why Princen would think that 
individuals caught up within ordinary conditions and lives would be able to act upon what they 
perceive to be the ‘irrationality’ of something like automobility—a move that would see them 
reject some of society’s most “intensely held beliefs” concerning human wellbeing, in favor of 
adopting an ethic of sufficiency which is completely at odds with the dominant rationality of 
contemporary society that “derives from modern economistic and legalistic thought . . . [and] that 
emphasize[s] the efficient and the judicial” over all else. Perhaps, Princen’s apparent faith in 
ordinary people’s capacity to act without “wait[ing] for their leaders to lead,” stems from his own 
experience, because while he may reside in a disciplinary/bio-power domain, as already 
discussed in Chapter Three, what emerges from his writings is dissidence in relation to, rather 
than subjection beneath, some of the most significant disciplinary/bio-power discourses and 
micro-techniques of contemporary society—a dissidence which is palpable in Princen’s 
criticisms of the drive towards ever greater efficiency, of the mechanization of society, of the 
implications of the (disciplinary) timetable, excessive supervision, overregulation, hyper-
specialization, etcetera (LS, 24, 321, 324, 364). In other words, it appears as though Princen is, 
like Sachs, anything but a cut-and-dried disciplinary/bio-power subject. But if this is the case, 
then it must also be acknowledged that the formation of such a dissident type of subjectivity, like 
the formation of the alternative subjectivities of those individuals/groups Princen posits as 
exemplars of restrained, pro-environmental behavior, is in great part facilitated by an amalgam of 
special conditions that are not enjoyed by most people. First of all, as discussed in relation to 
Sachs, a great deal of discerning intelligence and determination is required if one is, out of one’s 
own, to implicitly or explicitly reject the dominant dictates of disciplinary/bio-power society and 
to demand the adoption of an alternative ethical framework—an orientation that is 
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overwhelmingly palpable in Princen’s work. Second, the existence of the kind of dissident 
subjectivity reflected in Princen’s text, is, arguably, contingent not only upon such personal 
aptitude and determination, but also upon a number of other conditions that make possible the 
reconstitution of subjectivity in the midst of disciplinary/bio-power society, through allowing the 
individual the time and space necessary to attain conceptual distance from dominant societal 
discourses (mathēsis), and to apply themselves, on a daily basis, in a manner underpinned by 
alternative discourses (askēsis). And academia is precisely one of the few remaining spaces 
within which one could enjoy such privileges: a place where at least pockets of dissidence are 
permitted, and indeed funded. As such, if one is in a position in which one can embrace the role 
of ‘dissident academic,’ one is able to occupy oneself in the study of oppositional discourses for 
one’s entire life—discourses that one inevitably internalizes and that, accordingly, influence 
one’s thoughts, one’s teaching, one’s writings, and one’s life in general. Arguably, the 
reconstitution of subjectivity is here, again, revealed to be contingent upon the discursive terrain 
in which one finds oneself, as well as influenced by related conditions such as exceptional 
aptitude, privilege, institutional support, and the possibility of application. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
While certain discursive, personal and other conditions, such as those mentioned above, may 
allow for the formation of a type of subjectivity alternative to the docile, prostrate and 
infantilized type produced through the discourses and micro-techniques of disciplinary/bio-
power, as I indicated earlier, they are not necessarily conditions that the majority of people enjoy. 
Arguably, not everyone has the intelligence and determination necessary to identify the 
problematic discourses of their society, to reject them, and to engage in the arduous process of 
reconstituting their subjectivity with reference to an alternative ethical framework that they have 
constructed from scratch. And further still, even if individuals are sufficiently intelligent and 
determined, they may not have the benefit of the other conditions required for the reconstitution 
of subjectivity in the midst of disciplinary/bio-power society. For instance, they may not have the 
luxury of time to engage in the study and the assimilation of texts antagonistic to the profiteering, 
technocentric, and egotistical mores of contemporary society, and very many do not work in a 
professional environment where conceptual and behavioral deviance from the status quo would 
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ever be tolerated—this is something that Princen himself acknowledges when he advances that 
“many leaders know fundamental change must occur[, yet] . . . pursuing such change would be 
political suicide in any society wedded to scientific and technological knowledge, in a society 
that embraces freewheeling markets and promotes the proliferation of goods and services those 
markets generate” (LS, 9). However, it is precisely such time and such institutional support which 
make possible the application, and consequently, the effective subjectivation, of alternative 
discourses that allow for the gradual dismantling of disciplinary/bio-power subjectivity and the 
concomitant reconstitution of subjectivity in a manner that affords the individual the nuanced 
form of autonomy necessary for meaningful and enduring environmental and political 
engagement. 
In the light of this, it is possible that, relatively speaking, only a handful of people are able 
to cultivate a nuanced form of autonomy through engagement in what is tantamount to an (anti-
disciplinary) ethic of the self in the contemporary era. Cognitive deliberation alone will not get us 
there, because rather than being Kantian, we are inherently discursive animals—discursively 
constituted as subjects and equally reliant on alternative discourses for the reconstitution of 
ourselves as subjects of thought and of action. And this leads us to perhaps the most pressing of 
all questions: what is one then to do about the crucial civilizational change for which Sachs and 
Princen hope? How is one to engender such change if people are unable, for an array of personal 
and circumstantial reasons, to cultivate an ethic of existence which works against the docility, 
prostration and infantilization effected through disciplinary/bio-power? Perhaps the answer lies 
not in constructing an alternative ethic of existence from the ground up, but rather in reviving 
long-standing traditions that may for the moment be lying dormant in our discursive terrain, but 
that are possessed of (potentially) workable ethical frameworks—frameworks that, if reactivated 
and brought to bear, firstly, upon the problems of docility, prostration and infantilization on the 
subject side, and secondly, upon the problems of social and environmental injustice within 
society at large, may just be able to facilitate the reconstitution of the subjectivity of the many in 
a way that would enable mass revolt against the existing technological, political and economic 
trajectories of our time. While a comprehensive address of this, and other, possibilities for 
engendering civilizational transformation far exceeds the scope of this dissertation, I tentatively 
explore them in the Conclusion of this work, in an effort both to map out a future research 
trajectory and, above all, to affirm that pro-environmental change is possible to achieve—if 
approached from a complexity perspective that focuses the critical analytic gaze not only on 
deleterious technological, political and economic trends of society, but also on the problematic 
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discursive production of the subjectivity of those individuals who are to be the main catalysts for 
such change. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
Within this dissertation, I have explicitly allied myself with those who Clapp and Dauvergne 
refer to as the social greens and the bioenvironmentalists—the environmental theorists and 
activists who unequivocally oppose “the way we have organized political and economic life on 
the planet,”183
Sachs’ and Princen’s criticisms of the technological, political and economic dimensions 
of contemporary society are of immense value, especially in virtue of their disclosure of the 
frequently concealed, yet exceptionally detrimental, effects of, among other contemporary 
processes, unabated technological proliferation and open-ended economic development. 
However, I nevertheless maintain that the highly conceptual approach that they adopt in order to 
instigate individual behavioral change is not informed by an accurate conception of individual 
subjectivity. In short, to the extent that Sachs and Princen (at least in the above-mentioned texts) 
principally work with hypotheses concerning certain of our thoughts, ideas and beliefs that can be 
directly related to what is tantamount to the DSP, and thereby operate at the general level of 
cognitive content, they do not give due consideration to the complexities of the predominantly 
non-cognitive/non-conscious processes involved in the formation of individual subjectivity, and 
thereby miss an important dimension in the explanation of human behavior. That is to say, Sachs’ 
 and who for this reason advance that a fundamental transformation of individual 
behavior is required if we are to reorganize our societies in the interest of long-term survival. In 
an effort to identify the approach that social greens and bioenvironmentalists adopt in the hope of 
bringing about just such individual behavioral change, I focused on the most recent (single-
authored) texts of two prominent environmental theorists, namely those of the social green, 
Wolfgang Sachs, and of the bioenvironmentalist, Thomas Princen. And what my study of Sachs’ 
Planet Dialectics and Princen’s The Logic of Sufficiency brought to light is that these theorists, 
for the most part, focus within these texts on hypotheses concerning certain of our thoughts, ideas 
and beliefs that can be directly related to the ‘dominant social paradigm’ (DSP) of contemporary 
society—in a word, through their writings, they problematize their readers’ continued adherence 
to a paradigm that, essentially, instills an ecological apathy of sorts in individuals, owing to the 
fact that through it, the technological, political and economic trajectories of the contemporary era 
are framed as generally benevolent rather than as environmentally and socially malevolent.  
                                                 
183 Clapp and Dauvergne, Paths to a Green World, 8. 
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and Princen’s focus on cognitive content suggests that they adhere to a Kantian conception of 
autonomy, in terms of which individuals are conceived as rational beings, situated in a position 
not fundamentally determined by discourse, who give themselves the (moral) law—which 
renders them capable of changing their perspectives and patterns of behavior following cognitive 
deliberation. But other theories concerning the constitution of subjectivity, such as those of 
Foucault, problematize this Kantian conception of autonomy. In the case of a Foucaultian 
perspective—from which I write—individuals are construed not as entities capable of distancing 
themselves from all discourse, but on the contrary, as entities that are discursively produced. In 
terms of such a perspective, then, the constitution of individual subjectivity emerges as being far 
more complex, and the question of autonomy as being far more troublesome, than any Kantian 
perspective would admit. That is, as I attempted to show within the third and fourth chapters of 
this dissertation, if one acknowledges the role of discourse in the formation of subjectivity, it 
firstly becomes problematic to project onto the individual absolute rationality and autonomy—all 
the more so in the contemporary world, dominated as it is by disciplinary/bio-power discourses, 
through which subjectivity is produced as docile, prostrate, and infantilized. Also, if one admits 
to this possibility that individual subjectivity is discursively produced rather than ‘given’ in any 
Kantian sense, what one has secondly to reconsider is the approach that may have to be adopted 
in order to facilitate individual behavioral change. That is to say, if subjectivity is constituted 
through discourse—and at that, constituted around notions of docility, prostration, and 
infantilization in the present era—then pro-environmental behavioral change cannot spring from 
cognitive deliberation concerning the negative aspects of the technological, political and 
economic trajectories of contemporary society alone. Instead, as I attempted to show through the 
example of the practices of the first/second century C.E. Hellenistic/Roman cultures of the self, it 
would also be necessary for individuals to become critically aware of those discourses through 
which their own subjectivity has hitherto been constituted, and further still, to carefully select, 
and constantly subjectivize through conceptual effort and practical application, alternative 
discourses with reference to which they wish themselves to be reconstituted as subjects of 
thought and of action.  
 To sum up, if this is what it would take to facilitate the pro-environmental civilizational 
change for which Sachs and Princen hope—owing both to the (disciplinary/bio-power) discursive 
constitution of contemporary subjectivity around docility, prostration and infantilization, and to 
the consequent compounding of the complexity involved in growing a nuanced form of autonomy 
by reconstituting one’s subjectivity through an ethic/culture of the self—it is highly unlikely that 
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the majority of contemporary individuals would (or even could) engage in such an exercise. That 
is to say, as indicated in Chapter Four, while certain pockets of individuals are fortunate enough 
to be born into (marginal) cultures/traditions that prize independence and environmental care and 
that encourage the formation of a corresponding type of subjectivity, and while a select few who 
live in mainstream society harbor the personal capacity for, and enjoy external conditions 
conducive to, the uptake of an (anti-disciplinary) ethic of existence through which they can 
reconstitute their subjectivity and cultivate a nuanced form of autonomy, for the most part people 
do not find themselves in either of these two positions. And it is for this reason that I believe it to 
be necessary to find alternative means of effecting large-scale pro-environmental change—within 
the discursive parameters of dominant/popular institutions themselves. In other words, insofar as 
I hold that a reconstitution of individual subjectivity, (through processes involving more than 
mere cognitive deliberation), is required for the effective transformation of individual 
perspectives and behaviors, and insofar as I understand the subjectivity of the majority of 
individuals to be constituted to a significant degree through the discourses and micro-techniques 
that dominant/popular institutions disseminate and employ, I advance the necessity of attempting 
to alter the foci of these institutions—such that they begin to disseminate discourses that counter 
those that dominate at present, and do away with those micro-techniques that together with 
dominant discourses operate to produce contemporary subjectivity as docile, prostrate, and 
infantilized. As such, importantly, when I speak of such a thing as ‘institutional transformation,’ I 
do not focus on the alteration of government legislation or the modification of the modi operandi 
of immensely powerful economic institutions such as the World Bank and the WTO. Rather, 
insofar as I embrace the social green/bioenvironmentalist view that pro-environmental 
civilizational change can only be effected through a bottom-up approach, in future research on 
possible institutional transformation, I will focus on the reorientation of dominant/popular 
institutions that harbor the potential to instigate a mass transformation of subjectivity, from the 
ground up. Three significant examples of such institutions, to which we now briefly turn, are the 
media, the school, and religion. 
Owing to its pervasiveness, the mass media exercise an immense influence over 
contemporary subjects at a discursive level. We not only engage with interactive media on a daily 
basis,184
                                                 
184 The internet, which is one example of such media, is not focused upon within the subsequent discussion, but it 
does constitute a potential tool for discursive transformation. See Robert Paehlke’s Democracy’s Dilemma: 
Environment, Social Equity, and the Global Economy for an exceptionally optimistic perspective on the role of the 
 but have also just about accepted as a given the idea that it is completely fitting to 
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dedicate some of the larger portions of our day to the consumption of visual media. 
Unfortunately, however, for the most part the discourses that are disseminated through the mass 
media today do not involve significantly widespread problematization of the technological, 
political and economic dimensions of our societies, nor of the (correlative) approach that we 
adopt in relation to our own identity, to our dealings with others, and to the natural world 
surrounding us. For example, in terms of ‘U.S. mainstream’ cinematic products, which enjoy 
global acclaim, more often than not forms of technology are implicitly or explicitly valorized, 
audiences are encouraged to become increasingly acquisitive, especially by way of product 
placement within films, and human wellbeing is equated with monetary gain through rags-to-
riches tales. In other instances, individual fulfillment is portrayed as being dependent not on an 
understanding of the world and of one’s place within it, but upon the augmentation of one’s 
physical beauty or sexual allure, while individual subjectivity itself is often represented not as 
discursively constructed and hence as (ultimately) malleable, but rather as something integral, 
irretrievably marked by earlier experiences of trauma, and fathomable only through the mediation 
of an other, be it a priest or a psychiatrist. That said, though, there has of late emerged from 
within the U.S. film industry itself a number of films and documentaries that display an explicitly 
environmental focus, and that feature either famous Hollywood actors or prominent 
contemporary politicians who have, arguably, played a decisive role in the popularizing of these 
cinematic works. 
Perhaps the most notable feature films, with an explicitly pro-environmental focus, that 
have been produced in the last few years are Shyamalan’s The Happening and Derrickson’s The 
Day the Earth Stood Still.185
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Zavestoski’s article, “Virtual Environmental Citizenship: Web-Based Public Participation in Rule Making in the 
United States,” for a more circumspect appraisal of its potential as an instrument of change. Robert C. Paehlke, 
Democracy’s Dilemma: Environment, Social Equity, and the Global Economy (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 
2004); and David Schlosberg, Stuart W. Shulman and Stephen Zavestoski, “Virtual Environmental Citizenship: 
Web-Based Public Participation in Rule Making in the United States,” in Environmental Citizenship, eds. Andrew 
Dobson and Derek Bell (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2006), 207-236. 
 The narrative of The Happening, which stars Mark Wahlberg as a 
secondary school science teacher, Elliot Moore, revolves around the mysterious occurrence of 
185 The Happening, dir. M. Night Shyamalan (Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation, 2008); and The Day the 
Earth Stood Still, dir. Scott Derrickson (Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation, 2008). Another important, though 
less recent, film that involves an implicit criticism of the way in which technology has, under the auspices of 
capitalism and mass consumerism, grown autonomous to the point where it controls humankind itself, is Sonzero’s 
Pulse. In an earlier study, I placed particular emphasis on this film’s important (but unwitting) problematization of 
the assumption, propagated via contemporary cultural products such as mainstream film, that there is no need to 
revolt against the dehumanization that proceeds from the ‘technocentrism’ of postmodernity. In this regard, see Inge 
Konik, “Thematizing the Ugly Side of Sublime Technological Development: Sonzero’s Pulse (2006) as an 
Inadvertent Critique of the ‘Technocentrism’ of Postmodernity,” South African Journal of Art History 20/3 (2007): 
46-54. 
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people committing suicide en masse all across the northeastern United States. Moore, and a group 
of others, attempt to evade this particular fate by fleeing to a different region; however, along the 
way they learn that there is no such escape, since the mass suicides are triggered by a neurotoxin 
emitted by plants in their effort to defend themselves against humankind’s persistent abuses of 
the natural environment. Nevertheless, during the course of their journey, Moore and his 
companions do discover that to have even a marginal chance of surviving this happening, they 
must travel in the smallest of groups possible, because any accumulation of people in a number 
that plants sense as a significant enough threat would trigger their chemical self-defense 
mechanism. From the denouement of the film, it is evident that this happening ceases in the 
United States, but it does appear to erupt in France—with experts warning that this could be only 
the beginning of far greater events that may threaten the survival of an unwitting humankind in 
the future. Notably, though, despite this film’s potential to operate as an allegory of sorts, for the 
kinds of unanticipated acts of revenge that nature may exact on us if we continue in our unabated 
pillaging of the environment, the reviews of The Happening barely explored this dimension of the 
cinematic text. For example, while negative reviews of the film targeted its lack of suspense or 
the perceived absurdity of its plot, even the positive reviews it received were for the most part 
focused on its daring and playful theme, rather than on the possibility that it contains a very real 
cautionary message which is anything but trifling.  
The Day the Earth Stood Still involves a similar exploration of the possibility that the 
future of humankind is imperiled if we continue in our unreserved exploitation of the planet. The 
narrative of this film revolves around the arrival, upon earth, of an alien known as Klaatu (played 
by Keanu Reeves), who, accompanied by a destroyer robot, is intent on eradicating the entire 
human race in order to safeguard this planet—which extraterrestrials deem infinitely valuable 
owing to its capacity to sustain complex forms of life. However, during his time on earth, Klaatu 
becomes acquainted with a small group of people who, by way of their actions and their words, 
convince him that humankind is worth saving. That is to say, these individuals persuade him that, 
despite all appearances to the contrary, people do in fact harbor the potential to alter their 
perspectives and behaviors in order to avert the wholesale destruction of the environment on 
which they depend. And on the basis of this renewed faith in humanity, Klaatu sacrifices himself 
rather than allowing the destroyer robot to exterminate the human race. Yet, what is perhaps most 
significant about this denouement, from an environmental point of view, is that Klaatu’s sacrifice 
is accompanied by the permanent debilitation of every single technological device on the 
planet—this not only indicates that it is principally by way of technology that humankind has 
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inflicted destruction upon the planet, but also constitutes a major indictment of humans’ 
incapacity to restrain themselves if they continue to have technology at their disposal. 
Unfortunately though, in spite of the explicitly pro-environmental and anti-technocentric 
orientation of this film, very few reviews of The Day the Earth Stood Still made mention thereof. 
For the most part, the film received negative reviews, in which criticism was principally leveled 
at its static plot or at the uninspired acting of the central characters; and when positive appraisals 
were made, these were focused not on the pro-environmental bent of this film but rather on its 
‘big budget’ appearance. Be that as it may, the production of The Day the Earth Stood Still 
remains notable, particularly because this film—which constitutes a remake of a 1951 film of the 
same name that thematized the imminent threat of nuclear warfare—was consciously remodeled 
into a pro-environmental cautionary tale. That is, just as the 1951 film focused on the nuclear 
issue that plagued the world during the Cold War era, the 2008 film, by way of the character of 
Klaatu, explores the most pressing crisis of our time, namely the degree to which we have, 
because of our greed and lack of reflection concerning the rapid pace of technological (and 
economic) development, endangered not only future generations of humans but the survival of all 
forms of life on the planet. To sum up, the environmentally conscious orientation, shared by this 
cinematic text and The Happening, allows for at least some measure of optimism concerning the 
possibility that the U.S. film industry could decisively contribute to the dissemination of 
discourses that encourage viewers to reconsider how their gratuitous behavior may jeopardize life 
on earth—and in so doing play an important role in altering the discursive trajectory of 
mainstream society. Very importantly, though, the predominantly negative appraisals of these 
two films provide some indication of the degree to which they are, at a discursive level, swamped 
by films that endorse the status quo at technological, political and economic levels—and so much 
so that their environmental bent is ridiculed or downplayed rather than valued and focused in 
upon, assuming that it is registered at all. 
However, documentary films that are explicitly (and even aggressively) centered on 
environmental issues may prove to be far more successful than feature films, such as those 
mentioned above, in motivating environmental consciousness—as is evident from the worldwide 
acclaim enjoyed by both Guggenheim’s An Inconvenient Truth and Petersen and Conners’ The 
11th Hour.186
                                                 
186 An Inconvenient Truth, dir. Davis Guggenheim (Paramount Vantage, 2006); and The 11th Hour, dir. Leila Conners 
Petersen and Nadia Conners (Warner Independent Pictures, 2007). 
 An Inconvenient Truth focuses on the efforts made by Al Gore, the former Vice 
President of the United States, to raise awareness concerning our dire environmental 
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circumstances. In the main, the documentary focuses on Gore’s slideshow, which he has 
presented in countless cities across the globe, and through which he attempts to communicate the 
reality of global warming in as clear a manner as possible; this includes accounts of the 
(predominantly human-driven) causes of the phenomenon, its adverse environmental and social 
effects, and what can be done to mitigate it before the future of all of the species on the planet is 
placed in jeopardy. Notably, owing to such translation of the complex scientific arguments 
concerning global warming into a language that is conceptually accessible to the ordinary 
individual, Gore has been accused of ‘dumbing down’ what are inherently multifaceted and 
unpredictable processes. However, one can appreciate his as an attempt to drive home those facts 
of climate change most relevant to the audience he is addressing—for instance, the fact that 
unreflective human economic activity, (a product of which is ever-increasing volumes of 
greenhouse gas emissions), is one of the foremost causes of global warming, and the fact that 
such human activity can, by implication, be framed as being responsible for the many 
environmental problems and social catastrophes that are plaguing us in the present. That is to say, 
on the one hand, Gore pays much attention to thematizing that humankind and planet earth are on 
a collision course: firstly, insofar as the population explosion of the human species has resulted in 
us exceeding, or coming very close to exceeding, the earth’s carrying capacity; secondly, insofar 
as our rapid scientific and technological advancements have not seen us reject those ‘archaic’ 
dirty technologies that damage the ecosystem; and, thirdly, insofar as these scientific and 
technological advancements have also not been accompanied by any development, on our part, of 
sensitivity concerning the urgent need to change our behavioral patterns in order not to endanger 
the entire future of life on earth. And on the other hand—arguably in order to instigate in his 
audiences the development of precisely such sensitivity—Gore goes to a great deal of trouble to 
bring attention to the devastating environmental and social consequences of the insatiable human 
economic activity that characterizes the present day. For example, he emphasizes how such 
human activity has resulted in an inordinate escalation of greenhouse gas emissions, which, in 
turn, have caused an unprecedented melting of the polar regions of our planet, with potentially 
devastating effects on ocean currents, ecosystems, and sea levels; also, he shows that this same 
increase in emissions can be causally linked to ocean acidification, the rise in ocean temperatures, 
the strengthening of deadly storms, the high incidence of enormous wildfires and fatal heat 
waves, and the reduction of soil moisture on a global scale. Further, within his slideshow, Gore 
thematizes the flooding and the desertification that ensue from our indiscriminate pillaging of 
forests, and tries his utmost to prove to his audience, by way of examples and projections, that 
 184 
our industrial activities and the overconsumption that accompanies them adversely affect the 
natural world surrounding us in extraordinarily severe (and frequently irreversible) ways—ways 
to which the majority of the world population remains oblivious. 
The documentary also focuses on what, according to Gore, provided him with the 
personal motivation to tackle our environmental problems, such as his direct experience of farm 
life and his consequent development of appreciation for the natural world and sensitivity towards 
the changes it has undergone owing to excessive industrial activity; having the opportunity to 
learn about climate change early on in his academic study; how his failure in the presidential race 
freed him up to dedicate himself wholeheartedly to the problem of climate change; etcetera. But 
what is perhaps even more significant is that within the documentary, Gore also proceeds to 
attribute our apathy in the face of legitimate scientific evidence indicating the self-destructive 
path that we are traversing, to three particular things. Firstly, he argues, people fail to act on the 
scientific evidence of global warming because of the mixed messages that they receive 
concerning the existence of this phenomenon—for instance, politicians are very hesitant to 
acknowledge its seriousness, climate change skeptics constantly cast aspersions on its actuality 
and frame the likes of Gore as madmen, and in the mass media global warming is frequently 
portrayed as nothing other than scaremongering—all of which instigates confusion rather than 
clarity of purpose in the minds of ordinary individuals across the world. Secondly, from Gore’s 
perspective, people are not changing their behavioral patterns because they believe that they have 
to side either with the economy or with the environment. However, he advances that we do not 
have the luxury of choice, since neither the economy, nor anything else, will continue to exist if 
we have destroyed the natural environment, our only life-support system. And thirdly, Gore 
thinks that people fail to embrace more environmental ways of life because even if they do 
realize that global warming is in fact occurring and that it will have devastating effects in the 
future, they believe that it is too large a problem for them to address as individuals. Yet, as Gore 
emphatically states time and again throughout the documentary, every person is capable of 
making a contribution towards the mitigation of our climate crisis, be it by becoming more 
selective in his/her consumption of goods, by demanding more environmental responsibility from 
municipalities through, for example, pressuring the latter to adopt clean technologies, or by 
speaking with family, friends and others, about the environmental problems that are caused by us, 
and which we have to solve if we want future generations to have the chance of leading normal 
lives. In short, for Gore, we have the technological capacity to adopt a more ecologically 
sustainable pattern of existence, but we lack the determination of will; and it is for this reason 
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that he sets about communicating the realities of climate change person-by-person, and city-by-
city.      
The above-mentioned threefold reason that Gore provides for our ecological apathy may 
be found wanting, to the extent that it does not take into account the role of disciplinary/bio-
power discourses in the formation of (an inherently infantilized) contemporary subjectivity, and, 
by implication, in no way calls individual autonomy into question. But the documentary, as a 
whole, is valuable for its unequivocal identification of unrestrained human economic activity as 
the principal catalyst for environmental disaster, for its clarity in presenting what is ultimately a 
highly complex climatic problem, and for its emphasis on the idea that every single individual 
can in fact make changes in his/her own life to alleviate our environmental crisis. For the most 
part, An Inconvenient Truth was very well received: millions of people across the world went to 
see it, the majority of film critics showered nothing but praise upon it, it won numerous awards, 
and it caught the attention of a number of governments—several of which either recommended 
its viewing in general, or purchased copies thereof for their schools. When, however, this 
documentary has been subject to criticism, attacks upon it (and, in particular, upon the person of 
Al Gore), have been scathing to say the least. For instance, subsequent to the release of the 
documentary, certain film critics, journalists, and climate change skeptics, proceeded to label 
Gore an alarmist who represents our effect on the planet as far worse than it really is; others went 
so far as to suggest Gore to be an opportunist who is ‘cashing in’ on the global warming 
‘propaganda’ that he has been espousing through this documentary and other media;187 the 
National Science Teachers Association (NSTA) in the United States refused the offer of fifty 
thousand free copies of the documentary, fearing that acceptance may jeopardize funding for 
their Association from certain quarters in the future; and some of the scientific claims advanced 
in the documentary would later be pointedly problematized within Durkin’s The Great Global 
Warming Swindle.188
                                                 
187 In 2004, Al Gore and David Blood set up Generation Investment Management, a very successful sustainable 
investment film that is run in accordance with the principle that “raw capitalism” does not constitute a suitable 
economic trajectory for society, precisely because it does not meet the requirements of ecological and social 
sustainability. As Gore and Blood point out, theirs is an investment firm that accepts as fact that “business—and by 
extension the capital markets—need to change,” since society is “too focused on the short term: quarterly earnings, 
instant opinion polls, rampant consumerism and living beyond our means.” David Blood, quoted in Leo Hickman, 
“We Will Create Green New Deal, Says Gore: Global Campaigner and Investment Sidekick Call for ‘Sustainable 
Capitalism,’” The Guardian, March 14, 2009; and Al Gore and David Blood, “We Need Sustainable Capitalism: 
Nature Does Not Do Bailouts” (2008), Generation Investment Management LLP. Available from 
http://www.generationim.com/sustainability/advocacy/sustainable-capitalism.html. 
 It would be difficult to dispute the idea that such reactions, both positive 
and negative, are manifest proof of the monumental impact of An Inconvenient Truth at a global 
188 The Great Global Warming Swindle, dir. Martin Durkin (WAGtv, 2007). 
 186 
level—an impact that is understandable if one considers the increasing mediation of reality, and 
the consequent embrace of visual media rather than written texts as the primary sources of 
legitimate information. Unfortunately, however, it is for precisely these same reasons that this 
documentary was robbed of a significant amount of its critical discursive potential, since other 
media products that enjoyed similar global attention, proceeded to cast doubt upon both the 
personal sincerity of Al Gore and the scientific veracity of the claims made in An Inconvenient 
Truth.189
That said, though, the acclaim enjoyed by Guggenheim’s documentary may well have 
played some role in encouraging the production of another documentary film that seeks to 
instigate environmental consciousness, namely The 11th Hour, narrated by Hollywood film icon, 
Leonardo DiCaprio. Briefly, what is thematized within this documentary is that humankind has 
inflicted its greedy, destructive side upon this planet to such an extent that we have literally made 
the biosphere sick. That is, because we discovered ways to tap into “ancient sunlight” in the form 
of coal and oil, and because our subsequent use of such (non-renewable) fossil fuels has been 
guided by our erroneous ideas that nature constitutes a resource to be used rather than a life-
support system to be preserved, and that unlimited growth is not only eminently possible but also 
highly desirable, we have succeeded in generating not only an immense amount of products, but 
also an immense amount of pollution. And this latter ‘by-product’ of our rampant economic 
development and consumerism, together with a global population explosion which has placed 
even greater pressure on the earth’s carrying capacity, have precipitated our contemporary 
environmental crisis: species loss is occurring on a global scale; indiscriminate deforestation is 
taking place despite scientific evidence linking it to desertification; air and water pollution are 
continuing unabated. Further, while climate change is discussed far more generally in The 11th 
Hour than it was in An Inconvenient Truth, what is interesting is that in the later documentary, 
this phenomenon is framed as the revenge of nature upon humankind. In short, what is advanced 
is that humans have unreflectively harmed this planet and its organisms for centuries, but that the 
tide has turned—that through climate change, nature is now threatening the human species itself, 
by way of colossal wildfires, powerful storms, large-scale desertification, unprecedented 
 
                                                 
189 The author has witnessed the degree to which, even at the local level of the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
University, An Inconvenient Truth has been subject to ridicule, particularly subsequent to the screening of The Great 
Global Warming Swindle. That is to say, at the first mention of “Gore’s documentary,” students—especially those 
who resist any problematization of the current technological, political and economic trajectories of contemporary 
society—defend their embrace of the status quo by referring to the “fact” that The Great Global Warming Swindle 
has discredited the claims made by Gore in An Inconvenient Truth. What is perhaps most worrying about such 
reactions is that students, although evidently extremely well acquainted with the content of Durkin’s documentary, 
exhibit only a vague and uncertain recollection of the content of Guggenheim’s. 
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flooding, and potentially, a rise in sea levels that could easily turn millions of people across the 
world into environmental refugees. Notably, in relation to this issue, explicit reference is also 
made both to Al Gore’s efforts at educating the world about climate change, and to the 
astounding fact that, in spite of Gore’s information campaign, it appears as though people have 
still not changed their ways in order to avert global ecological catastrophe. 
Yet, such failure to change is within this documentary ascribed to a number of factors 
other than those thematized by Gore in An Inconvenient Truth. On the one hand, what is 
advanced is that ordinary people have no real voice in the societies of the present, because the 
trajectory of these societies is for the most part dictated by multinational corporations and 
powerful politicians. Accordingly, for primarily economic reasons, these businesses and political 
leaders, firstly, promote unreflective economic globalization; secondly, support the proliferation 
and continued use of dirty technologies; and thirdly, (as Herman Daly points out within this 
documentary), uphold the scientifically invalid neoclassical economic assumption that the 
ecosystem constitutes a mere subsystem of the economy, such that nature—seen as the property 
of humankind—can be used as we see (economically) fit. And, on the other hand, what is also 
advanced by several of the environmentalists and social theorists interviewed in The 11th Hour is 
that the apathy of the ordinary individual can be attributed to a global cultural problem. That is, 
day in and day out, we are swamped by print and television advertisements and other forms of 
mass media that frame consumerism as the source of freedom and contentment; also, we ascribe 
too much legitimacy to the information that is fed us through such media, most of which endorses 
the (un-ecological) technological, political and economic dimensions of contemporary society; 
and finally, we have become so encapsulated within, or “psychically anesthetized” through, such 
media, that we have grown completely oblivious to the (natural) world, to our dependence upon 
it, and to our responsibility towards it. 
The identification of such significant obstacles to engendering even a modicum of 
environmental concern in the individual, does not, however, prevent the narrator, along with 
those interviewed in the documentary, from attempting to educate the viewer concerning the 
development of clean technologies that mimic nature; the use of solar and wind power as realistic 
alternatives to coal and oil; the need to create an entirely new economy and a culture that is not 
centered on consumerism; the possibility of taking personal action to solve our environmental 
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dilemma;190 and so on. Also, very importantly, in the additional interviews released with the 
DVD version of The 11th Hour, these possible solutions are afforded even greater emphasis and 
explanation, and religious perspectives on our environmental crisis are provided—many of which 
focus on the need to overcome our egocentrism, to observe our spiritual duty as custodians of 
(whichever) God’s earth, and to realize that we are endangering the wellbeing of all of the life 
forms on this planet through our (un-spiritual) activities, most notably that of rampant 
consumerism. This documentary, much like An Inconvenient Truth, is arguably deficient in its 
attempt to address the reasons for our continued ecological apathy, insofar as it focuses generally 
on possible economic, political and cultural determinants of such apathy rather than giving 
consideration to the possibility that such apathy may derive from the discursive constitution of 
contemporary subjectivity, around notions of docility, prostration and infantilization. However, 
The 11th Hour does make an important contribution to highlighting our environmental problems, 
the effects that these problems have on species the world over, and the ways in which even the 
ordinary individual can help to solve them. It is likely that aspects such as these, (together with 
the celebrity of DiCaprio), contributed to the largely positive reception of this documentary—the 
notable exception being criticism leveled by Patrick Moore, one of the founders of Greenpeace, 
who accuses The 11th Hour of being little more than “anti-forestry scare tactics,” owing to what 
he perceives as its overemphasis upon the preservation of old-growth forests that, in fact, capture 
far less carbon dioxide than do younger trees.191
On the negative side, then, as I indicated earlier, neither An Inconvenient Truth nor The 
11th Hour adequately address the issue of ecological apathy on the part of the individual, insofar 
as neither documentary seems to take into account the fundamental role that discourse plays in 
constituting contemporary subjectivity around docility and prostration. And added to this, 
although these documentaries are manifestations of a medium that harbors unparalleled potential 
to influence subjectivity—precisely because people spend an inordinate amount of their daily 
lives consuming discursively saturated visual media—they are still hopelessly swamped in 
number by products that endorse, rather than problematize, the (un-ecological) status quo of 
contemporary society. Yet, on the positive side, it is possible that An Inconvenient Truth and The 
11th Hour may engender a ‘domino effect’ of sorts, through encouraging the production of other 
documentaries with an environmental bent—albeit on account of their critical acclaim or 
  
                                                 
190 For instance, it is suggested that all individuals have the power to exercise frugality and discretion in their 
consumption of goods, to learn about environmental problems and speak out against their aggravation, to take 
cognizance of the interrelation of life, etcetera. 
191 Patrick Moore, “An Inconvenient Fact,” The Vancouver Sun, August 29, 2007. 
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financial success rather than their subject matter per se. It is notable that the typically skeptical 
Foucault would himself, in a 1980 interview, indicate the potential of the mass media to reshape 
subjectivity owing to their pervasiveness and to the (discursive) credibility with which they are 
imbued. In this interview Foucault, on the one hand, expresses characteristic concern over the 
preponderance of media products that endorse the status quo, arguing that while there are very 
many people who have the intellectual capacity to question what is usually accepted as given, the 
major obstacle is that these people have very limited means of communicating their thoughts and 
engendering similar curiosity and skepticism in others—that “channels of communication . . . are 
too narrow, almost monopolistic, inadequate.” However, on the other hand, he proceeds to 
emphasize that the existence of this particular problem does not imply that we must abandon the 
mass media as a potential tool of subjective transformation—we should, on the contrary, make a 
great effort to see how we can utilize the mass media to introduce ‘discursive difference’ into the 
domain of general society. Accordingly, Foucault states: 
 
We mustn’t adopt a protectionist attitude, to stop ‘bad’ information from invading and stifling the ‘good.’ 
Rather, we must increase the possibility for movement backward and forward . . . Books, universities, learned 
journals are also information media. One should refrain from calling every channel of information to which 
one cannot or does not wish to gain access a ‘mass medium.’ The problem is to know how to exploit the 
differences, whether we ought to set up a reserve, a ‘cultural park,’ for delicate species of scholars threatened 
by the rapacious inroads of mass information, while the rest of the space would be a huge market for shoddy 
products. Such a division does not seem to . . . correspond to reality [and] . . . it isn’t at all desirable. If useful 
differentiations are to be brought into play, there must not be any such division . . . [P]eople must be 
constantly able to plug into culture and in as many ways as possible. There ought not to be, on the one hand, 
this education to which one is subjected and, on the other, this information one is fed.192
 
   
To sum up, from the (Foucaultian) perspective that people are discursively constituted as 
subjects, and are hence equally reliant on long-term exposure to alternative discourses for the 
reconstitution of themselves as subjects, it is possible that the subjectivity of contemporary 
individuals can over time be reshaped through media products that problematize the 
disciplinary/bio-power discourses that pervade our societies, as well as the technological, 
political and economic trajectories of our world. But the mass media are, perhaps, not the only 
means at our disposal to alter the subjectivity of ordinary individuals, in a manner that would 
reduce the infantilizing effects of disciplinary/bio-power, and concomitantly, allow for the 
                                                 
192 Michel Foucault, “The Masked Philosopher” (1980), in Ethics: Essential Works of Foucault: 1954-1984, ed. Paul 
Rabinow (London: Penguin, 2000), 326-327. 
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cultivation of the nuanced autonomy necessary to actively resist the lure of consumerism, and so 
on. 
In short, in attempts to engender pro-environmental civilizational change, the institution 
of the school may also constitute a deserving avenue of exploration. This is because, if one takes 
into consideration the role of discourse in the formation of subjectivity, the school constitutes 
perhaps the ideal site for encouraging the formation of a different type of subjectivity and the 
embrace of a different set of principles and concerns. Why I argue this to be the case is because 
children are still in the process of being discursively constituted—this, in stark contrast to the 
adult, who is possessed of a thoroughly established disciplinary/bio-power subjectivity, and who 
is thus obliged to undertake arduous processes in order to effectively reconstitute his/her 
subjectivity with reference to alternative discourses which do not render him/her docile, prostrate 
and infantilized. However, Foucault makes it clear that the contemporary school is no less 
carceral, and no less informed by disciplinary/bio-power, than any army barracks or factory. That 
is, he explains that even though it may nowhere be stated explicitly, the school is, at bottom, 
tasked with training children in such a way that they become (politically) obedient and 
(economically) efficient workers later in life. And in its imperative to do so, the institution of the 
school has, firstly, implemented an array of disciplinary mechanisms of control, such as micro-
penalties for even the most marginal of verbal, behavioral, and other, infractions (DP, 178); 
secondly, gone to tremendous efforts “to diminish or minimize . . . affectional relations” between 
schoolchildren, since the development of meaningful friendships may encourage children to 
group together and become unruly;193 and thirdly, taken upon itself the task of placing even 
parents under observation, to the extent that “the bad behaviour of the child, or his absence, is a 
legitimate pretext . . . for one to go and question . . . the parents themselves, to find out . . . 
whether they are determined to root out the vices of their children,” etcetera (DP, 211).194
But to get school administrators to abandon this type of carceral, or disciplinary, 
organization would be very difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. This is because, over the last 
 
                                                 
193 In “Sex, Power, and the Politics of Identity,” Foucault comments on the fact that in schools, above all other 
‘disciplinary’ institutions, attempts are made at instigating rivalry rather than friendship among children—since 
friendship allows individuals to forge bonds that may encourage them to oppose conditions or decisions that they 
perceive to be intolerable or unfair. Accordingly, Foucault advances that “when they started grade schools with 
hundreds of young boys, one of the problems was how to prevent them not only from having sex, of course, but also 
from developing friendships . . . You can find, from the sixteenth century on, texts that explicitly criticize friendship 
as something dangerous.” Michel Foucault, “Sex, Power, and the Politics of Identity” (1982), in Ethics: Essential 
Works of Foucault: 1954-1984, ed. Paul Rabinow (London: Penguin, 2000), 170-171. 
194 As already mentioned in Chapter Three, it is notable that Thomas Princen echoes Foucault on this score; that is, 
he similarly argues that today, schools “routinely instruct children and their parents on the virtues of efficient time 
management” (LS, 81). 
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few centuries, disciplinary/bio-power discourses and micro-techniques have become imbued with 
such credence, and have played such an immense role in the formation of contemporary 
subjectivity, that their influence upon, and presence within, our society and its institutions are 
either simply accepted as given, or vociferously defended as the most effective means of 
fostering an ever more ‘efficient’ and ‘progressive’ society. Therefore, for a school to dismantle 
its disciplinary infrastructure would be perceived as a step backward—as a move that reverses the 
progress that has been made to cultivate in pupils obedience and efficiency, and as one that risks 
fostering in pupils those kinds of vices, (e.g. waywardness and tardiness), that may severely 
jeopardize societal ‘productivity’ in the long run. In brief, then, the dismantling of the 
disciplinary/bio-power infrastructure of the school (and for that matter of society in general), may 
be desirable if one wishes for future generations to enjoy a type of subjectivity that is relatively 
autonomous rather than inherently infantilized; but such dismantling is certainly something that 
will meet with great resistance, and something that is most likely impossible to achieve in time 
for us to resolve our environmental crisis. For this reason, it may be necessary to find a way of 
working, (with a considerable degree of furtiveness), within the school system as is—yet, in the 
interest of working against this same system by sabotaging its discursive production of docile, 
prostrate, and economically useful, subjects.195
In “Encouraging Environmental Citizenship: The Roles and Challenges for Schools,” 
Monica Carlsson and Bjarne Bruun Jensen discuss some important attempts at cultivating in 
schoolchildren at least a certain degree of political recalcitrance, and an ability to effectively 
engage with critical issues in their society. The basic premise advanced by Carlsson and Jensen is 
that schools cannot merely provide pupils with information on our environmental problems, 
because this ‘traditional’ approach does not result in these pupils actually caring about or 
engaging with such problems. Instead, they argue, “education in school must strive to help pupils 
become better at making decisions about their own lives and influencing their surrounding 
environment.”
 
196
                                                 
195 While it can be argued that university students, owing to their maturity, would be more receptive to the embrace 
of an alternative mode of existence, it is possible to advance that primary and secondary schools are, at the least, 
equally viable sites for the formation of alternative subjectivities—owing precisely to the (discursive) youth of the 
participants concerned. 
 And in order for education to facilitate the development of such capacities, 
schools ought to provide children with opportunities both to come to grips with a particular 
environmental/social issue at a theoretical level, and then to become actively involved in 
196 Monica Carlsson and Bjarne Bruun Jensen, “Encouraging Environmental Citizenship: The Roles and Challenges 
for Schools,” in Environmental Citizenship, eds. Andrew Dobson and Derek Bell (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 
2006), 237. 
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criticizing the sources of, and attempting to find workable solutions to, the issue in question. 
Notably, Carlsson and Jensen indicate that some schools in Denmark have in fact attempted to 
provide such opportunities, and imperfect as their attempts may have been, they do proffer 
models for other schools to follow in the future. Perhaps the most significant case that they 
discuss in this regard is that of a number of schools in a Danish municipality that, as part of their 
environmental education program, encouraged pupils to identify pressing local environmental 
problems with the help of their teachers, and then to choose, out of their own, the one 
environmental problem that plagues them the most, and that should, as such, be remedied as soon 
as possible. Somewhat surprisingly, pupils chose traffic as the major issue that needs to be 
addressed, and together with their teachers, their parents, and some politicians, they organized a 
demonstration, demanding the reorganization of traffic and the curbing of speeding, especially 
around schools. Ultimately, these pupils’ actions played some role in instigating, among several 
changes, the reduction of speed limits in the municipal area in general, and the placing of zebra 
crossings near schools. Carlsson and Jensen do, however, point out that the success of this 
undertaking can in large part be attributed to the fact that the local municipality had been 
consulted concerning, and had approved the idea of, traffic reorganization, in advance—which 
explains their supportive attitude towards the demonstration. The problem with this is that a 
similarly supportive attitude cannot be expected either from municipalities that have been 
consulted prior to a demonstration but that have rejected the feasibility of the demands that would 
be made during the demonstration, or from those that are caught off guard because they have not 
been consulted at all. That said, though, even a ‘prearranged’ demonstration such as the one held 
in this particular Danish municipality, allows schoolchildren to grasp, in very real terms, that they 
should criticize intolerable circumstances and that they can facilitate change for the better—this 
much is particularly evident in the sentiments expressed by one of the pupils interviewed, who 
advanced: “Now I just don’t worry, now I’ll phone and complain . . . if there’s any traffic 
problem again. I’ve learned a lot from this. Like giving them a kick in the backside.”197
But this type of undertaking demands much of schools and teachers, not only in terms of 
the logistics of arranging such demonstrations, but also in terms of the obligation to leave things 
up to their pupils—to trust that young people are capable of making decisions and acting upon 
these decisions in an informed and responsible manner. According to Carlsson and Jensen, 
reservations such as these constitute a serious obstacle to fostering in pupils the belief that they 
 
                                                 
197 My emphasis. Carlsson and Jensen, “Encouraging Environmental Citizenship: The Roles and Challenges for 
Schools,” 250. 
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can challenge the sources of, and play a decisive role in rectifying, environmental problems; this 
is mainly because such reservations cause teachers to dictate to pupils what environmental 
problems they should be concerned about, and make them hesitant about allowing children to act 
on environmental problems, particularly outside of school bounds. Owing to these problems, it 
may be necessary to find alternative means of allowing children to ‘grow autonomy’ within the 
domain of the school, that may not have anything to do with any official environmental education 
program run by the school itself.198
                                                 
198 In the context of South African education, what compounds matters even further is that even when mention is 
made of the environment or environmental problems within school textbooks, such mention could easily be 
motivated by an agenda which has more to do with party politics than with environmental care. For instance, 
recently, a young journalist, who provides schoolchildren with supplementary instruction, happened upon the 
following, politically loaded, piece of writing in an ostensibly politically neutral Grade Nine textbook: “The 
members of the ANC [i.e. the African National Congress—the ruling party in South Africa] gave incredibly of their 
time and energy. They hoped to be remembered in history for reducing pollution.” Nica Cornell, “Propaganda in 
Pronoun,” The Times, March 17, 2009. 
 One possibility could be that of working with existing 
marginalia such as enrichment classes; another, which may be far more difficult to implement, 
could be that of introducing into history curricula what may be termed the study of the ‘history of 
the present.’ In either of these two possible undertakings, understanding and finding solutions to 
problems of ‘environment’ would constitute the principal object of focus, but in such study, 
‘environment’ would be conceived in two ways. On the one hand, it would refer to the natural 
environment (and to the social conditions arising from changes in this environment), and would 
therefore require the examination of the roles that technology, politics, economics, and our 
culture of consumerism, play in causing, or exacerbating, our pressing environmental and social 
crises. On the other hand, (and perhaps more fundamentally), in such study ‘environment’ would 
also refer to the discursive environment, and would therefore require the examination of the roles 
that the discourses and micro-techniques that pervade contemporary society and its institutions 
(including the school), play both in robbing contemporary subjects of their potential for relative 
autonomy, independence and frugality, and in engendering in contemporary subjects docility, 
prostration and infantile acquisitiveness. However, if one takes into consideration the pivotal role 
of the institution of the school in the maintenance of the (disciplinary/bio-power) discursive 
‘regime’ of the present, the above approach could be immensely risky and could in a very short 
period of time be met by severe opposition from school bodies. This is because such an approach 
to education would involve nothing short of an attempt at allowing children to understand, from 
the outset of their lives, that in our societies certain things may be said to be true, right, 
benevolent, and timeless, but that they may simply be recently created instruments of power—
and at that, of a type of power that has no ethics or conscience, and that often precipitates 
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intolerable environmental, social, and personal circumstances. Nevertheless, despite the 
challenges that such an approach to education would have to contend with, I strongly believe that 
by fostering critical perspectives in children, and facilitating opportunities for them to act upon 
their newfound critical understanding of a particular institution, practice or occurrence, it would 
be possible to habituate in them the attitude that they do not have to think and behave as our 
(disciplinary/bio-power) society says they should—that they can dissociate themselves, 
conceptually and in practice, from problematic dominant discourses, and in the process develop 
an ever-increasing appreciation of their capacity as agents of change.199
 The third institution that I consider to be a viable site for instigating the reorientation (if 
not the complete reconstitution) of subjectivity in the not-too-distant future, is that of religion. 
Arguably, many forms of religion are possessed of at least some remnants of a workable ethical 
framework that, if brought to bear upon the (disciplinary/bio-power) problems of docility, 
prostration and infantilization on the subject side, and the problems of social and environmental 
injustice within society at large, could play a decisive role in facilitating large-scale pro-
environmental change. Otherwise stated, by means of ‘modified’ ethical frameworks, it may be 
possible to discursively reorient the subjectivity of the faithful—that is, those who put more store 
by the ‘spiritual’ than the ‘secular’ dimension of their lives—in a manner that would inspire them 
to establish critical detachment from the dictates of the ‘secular’ world of technocentrism, 
economism, consumerism, etcetera, and to foster a real sense of responsibility towards the 
(natural and social) world within which they find themselves situated.
 In short, developing 
conceptually lucid material to be included within, and finding a means of practically 
implementing, the above-mentioned two-fold study of ‘environment,’ constitutes a crucial avenue 
for future research. From a Foucaultian perspective, such education constitutes a viable means of 
(discursively) shaping children in such a way that they later become individuals who question 
rather than accept, who are carefully recalcitrant rather than blindly obedient, and who aspire to 
become well-informed, (relatively) autonomous political animals rather than mere cogs in the 
technocentric, economistic and consumerist machine that is our contemporary world. 
200
                                                 
199 Foucault, “Truth, Power, Self: An Interview with Michel Foucault,” 11. 
 However, in order for 
200 Foucault himself hinted at the ‘revolutionary’ potential of religion, specifically in his discussions on the Iranian 
Revolution. However, some have criticized Foucault for being far too optimistic about the case of Iran, by pointing 
out that the same ‘return to Islam’ that facilitated this revolutionary event would later be used to legitimate a regime 
of terror. In this respect, see Christian Jambet, “The Constitution of the Subject and Spiritual Practice: Observations 
on L’Histoire de la Sexualité,” in Michel Foucault: Philosopher, trans. Timothy J. Armstrong (New York: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1992), 233-247; Michel Foucault, “Iran: The Spirit of a World Without Spirit” (1979), in Politics, 
Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings 1977-1984, ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman (New York: Routledge, 
1990), 211-224; and Foucault, “Useless to Revolt?,” 449-453. 
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the institution of religion to fulfill such a role of reorienting individual subjectivity, a number of 
problems would need to be decisively addressed—perhaps the most notable of which being 
anthropocentrism, otherworldliness, obedience, and commercialization.  
That is, firstly, some religions are dangerously anthropocentric, in the sense that their 
preoccupation with human concerns leads them to neglecting other, at least equally important, 
problems within the world—be it the wellbeing of other animal species, or the state of the natural 
environment. Herman Daly and John Cobb, two ecological economists who describe themselves 
as Christian theists, are strongly critical of such an anthropocentric tendency even within the 
religion to which they subscribe. Specifically, in For the Common Good: Redirecting the 
Economy Toward Community, the Environment, and a Sustainable Future, they explain that it is 
clear, from Jewish scriptures, that “the land is God’s, not a commodity to be owned by human 
beings” and that even though God cares about human beings more than He cares about any of his 
other creations, “the care for the lilies and for the sparrows is not just for the sake of human 
beings; it is for the lilies and the sparrows themselves.” However, they proceed to argue, this 
early attitude of environmental reverence and care was, unfortunately, not perpetuated in 
Christianity, since the latter “tradition especially in its Protestant form became narrowly focused 
on God and the human soul,” and this orientation led to the “relegation of the rest of creation to 
the status of passive matter to be shaped by human beings to human ends.”201 From Daly and 
Cobb’s argument in this regard, as well as from the testimonies of other proponents of a nuanced 
form of Christianity,202
A second major obstacle to shifting religions into a pro-environmental trajectory is that of 
otherworldliness. Preoccupation with the afterlife constitutes a familiar feature in the discursive 
 it is clear that the ethical framework of Christianity certainly needs to be 
modified through, for instance, including within it the spiritual obligation to revere God’s 
creations, not only because they belong to Him but also because they are valuable in themselves. 
But what is significant, in the case of Christianity, is that for such a notion to be included within 
the ethical framework of this religion, no radical gesture of embracing ‘pagan’ ideas is necessary; 
rather, what is required is merely a return to the pro-environmental teachings of the prophetic 
tradition out of which Christianity developed. 
                                                 
201 Herman E. Daly and John B. Cobb, For the Common Good: Redirecting the Economy Toward Community, the 
Environment, and a Sustainable Future (Boston: Beacon Press, 1994), 385. 
202 For instance, in a feature on religious perspectives included with the DVD version of The 11th Hour, a Christian 
Reverend advances that one of the major problems of religion today, is that the faithful harbor the erroneous idea that 
the earth will always exist and will continue to support life indefinitely; accordingly, they neither take into serious 
consideration the scale of the destruction that humans wreak upon the planet, nor contemplate the possibility that 
such environmental destruction may well be irreversible. 
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landscape of many religious traditions, and such preoccupation with (and belief in) a world that 
awaits one after death can very easily engender in the religious an indifference towards the 
environmental and social crises that blight earthly existence. This is something that Foucault 
himself hints at when, in “Technologies of the Self,” he unfavorably compares the underpinnings 
of Christian asceticism with those of the askēsis undertaken by the Stoics and the Epicureans in 
the first and second centuries C.E. That is to say, albeit implicitly, he criticizes the ‘otherworldly’ 
orientation of Christianity while valorizing the ‘immanent’ orientation of Stoicism, in his 
argument that 
 
in Christianity asceticism always refers to a certain renunciation of the self and of reality because most of the 
time your self is a part of that reality you have to renounce in order to get access to another level of reality . . . 
[But i]n the philosophical tradition dominated by Stoicism, askēsis means not renunciation but the progressive 
consideration of the self, or mastery over oneself, obtained not through the renunciation of reality but through 
the acquisition and assimilation of truth. It has as its final aim not preparation for another reality but access 
to the reality of this world.203
 
 
Notably, Foucault’s above argument is, in effect, endorsed by Daly and Cobb, who in their For 
the Common Good explicitly criticize the otherworldly orientation of various forms of 
Christianity, on the grounds that such an orientation engenders ecological (and often also socio-
political) apathy. That is, they argue, for instance, that “Christian theism has done much to bring 
about the dangerous situation to which the world has come” through, among other things, 
“direct[ing] . . . attention away from the urgent needs of this life.”204
Thirdly, many religions would have to lessen their emphasis on blind obedience, in order 
to engender in their followers an attitude of active (and frequently defiant) engagement with the 
problems of the present. In Christianity, for instance, obedience constitutes an indispensable 
 To sum up, then, 
otherworldliness, (which is certainly not exclusive to Christianity), can be argued to decisively 
impede spiritual practitioners’ concern over what takes place during life on earth. And, 
unfortunately, this orientation may be extremely difficult to curtail, both because it is deeply 
embedded in many religious traditions, and because it is almost ‘ontologically’ indispensable to 
the faithful—not only insofar as belief in an afterlife makes death more of an unpleasant 
transition than a dismal end, but also insofar as individuals who suffer in this life can find solace 
in their belief that their suffering will be done away with in the afterlife. 
                                                 
203 My emphasis. Foucault, “Technologies of the Self,” 35. 
204 My emphasis. Daly and Cobb, For the Common Good, 399. 
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element in religious hierarchy; and the necessity of obedience is even emphasized in one of the 
most important Christian myths: the fall of humankind is attributed, precisely, to the disobedience 
of Adam and Eve. Foucault, in his studies of Christianity, gives particular emphasis to the 
obligation of obedience in this religious tradition—not least because he believes that 
disciplinary/bio-power society ‘inherited’ and intensified a number of Christian concepts and 
techniques in order to produce an ever more docile, prostrate, and infantilized, social body. For 
instance, in “Pastoral Power and Political Reason,” Foucault contends that for the Greeks, 
obedience constituted “a provisional means to an end,”205 in the sense that someone would, say, 
obey the instructions of a physician in order to get better; also, as we saw in Chapter Four, in 
regard of the first/second century C.E. Hellenistic/Roman cultures of the self, students would 
have to obey the philosopher-guide who is more advanced than them in the care of the self, but 
only because the initial mediation of the philosopher-guide would help “to lead the disciple to a 
happy and autonomous life.”206 But in Christianity, obedience operates differently—it is “a 
permanent state; the sheep must permanently submit to their pastors.”207 And even beyond such 
obedience to the priest, the faithful are required to unquestioningly accept as eternally true certain 
writings, to believe in various things because they are told to do so (and then to demonstrate such 
belief), and to submit to numerous other duties without demanding any justification for their 
imposition.208
 A fourth problem inherent in religion today is that of commercialization. On the one hand, 
many traditional religious institutions, such as churches, are run more like businesses than 
religious centers, with ‘donations’ making way for ‘profit,’ and personal counsel making way for 
best-selling texts concerning how to remedy your marital problems, how to raise your children, 
how to excel in the workplace, etcetera. And on the other hand, even newfangled spiritualities 
that put themselves forward as ‘progressive’ alternatives to so-called archaic religions such as 
Christianity, Judaism and Islam, are equally commercialized—that is, more often than not the 
 Such docility does not bode well if mass rebellion against the discursive ‘powers-
that-be’ is what is needed for us to have any chance of securing an ecologically and socially 
sustainable future; in a word, blind obedience constitutes a major hindrance to any attempt at pro-
environmental change, and how one could frame it as a vice rather than a virtue within religious 
praxis remains an all-important question. 
                                                 
205 Michel Foucault, “Pastoral Power and Political Reason” (1979), in Religion and Culture, ed. Jeremy Carrette 
(New York: Routledge, 1999), 142. 
206 My emphasis. Foucault, “Technologies of the Self,” 44. 
207 My emphasis. Foucault, “Pastoral Power and Political Reason,” 142. 
208 Foucault, “Technologies of the Self,” 40. 
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practice of these forms of spirituality involves the purchase of guidebooks, DVDs, home décor 
and other accouterments as much as (or even more than) it involves the fostering of any 
mindfulness through meditation, and so on. In short, the majority of traditional religions, and 
alternative spiritual systems, in virtue of their commercial bent, tend to endorse the technological, 
political and economic ethos of contemporary (disciplinary/bio-power) society, and in so doing 
fail to challenge precisely those discursive dynamics in our society that precipitate both 
individual docility, prostration and infantilization, and broader environmental and social 
problems. Notably, the Foucaultian religious studies scholar, Richard King, attributes the political 
impotence (and consequent commercialization) of traditional forms of religion to the de-
politicization of religion during the Enlightenment; that is, he advances that the lack of discursive 
antagonism on the part of traditional religions today, can be traced back to the eighteenth century 
re-conceptualization of religion as an exclusively spiritual concern that has no place in the realm 
of the political—not even in the capacity of criticism.209 In turn, in Selling Spirituality: The Silent 
Takeover of Religion, King, along with Jeremy Carrette, criticize the fact that new spiritualities 
share this same apolitical orientation with traditional religion. In short, they advance that these 
new spiritualities are ‘packaged’ as products for consumption, and therefore operate squarely 
within the contemporary economic system rather than in a manner opposed to the status quo. And 
such failure, on the part of these new spiritualities, to become politically engaged, has resulted in 
them doing more harm than good—they have come to constitute “the new cultural prozac 
bringing transitory feelings of ecstatic happiness and thoughts of self-affirmation, but never 
addressing sufficiently the underlying problem of social isolation and injustice.”210 From this, it 
is evident that in order to become a viable site for instigating the reorientation of subjectivity en 
masse, in the ultimate interest of engendering pro-environmental civilizational change, religion 
would need to be re-politicized. This would involve it becoming focused upon, and actively 
engaged in addressing, the issue of the (disciplinary/bio-power) production of docile, prostrate 
and infantilized subjects, and the broader problems of social and environmental injustice.211
                                                 
209 Richard King, Orientalism and Religion: Postcolonial Theory, India and ‘the Mystic East’ (London: Routledge, 
2008), 10-11, 13. 
 For 
210 Jeremy Carrette and Richard King, Selling Spirituality: The Silent Takeover of Religion (London: Routledge, 
2008), 77. 
211 In Buddhism and Transgression, Adrian Konik pays particular attention to how the re-politicization of religion—
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the moment, though, it appears as though Harvey Cox could not have been more accurate in 
stating that today, “the danger is that religion could become no more than a service sector to the 
global civilization, no longer shaping its values but merely repairing the spiritual damage it 
inflicts.”212
 Ultimately, within this dissertation, I have made the assumption that in order to facilitate 
pro-environmental civilizational change, it would first be necessary to change individual 
subjectivity itself, precisely because this subjectivity has been produced as docile, prostrate and 
infantilized through the (disciplinary/bio-power) discourses and micro-techniques that pervade 
contemporary society. Accordingly, I have argued that unless individuals are born into (marginal) 
cultures/traditions that promote independence, frugality and environmental care—or unless 
individuals within mainstream society harbor the personal capacity for, and are endowed with 
external conditions conducive to, the uptake of an ethic of existence through which such qualities 
can be fostered—it would be near-impossible to engender ‘environmental revolution’ without 
involving dominant/popular institutions themselves. But engaging dominant/popular institutions, 
such as the media, the school, and religion, in such an endeavor would require a marked 
reorientation of their existing modes of operating, which at present, under the impetus of 
disciplinary/bio-power, effect the constitution of individual subjectivity around docility, 
prostration and infantilization, and buttress the environmentally and socially deleterious 
trajectories of our time. However, if the modi operandi of these institutions could be altered, the 
pro-environmental civilizational change for which Sachs and Princen hope could surely be 
effected. This is because nearly all people have enduring involvement with these institutions, and 
such involvement is crucial if one accepts that the reconstitution of subjectivity, rather than being 
purely conceptual and relatively immediate, requires long-term exposure to alternative 
discourses—exposure which is at once theoretical and practical in nature. 
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